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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 703842 |
Time | |
Date | 200607 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : las.airport |
State Reference | NV |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : pushback |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
ASRS Report | 703842 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : published procedure non adherence : company policies |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Company |
Primary Problem | Company |
Narrative:
Flight deck communication on pushback was non existent. I chose not to push the aircraft via 'hand signals' as there was confusion on behalf of the ground handlers as to signals and communication. The tug driver got out of the tug and plugged the headset into the aircraft jack directly without the extension. Communication was good. He then said he was going to turn it over to his sic for the push. He got back in the tug and the person talking on the headset did not understand the proper pushback language or air carrier procedures. He said ok cleared to push; and I had to release the brakes as there was no understanding from the person on the headset everything to say. The person on the headset did not -- I repeat did not -- understand what I had asked him about the gear pins he mentioned. The tug driver got out of the tug after push and said push complete. I answered cleared to disconnect headset and tow bar go to hand signals. Communication was very poor at best. Preventive measures: better training. A back-up headset. People who read; speak and understand the english language and air carrier procedures. I am not being condescending; I am being serious. This could create a mishap if in the future anything was to go wrong and no one understands what the captain is saying on the ground.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ACR CREW HAS COM DIFFICULTIES WITH PUSHBACK CREW AT LAS.
Narrative: FLT DECK COM ON PUSHBACK WAS NON EXISTENT. I CHOSE NOT TO PUSH THE ACFT VIA 'HAND SIGNALS' AS THERE WAS CONFUSION ON BEHALF OF THE GND HANDLERS AS TO SIGNALS AND COM. THE TUG DRIVER GOT OUT OF THE TUG AND PLUGGED THE HEADSET INTO THE ACFT JACK DIRECTLY WITHOUT THE EXTENSION. COM WAS GOOD. HE THEN SAID HE WAS GOING TO TURN IT OVER TO HIS SIC FOR THE PUSH. HE GOT BACK IN THE TUG AND THE PERSON TALKING ON THE HEADSET DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE PROPER PUSHBACK LANGUAGE OR ACR PROCS. HE SAID OK CLRED TO PUSH; AND I HAD TO RELEASE THE BRAKES AS THERE WAS NO UNDERSTANDING FROM THE PERSON ON THE HEADSET EVERYTHING TO SAY. THE PERSON ON THE HEADSET DID NOT -- I REPEAT DID NOT -- UNDERSTAND WHAT I HAD ASKED HIM ABOUT THE GEAR PINS HE MENTIONED. THE TUG DRIVER GOT OUT OF THE TUG AFTER PUSH AND SAID PUSH COMPLETE. I ANSWERED CLRED TO DISCONNECT HEADSET AND TOW BAR GO TO HAND SIGNALS. COM WAS VERY POOR AT BEST. PREVENTIVE MEASURES: BETTER TRAINING. A BACK-UP HEADSET. PEOPLE WHO READ; SPEAK AND UNDERSTAND THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE AND ACR PROCS. I AM NOT BEING CONDESCENDING; I AM BEING SERIOUS. THIS COULD CREATE A MISHAP IF IN THE FUTURE ANYTHING WAS TO GO WRONG AND NO ONE UNDERSTANDS WHAT THE CAPT IS SAYING ON THE GND.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.