Narrative:

We were cleared from around 10000 ft down to 2500 ft. I had completed the approach check with the exception of two items due to our distance from the airport which were completed at the appropriate time and distance. Jacksonville informed us of the location of the airport and to expect the visual and to let them know when we had savannah in sight. Only a few moments passed when my captain said that runway 9 and what he thought was savannah was in sight. I looked up from the checklists; approach plates; and taxiway diagrams to confirm that he did indeed have the runway in sight. I; too; felt I was looking at savannah's runway 9 and confirmed it. I felt comfortable and safe asking him if he wanted me to cancel our IFR flight plan. He said go ahead and cancel; which I did with the controller and they advised us to change to advisory frequency and squawk VFR. We both changed to the advisory frequency where I made a radio call stating our position. A few seconds later we turned to final. I looked down at the FMS to get our distance so I would give an accurate distance that we were on final. I told them that we were rolling out on a 7 mile final. I looked up at the runway and I thought to myself that it did seem we were about a 4-5 mile final instead of the 7 that the FMS had read. I thought at night things do look closer than normal and didn't feel the need to question a 2-3 mile distance. Just after I made the radio call a king air had called on the advisory frequency stating that it was holding short of runway 9. He said that he was going to wait for us to land before he took off. After that; I looked down on my HSI to confirm if we might have been getting the localizer and the glideslope. We both were getting erroneous indications and I thought that to be expected due to the NOTAM saying the localizer was out of service. We continued the approach and I felt comfortable of our position; height; and lateral distance from the airport. I did point out to my captain that; to me; the runway lights were obviously on their brightest intensity and asked him when we got closer to let me know when he wanted me to turn them down. I finished the before landing check about 5 miles out and my captain confirmed it. 2-3 miles out we got another call from the king air asking us where on final are we. I told them that we are coming up on a 2 mile final. The king air then replied that they did not have us in sight so they would continue to hold short. As we were getting closer I was occasionally glancing up to look for runway 18/36 and the txwys behind it so when we landed I could immediately inform my captain where we needed to turn off. I had no success in locating where runway 18/36 would have been even though the lights were off. I figured it is difficult to just glance up to look for a closed runway at nighttime when you are a couple miles on final. We got a little closer and my captain informed me to lower the intensity of the light in which I had no success. I just figured that it was some type of malfunction with the lights or I wasn't allowing enough time between clicks or too little time. The end result was that I couldn't get the lights to a lower intensity. When we got inside about a mile and a half final I made one last position report. We continued our descent and landing. I was making my usual callouts. We landed; got the nosewheel down and a few seconds later I noticed how significant; at least to me; the upslope was on the runway. I thought to myself that we are going to have to get at least halfway down the runway to get over the slope in order to see the intersecting runway. My captain asked where we needed to turn off and I informed hi that we should be crossing runway 18/36 in another few seconds and that we needed to look for taxiway B after that which is the next intersecting taxiway after we cross the runway. We had no success and we started to come up to the last 2000 ft of the runway. I told my captain that I did not see another taxiway and that we need to turn left on the one coming up and to at least pull off the runway. We passed by it and di a 180 on the runway where I made another advisory to let the king air where and what we were doing at the end of the runway. I received no response and I thought it a little odd but just figured they might have been busy. After we cleared the runway I was in a hurry to let the king air know that we were clear since I was getting no response earlier. We kept taxiing forward at a slow speed where I was also looking outside to help my captain to at least get us going in the direction we needed to so I can do the after landing checklist. We were confused at our location; stopped the aircraft where I just confirmed the after landing check. I looked back out to see a bldg that I know wasn't the one we needed. My captain said that he saw and aircraft in front of us and I confirmed it but it was stopped and we both knew that it wouldn't be a conflict. He turned the aircraft back around to see if we could pick up a taxiway sign or something to let us know where we were at on the airport. We saw a taxiway 2. Then he said to me that we are probably at the wrong airport. He said put a direct to savannah in the FMS to see what our mileage was and it read around 7 miles. That confirmed that we were at the wrong airport. Supplemental information from acn 705794: I was with jacksonville center at 2500 ft and reported I had sav in sight and was cleared for a visual approach to runway 9. At this time I cancelled my IFR and proceeded to the airport for a visual approach and landing. Upon landing I discovered that I had; in error landed at hunter aaf which is 6 mi to the south of sav. I stopped the aircraft and spoke with the security officer who related 'do not worry this happens six to eight times a yr this late.' after calling the tower I was granted permission to take off and continue to sav. I did see the airport beacon and to the best of my knowledge it only flashed one white light.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A C550 FLIGHT CREW LANDED AT SVN WHEN THEY INTENDED TO LAND AT SAV.

