Narrative:

We were being vectored on a right downwind for runway 35R at sdf. Initial clearance was to descend to 4000 ft and then slow to 190 KTS. Upon reaching 4000 ft; and before slowing; clearance was revised to first descend to 3000 ft and then slow to 170 KTS. While descending at about 210 KTS; we were given a right turn to 260 degrees followed quickly by a further turn to 290 degrees along with a descent to 2500 ft. We deployed speed brakes and began to configure the aircraft for landing; but because of our speed and short distance from our downwind leg to runway centerline; it was not possible to intercept final for runway 35R final without overshooting it. While entering the turn it was obvious that we would overshoot runway 35R final by a considerable distance. The captain informed approach control of this with no immediate response. We were then advised of traffic behind us on final for runway 35L. Captain was able to get traffic in sight. Because of our bank angle and location of traffic I was unable to visually identify runway 35L traffic. We received a TA and I disconnected the autoplt. Based on the direction of the captain who had the traffic in sight; I rolled into a steeper turn and was able to get back to the runway 35R centerline outside of the marker. Both the runway 35L aircraft and our aircraft landed on our respective runways without further incident. After talking to the crew of the runway 35L aircraft on the ground; we learned that other aircraft had been cleared for an ILS approach to runway 35L; was on tower frequency; and was unaware of our xmissions indicating that we would fly into his approach path. The only indication from tower to this aircraft was an eventual statement to the effect '...you might want to widen out to the west to avoid traffic.' at no time were we given instructions to avoid other aircraft other than the initial traffic call. Fortunately good VFR conditions existed at the time of incident and both aircraft had each other in sight. Had we been IFR things could have been very ugly. My thoughts on the incident are that the approach controller had a poor understanding of the relationship between the aircraft's turning radius versus its speed. The downwind leg was far too close to the runway and our speed should have been reduced sooner. Since we were flying assigned speeds and headings we were not able to plan an acceptable approach ourselves. Had we been given a visual approach on downwind; we would have slowed sooner and flown a wider downwind. Supplemental information from acn 705397: we were cleared for the instrument approach to runway 35L and established. At 1500 ft and about a 6 mi final we visually acquired another aircraft shooting through the final for runway 35R and into the final for runway 35L. We received a TA and visually maneuvered the aircraft to the left. This resulted in both aircraft coming within 400 ft vertical 1500 ft horizontal. We were on separate approach frequencys so we never heard any xmissions to ATC to question them overshooting. When we checked on with tower and during our TA; tower never seemed concerned other than to say you might want to turn to the left to give the traffic some room.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 ON CLOSE IN DOWNWIND VECTOR FOR RWY 35R AT SDF OVERSHOT TURN AND CONFLICTED WITH TFC INBOUND TO RWY 35L.

Narrative: WE WERE BEING VECTORED ON A R DOWNWIND FOR RWY 35R AT SDF. INITIAL CLRNC WAS TO DSND TO 4000 FT AND THEN SLOW TO 190 KTS. UPON REACHING 4000 FT; AND BEFORE SLOWING; CLRNC WAS REVISED TO FIRST DSND TO 3000 FT AND THEN SLOW TO 170 KTS. WHILE DSNDING AT ABOUT 210 KTS; WE WERE GIVEN A R TURN TO 260 DEGS FOLLOWED QUICKLY BY A FURTHER TURN TO 290 DEGS ALONG WITH A DSCNT TO 2500 FT. WE DEPLOYED SPD BRAKES AND BEGAN TO CONFIGURE THE ACFT FOR LNDG; BUT BECAUSE OF OUR SPD AND SHORT DISTANCE FROM OUR DOWNWIND LEG TO RWY CTRLINE; IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO INTERCEPT FINAL FOR RWY 35R FINAL WITHOUT OVERSHOOTING IT. WHILE ENTERING THE TURN IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT WE WOULD OVERSHOOT RWY 35R FINAL BY A CONSIDERABLE DISTANCE. THE CAPT INFORMED APCH CTL OF THIS WITH NO IMMEDIATE RESPONSE. WE WERE THEN ADVISED OF TFC BEHIND US ON FINAL FOR RWY 35L. CAPT WAS ABLE TO GET TFC IN SIGHT. BECAUSE OF OUR BANK ANGLE AND LOCATION OF TFC I WAS UNABLE TO VISUALLY IDENT RWY 35L TFC. WE RECEIVED A TA AND I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT. BASED ON THE DIRECTION OF THE CAPT WHO HAD THE TFC IN SIGHT; I ROLLED INTO A STEEPER TURN AND WAS ABLE TO GET BACK TO THE RWY 35R CTRLINE OUTSIDE OF THE MARKER. BOTH THE RWY 35L ACFT AND OUR ACFT LANDED ON OUR RESPECTIVE RWYS WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. AFTER TALKING TO THE CREW OF THE RWY 35L ACFT ON THE GND; WE LEARNED THAT OTHER ACFT HAD BEEN CLRED FOR AN ILS APCH TO RWY 35L; WAS ON TWR FREQ; AND WAS UNAWARE OF OUR XMISSIONS INDICATING THAT WE WOULD FLY INTO HIS APCH PATH. THE ONLY INDICATION FROM TWR TO THIS ACFT WAS AN EVENTUAL STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT '...YOU MIGHT WANT TO WIDEN OUT TO THE W TO AVOID TFC.' AT NO TIME WERE WE GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS TO AVOID OTHER ACFT OTHER THAN THE INITIAL TFC CALL. FORTUNATELY GOOD VFR CONDITIONS EXISTED AT THE TIME OF INCIDENT AND BOTH ACFT HAD EACH OTHER IN SIGHT. HAD WE BEEN IFR THINGS COULD HAVE BEEN VERY UGLY. MY THOUGHTS ON THE INCIDENT ARE THAT THE APCH CTLR HAD A POOR UNDERSTANDING OF THE RELATIONSHIP BTWN THE ACFT'S TURNING RADIUS VERSUS ITS SPD. THE DOWNWIND LEG WAS FAR TOO CLOSE TO THE RWY AND OUR SPD SHOULD HAVE BEEN REDUCED SOONER. SINCE WE WERE FLYING ASSIGNED SPDS AND HDGS WE WERE NOT ABLE TO PLAN AN ACCEPTABLE APCH OURSELVES. HAD WE BEEN GIVEN A VISUAL APCH ON DOWNWIND; WE WOULD HAVE SLOWED SOONER AND FLOWN A WIDER DOWNWIND. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 705397: WE WERE CLRED FOR THE INST APCH TO RWY 35L AND ESTABLISHED. AT 1500 FT AND ABOUT A 6 MI FINAL WE VISUALLY ACQUIRED ANOTHER ACFT SHOOTING THROUGH THE FINAL FOR RWY 35R AND INTO THE FINAL FOR RWY 35L. WE RECEIVED A TA AND VISUALLY MANEUVERED THE ACFT TO THE L. THIS RESULTED IN BOTH ACFT COMING WITHIN 400 FT VERT 1500 FT HORIZ. WE WERE ON SEPARATE APCH FREQS SO WE NEVER HEARD ANY XMISSIONS TO ATC TO QUESTION THEM OVERSHOOTING. WHEN WE CHKED ON WITH TWR AND DURING OUR TA; TWR NEVER SEEMED CONCERNED OTHER THAN TO SAY YOU MIGHT WANT TO TURN TO THE L TO GIVE THE TFC SOME ROOM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.