Narrative:

We were launching as a pre-planned spare to relieve a broken aircraft. The aircraft was empty and the captain elected to act as PF. I was PNF. There were no write-ups of note in the maintenance logbook. As we were taxiing out we got an ACARS message requesting a maximum power takeoff. During takeoff roll there was an engine overtemp; spotted by the flight engineer; which the captain had anticipated given the relatively high temperature of 32 degrees celsius and briefed actions to be taken in detail should an overtemp occur. Given the light takeoff weight and the maximum power setting the aircraft was climbing extremely fast; and concern over the engine overtemp and attention to power settings combined with normal radio changes and ATC communications interfered somewhat with normal habit patterns. The captain called for flaps 12 degrees/climb thrust as usual and may have called for flaps up; but if so; I missed it. I did notice that the climb check had not yet been performed as we passed 4000 ft; but the captain was busy discussing what engine temperature had been observed with the flight engineer. The captain called for the climb check at approximately 6000 ft when we were still well below 230 KTS (because we were still in vmo speed mode); at which point I performed the uplatch check; which I normally do upon bringing flaps completely up. We subsequently passed 10000 ft and began accelerating with the flaps still at 12 degrees. I noticed the flap indicator showing flaps at 12 degrees at approximately 14000 ft and 290 KTS. I instantly informed the captain and brought the flaps up. The flaps retracted normally and the slot light went out normally as well. As directed by the captain; the flight engineer informed the company of the engine overtemp and flap overspd by ACARS. Descending; we were informed by ACARS message that maintenance requested we make an air turn-back to ZZZ. Upon configuring for landing at ZZZ; the left main landing gear indicated unsafe. We broke off the approach with ATC and headed west to hold while running the checklist. The captain continued flying while the first officer and I ran the unsafe gear indication checklist in the aom. The checklist directed cycling the gear up then down; after which the gear indicated safe and we returned to the pattern; making an approach and landing. Given the flap overspd; we paid special attention to the flaps as they came down. The flaps extended normally from 0-35 degrees. From flaps 35 degrees to flaps full; a very slight split flap condition occurred for a couple of seconds and then disappeared. We considered making a flaps 35 degree landing; but with the flaps symmetrical full down and no hydraulic problems; the captain elected to leave the flaps full. Landing was uneventful.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DC8 FLT CREW EXCEEDS FLAP RETRACTION SPD DURING CLB.

Narrative: WE WERE LAUNCHING AS A PRE-PLANNED SPARE TO RELIEVE A BROKEN ACFT. THE ACFT WAS EMPTY AND THE CAPT ELECTED TO ACT AS PF. I WAS PNF. THERE WERE NO WRITE-UPS OF NOTE IN THE MAINT LOGBOOK. AS WE WERE TAXIING OUT WE GOT AN ACARS MESSAGE REQUESTING A MAX PWR TKOF. DURING TKOF ROLL THERE WAS AN ENG OVERTEMP; SPOTTED BY THE FLT ENGINEER; WHICH THE CAPT HAD ANTICIPATED GIVEN THE RELATIVELY HIGH TEMP OF 32 DEGS CELSIUS AND BRIEFED ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN DETAIL SHOULD AN OVERTEMP OCCUR. GIVEN THE LIGHT TKOF WT AND THE MAX PWR SETTING THE ACFT WAS CLBING EXTREMELY FAST; AND CONCERN OVER THE ENG OVERTEMP AND ATTN TO PWR SETTINGS COMBINED WITH NORMAL RADIO CHANGES AND ATC COMS INTERFERED SOMEWHAT WITH NORMAL HABIT PATTERNS. THE CAPT CALLED FOR FLAPS 12 DEGS/CLB THRUST AS USUAL AND MAY HAVE CALLED FOR FLAPS UP; BUT IF SO; I MISSED IT. I DID NOTICE THAT THE CLB CHK HAD NOT YET BEEN PERFORMED AS WE PASSED 4000 FT; BUT THE CAPT WAS BUSY DISCUSSING WHAT ENG TEMP HAD BEEN OBSERVED WITH THE FE. THE CAPT CALLED FOR THE CLB CHK AT APPROX 6000 FT WHEN WE WERE STILL WELL BELOW 230 KTS (BECAUSE WE WERE STILL IN VMO SPD MODE); AT WHICH POINT I PERFORMED THE UPLATCH CHK; WHICH I NORMALLY DO UPON BRINGING FLAPS COMPLETELY UP. WE SUBSEQUENTLY PASSED 10000 FT AND BEGAN ACCELERATING WITH THE FLAPS STILL AT 12 DEGS. I NOTICED THE FLAP INDICATOR SHOWING FLAPS AT 12 DEGS AT APPROX 14000 FT AND 290 KTS. I INSTANTLY INFORMED THE CAPT AND BROUGHT THE FLAPS UP. THE FLAPS RETRACTED NORMALLY AND THE SLOT LIGHT WENT OUT NORMALLY AS WELL. AS DIRECTED BY THE CAPT; THE FE INFORMED THE COMPANY OF THE ENG OVERTEMP AND FLAP OVERSPD BY ACARS. DSNDING; WE WERE INFORMED BY ACARS MESSAGE THAT MAINT REQUESTED WE MAKE AN AIR TURN-BACK TO ZZZ. UPON CONFIGURING FOR LNDG AT ZZZ; THE L MAIN LNDG GEAR INDICATED UNSAFE. WE BROKE OFF THE APCH WITH ATC AND HEADED W TO HOLD WHILE RUNNING THE CHKLIST. THE CAPT CONTINUED FLYING WHILE THE FO AND I RAN THE UNSAFE GEAR INDICATION CHKLIST IN THE AOM. THE CHKLIST DIRECTED CYCLING THE GEAR UP THEN DOWN; AFTER WHICH THE GEAR INDICATED SAFE AND WE RETURNED TO THE PATTERN; MAKING AN APCH AND LNDG. GIVEN THE FLAP OVERSPD; WE PAID SPECIAL ATTN TO THE FLAPS AS THEY CAME DOWN. THE FLAPS EXTENDED NORMALLY FROM 0-35 DEGS. FROM FLAPS 35 DEGS TO FLAPS FULL; A VERY SLIGHT SPLIT FLAP CONDITION OCCURRED FOR A COUPLE OF SECONDS AND THEN DISAPPEARED. WE CONSIDERED MAKING A FLAPS 35 DEG LNDG; BUT WITH THE FLAPS SYMMETRICAL FULL DOWN AND NO HYD PROBS; THE CAPT ELECTED TO LEAVE THE FLAPS FULL. LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.