Narrative: WE WERE CLRED FROM AROUND 10000 FT DOWN TO 2500 FT. I HAD COMPLETED THE APCH CHK WITH THE EXCEPTION OF TWO ITEMS DUE TO OUR DISTANCE FROM THE ARPT WHICH WERE COMPLETED AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME AND DISTANCE. JACKSONVILLE INFORMED US OF THE LOCATION OF THE ARPT AND TO EXPECT THE VISUAL AND TO LET THEM KNOW WHEN WE HAD SAVANNAH IN SIGHT. ONLY A FEW MOMENTS PASSED WHEN MY CAPT SAID THAT RWY 9 AND WHAT HE THOUGHT WAS SAVANNAH WAS IN SIGHT. I LOOKED UP FROM THE CHKLISTS; APCH PLATES; AND TXWY DIAGRAMS TO CONFIRM THAT HE DID INDEED HAVE THE RWY IN SIGHT. I; TOO; FELT I WAS LOOKING AT SAVANNAH'S RWY 9 AND CONFIRMED IT. I FELT COMFORTABLE AND SAFE ASKING HIM IF HE WANTED ME TO CANCEL OUR IFR FLT PLAN. HE SAID GO AHEAD AND CANCEL; WHICH I DID WITH THE CTLR AND THEY ADVISED US TO CHANGE TO ADVISORY FREQ AND SQUAWK VFR. WE BOTH CHANGED TO THE ADVISORY FREQ WHERE I MADE A RADIO CALL STATING OUR POSITION. A FEW SECONDS LATER WE TURNED TO FINAL. I LOOKED DOWN AT THE FMS TO GET OUR DISTANCE SO I WOULD GIVE AN ACCURATE DISTANCE THAT WE WERE ON FINAL. I TOLD THEM THAT WE WERE ROLLING OUT ON A 7 MILE FINAL. I LOOKED UP AT THE RWY AND I THOUGHT TO MYSELF THAT IT DID SEEM WE WERE ABOUT A 4-5 MILE FINAL INSTEAD OF THE 7 THAT THE FMS HAD READ. I THOUGHT AT NIGHT THINGS DO LOOK CLOSER THAN NORMAL AND DIDN'T FEEL THE NEED TO QUESTION A 2-3 MILE DISTANCE. JUST AFTER I MADE THE RADIO CALL A KING AIR HAD CALLED ON THE ADVISORY FREQ STATING THAT IT WAS HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 9. HE SAID THAT HE WAS GOING TO WAIT FOR US TO LAND BEFORE HE TOOK OFF. AFTER THAT; I LOOKED DOWN ON MY HSI TO CONFIRM IF WE MIGHT HAVE BEEN GETTING THE LOCALIZER AND THE GLIDESLOPE. WE BOTH WERE GETTING ERRONEOUS INDICATIONS AND I THOUGHT THAT TO BE EXPECTED DUE TO THE NOTAM SAYING THE LOCALIZER WAS OUT OF SERVICE. WE CONTINUED THE APCH AND I FELT COMFORTABLE OF OUR POSITION; HEIGHT; AND LATERAL DISTANCE FROM THE ARPT. I DID POINT OUT TO MY CAPT THAT; TO ME; THE RWY LIGHTS WERE OBVIOUSLY ON THEIR BRIGHTEST INTENSITY AND ASKED HIM WHEN WE GOT CLOSER TO LET ME KNOW WHEN HE WANTED ME TO TURN THEM DOWN. I FINISHED THE BEFORE LANDING CHK ABOUT 5 MILES OUT AND MY CAPT CONFIRMED IT. 2-3 MILES OUT WE GOT ANOTHER CALL FROM THE KING AIR ASKING US WHERE ON FINAL ARE WE. I TOLD THEM THAT WE ARE COMING UP ON A 2 MILE FINAL. THE KING AIR THEN REPLIED THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE US IN SIGHT SO THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO HOLD SHORT. AS WE WERE GETTING CLOSER I WAS OCCASIONALLY GLANCING UP TO LOOK FOR RWY 18/36 AND THE TXWYS BEHIND IT SO WHEN WE LANDED I COULD IMMEDIATELY INFORM MY CAPT WHERE WE NEEDED TO TURN OFF. I HAD NO SUCCESS IN LOCATING WHERE RWY 18/36 WOULD HAVE BEEN EVEN THOUGH THE LIGHTS WERE OFF. I FIGURED IT IS DIFFICULT TO JUST GLANCE UP TO LOOK FOR A CLOSED RWY AT NIGHTTIME WHEN YOU ARE A COUPLE MILES ON FINAL. WE GOT A LITTLE CLOSER AND MY CAPT INFORMED ME TO LOWER THE INTENSITY OF THE LIGHT IN WHICH I HAD NO SUCCESS. I JUST FIGURED