Narrative:

I was working 4 radar sectors combined with a large area of thunderstorm activity through the sectors resulting in excessive coordination and frequency congestion during a period of moderate (13 aircraft) traffic. I issued a course deviation for aircraft Y; BE10 departing gnv; fl; en route to mco; fl; to avoid WX and an altitude of 9000 ft per LOA versus 7000 ft requested on the flight plan. Aircraft X HS125 inbound to gnv; fl; from the south was also issued course deviation for WX then assigned a descent to 8000 ft. I assigned 8000 ft thinking I had assigned 7000 ft to the BE10. The BE10 climbed quickly and was level at 9000 ft within 15 mi east of gnv. Aircraft X descended very slowly; leveled at 10000 ft until about 12 mi from aircraft Y then made a turn toward and descended into aircraft Y resulting in a loss of separation (600 ft versus 1000 ft). Aircraft X was at 8800 ft descending 5 mi from aircraft Y where aircraft Y responded to an RA then climbed up to 9100 ft changed the action then descended resulting in 600 ft separation. I was involved in coordination at the time and was not aware the aircraft were conflicting as the new stars equipment's conflict alert did not sound an alarm. Primary cause: I issued 8000 ft to aircraft X thinking I had assigned 7000 ft to aircraft Y. Frequency congestion and coordination prevented me from doublechking altitude information which I would normally do. Contributing factors: aircraft X did not appear to descend at a standard rate and the response to an RA resulted in the aircraft climbing into aircraft Y without my knowledge until after the aircraft had passed. The FAA's conflict alert equipment did not alarm. Frequency congestion: the reduced strength of the frequencys being used in this large sector requires the use of multiple frequencys as aircraft progress through the sector. You must use multiple frequencys simultaneously or lose radio coverage with the aircraft. Human performance: the FAA began a policy about 1-2 yrs ago to increase productivity (reduce controller's time off position) during a shift. Controllers are working considerably more time on position with less breaks resulting in tired controllers returning from short breaks to work heavy traffic.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: JAX TRACON CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT 9000 FT WHEN CLBING AN ACFT TO AN OCCUPIED ALT.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING 4 RADAR SECTORS COMBINED WITH A LARGE AREA OF TSTM ACTIVITY THROUGH THE SECTORS RESULTING IN EXCESSIVE COORD AND FREQ CONGESTION DURING A PERIOD OF MODERATE (13 ACFT) TFC. I ISSUED A COURSE DEV FOR ACFT Y; BE10 DEPARTING GNV; FL; ENRTE TO MCO; FL; TO AVOID WX AND AN ALT OF 9000 FT PER LOA VERSUS 7000 FT REQUESTED ON THE FLT PLAN. ACFT X HS125 INBOUND TO GNV; FL; FROM THE S WAS ALSO ISSUED COURSE DEV FOR WX THEN ASSIGNED A DSCNT TO 8000 FT. I ASSIGNED 8000 FT THINKING I HAD ASSIGNED 7000 FT TO THE BE10. THE BE10 CLBED QUICKLY AND WAS LEVEL AT 9000 FT WITHIN 15 MI E OF GNV. ACFT X DSNDED VERY SLOWLY; LEVELED AT 10000 FT UNTIL ABOUT 12 MI FROM ACFT Y THEN MADE A TURN TOWARD AND DSNDED INTO ACFT Y RESULTING IN A LOSS OF SEPARATION (600 FT VERSUS 1000 FT). ACFT X WAS AT 8800 FT DSNDING 5 MI FROM ACFT Y WHERE ACFT Y RESPONDED TO AN RA THEN CLBED UP TO 9100 FT CHANGED THE ACTION THEN DSNDED RESULTING IN 600 FT SEPARATION. I WAS INVOLVED IN COORD AT THE TIME AND WAS NOT AWARE THE ACFT WERE CONFLICTING AS THE NEW STARS EQUIP'S CONFLICT ALERT DID NOT SOUND AN ALARM. PRIMARY CAUSE: I ISSUED 8000 FT TO ACFT X THINKING I HAD ASSIGNED 7000 FT TO ACFT Y. FREQ CONGESTION AND COORD PREVENTED ME FROM DOUBLECHKING ALT INFO WHICH I WOULD NORMALLY DO. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: ACFT X DID NOT APPEAR TO DSND AT A STANDARD RATE AND THE RESPONSE TO AN RA RESULTED IN THE ACFT CLBING INTO ACFT Y WITHOUT MY KNOWLEDGE UNTIL AFTER THE ACFT HAD PASSED. THE FAA'S CONFLICT ALERT EQUIP DID NOT ALARM. FREQ CONGESTION: THE REDUCED STRENGTH OF THE FREQS BEING USED IN THIS LARGE SECTOR REQUIRES THE USE OF MULTIPLE FREQS AS ACFT PROGRESS THROUGH THE SECTOR. YOU MUST USE MULTIPLE FREQS SIMULTANEOUSLY OR LOSE RADIO COVERAGE WITH THE ACFT. HUMAN PERFORMANCE: THE FAA BEGAN A POLICY ABOUT 1-2 YRS AGO TO INCREASE PRODUCTIVITY (REDUCE CTLR'S TIME OFF POS) DURING A SHIFT. CTLRS ARE WORKING CONSIDERABLY MORE TIME ON POS WITH LESS BREAKS RESULTING IN TIRED CTLRS RETURNING FROM SHORT BREAKS TO WORK HVY TFC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.