THAT IT WAS SOME TYPE OF MALFUNCTION WITH THE LIGHTS OR I WASN'T ALLOWING ENOUGH TIME BETWEEN CLICKS OR TOO LITTLE TIME. THE END RESULT WAS THAT I COULDN'T GET THE LIGHTS TO A LOWER INTENSITY. WHEN WE GOT INSIDE ABOUT A MILE AND A HALF FINAL I MADE ONE LAST POSITION REPORT. WE CONTINUED OUR DESCENT AND LNDG. I WAS MAKING MY USUAL CALLOUTS. WE LANDED; GOT THE NOSEWHEEL DOWN AND A FEW SECONDS LATER I NOTICED HOW SIGNIFICANT; AT LEAST TO ME; THE UPSLOPE WAS ON THE RWY. I THOUGHT TO MYSELF THAT WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO GET AT LEAST HALFWAY DOWN THE RWY TO GET OVER THE SLOPE IN ORDER TO SEE THE INTERSECTING RWY. MY CAPT ASKED WHERE WE NEEDED TO TURN OFF AND I INFORMED HI THAT WE SHOULD BE CROSSING RWY 18/36 IN ANOTHER FEW SECONDS AND THAT WE NEEDED TO LOOK FOR TXWY B AFTER THAT WHICH IS THE NEXT INTERSECTING TXWY AFTER WE CROSS THE RWY. WE HAD NO SUCCESS AND WE STARTED TO COME UP TO THE LAST 2000 FT OF THE RWY. I TOLD MY CAPT THAT I DID NOT SEE ANOTHER TXWY AND THAT WE NEED TO TURN LEFT ON THE ONE COMING UP AND TO AT LEAST PULL OFF THE RWY. WE PASSED BY IT AND DI A 180 ON THE RWY WHERE I MADE ANOTHER ADVISORY TO LET THE KING AIR WHERE AND WHAT WE WERE DOING AT THE END OF THE RWY. I RECEIVED NO RESPONSE AND I THOUGHT IT A LITTLE ODD BUT JUST FIGURED THEY MIGHT HAVE BEEN BUSY. AFTER WE CLEARED THE RWY I WAS IN A HURRY TO LET THE KING AIR KNOW THAT WE WERE CLEAR SINCE I WAS GETTING NO RESPONSE EARLIER. WE KEPT TAXIING FORWARD AT A SLOW SPEED WHERE I WAS ALSO LOOKING OUTSIDE TO HELP MY CAPT TO AT LEAST GET US GOING IN THE DIRECTION WE NEEDED TO SO I CAN DO THE AFTER LANDING CHKLIST. WE WERE CONFUSED AT OUR LOCATION; STOPPED THE ACFT WHERE I JUST CONFIRMED THE AFTER LNDG CHK. I LOOKED BACK OUT TO SEE A BLDG THAT I KNOW WASN'T THE ONE WE NEEDED. MY CAPT SAID THAT HE SAW AND ACFT IN FRONT OF US AND I CONFIRMED IT BUT IT WAS STOPPED AND WE BOTH KNEW THAT IT WOULDN'T BE A CONFLICT. HE TURNED THE ACFT BACK AROUND TO SEE IF WE COULD PICK UP A TXWY SIGN OR SOMETHING TO LET US KNOW WHERE WE WERE AT ON THE ARPT. WE SAW A TXWY 2. THEN HE SAID TO ME THAT WE ARE PROBABLY AT THE WRONG AIRPORT. HE SAID PUT A DIRECT TO SAVANNAH IN THE FMS TO SEE WHAT OUR MILEAGE WAS AND IT READ AROUND 7 MILES. THAT CONFIRMED THAT WE WERE AT THE WRONG ARPT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 705794: I WAS WITH JACKSONVILLE CENTER AT 2500 FT AND REPORTED I HAD SAV IN SIGHT AND WAS CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 9. AT THIS TIME I CANCELLED MY IFR AND PROCEEDED TO THE AIRPORT FOR A VISUAL APCH AND LNDG. UPON LANDING I DISCOVERED THAT I HAD; IN ERROR LANDED AT HUNTER AAF WHICH IS 6 MI TO THE S OF SAV. I STOPPED THE ACFT AND SPOKE WITH THE SECURITY OFFICER WHO RELATED 'DO NOT WORRY THIS HAPPENS SIX TO EIGHT TIMES A YR THIS LATE.' AFTER CALLING THE TWR I WAS GRANTED PERMISSION TO TAKE OFF AND CONTINUE TO SAV. I DID SEE THE AIRPORT BEACON AND TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE IT ONLY FLASHED ONE WHITE LIGHT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.