Narrative:

As we were approaching rwi; I picked up the current WX from the rwi ASOS; per our company's SOP. The ASOS indicated that the WX was VFR; but I suggested to my first officer that we conduct an instrument approach due to the fact that the flight conditions appeared worse than the ASOS was reporting. The center controller asked us what type of approach we wanted; and I requested radar vectors to the ILS runway 04. The controller provided us vectors; followed by an approach clearance. We had previously tuned and identified the localizer; and proceeded to join the localizer course. Shortly after glideslope intercept; the controller called and cancelled our approach clearance. She instructed us to climb to 3000 ft and proceeded to tell us that the ILS had just been notamed out of service. She then asked us what approach we would like and I requested the GPS runway 04. She told us that she had to get her chart out and review it; and asked what transition we would like to use to fly the approach. Before I could reply; she cleared us directly to fenim for the GPS runway 04 approach (at this point she had not issued an approach clearance). I looked at both the chart and the FMS; and fenim was not listed as a transition. I did see fenag listed; and assumed that I must not have heard her properly. I proceeded to verify the fix; and she again said what sounded like fenim. I was still not satisfied that we were talking about the same fix; so I again asked for verification and spelled fenag phonetically. The controller replied; 'affirmative; cleared for approach.' she did not read back the fix; or specify the runway. At the same time I was busy trying to load the approach in the FMS; and brief the first officer on the new approach. As I completed these tasks; I studied the approach plate again; and noticed that fenim was the missed approach fix for the GPS runway 04; and an IAF for the GPS runway 22. I now really doubted that the controller had given us a clearance for the GPS runway 04; so I queried her again; this time being very careful to clarify that we had requested the GPS runway 04 approach; and not the GPS runway 22. She impatiently snapped back at us obviously frustrated that we kept asking for clarification of our clearance. After a pause she finally cleared us directly to fenag and issued and approach clearance for the GPS runway 04. We flew the approach and landed without further confusion. Looking back; there were a number of places where the system broke down. 1) we were broken off from our first approach; at a very late point in the procedure. 2) I did not mention this in my narrative; but there was another aircraft behind us awaiting an approach to rwi. The controller was pushing us to hurry; and seemed very impatient. I understand that the system needs to keep moving; but she placed us in a very high workload situation; and as the PIC; it is my responsibility to slow things down so that mistakes are not made. I believe that her hurrying led to her not paying attention to my requests to clarify our clearance. If she had listened to my earlier queries; and answered them more concisely; we could have sorted out this miscommunication much sooner. I was especially disturbed by her ambiguous reply to my second query; when I spelled out fenag. Her reply neither verified that we were talking about the same waypoint or even the same approach procedure. Instead she issued an approach clearance that did not specify the approach procedure we were cleared for. She left me no choice but to inquire again; at which point she became audibly annoyed by our repeated desire to clarify our clearance. For this issue; I suggest that controllers and pilots slow down when necessary. I know that we all get busy; but hurrying leads to people being hurt or killed. Sometimes it pays to slow down. Proper training of both pilots and controllers can help to instill this good habit. 3) there are two IAF fixes at the same airport; but on different approach procedures; that sound very similar on the radio (especially when there is background noise in the transmission). Fenim and fenag sound very much alike; and I would suspect that there will be confusion regarding these two fixes again someday. Here the solution is easy. One of thesefixes at rwi should be renamed. I do not know if the issue of similar sounding fixes at the same airport is considered during the process of designing an approach. If this is not something that is considered; I would suggest that this consideration be added to the approach design process. I have never made this request before; but I would really like to speak with a safety analyst regarding this report. I feel that this is one of the most serious safety deficiencies I have ever experienced in an aircraft. With all the emphasis that is currently placed on approach and landing accident reduction; I hope that my report can be shared so that other crews don't get led into the same trap that we almost were led into. If this situation had taken place in mountainous terrain; I might not have lived to tell this story.callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that ZDC was controling and after being cleared for the ILS approach and having configured the aircraft for the approach; the controller determined that the ILS had become notamed out of service. A missed approach was initiated and the controller requested of the reporter; 'what approach would you like?' they determined that with the ceiling/visibility (600/3) that the RNAV (GPS) runway 4 would be suitable. The controller cleared the aircraft to the fenim IAF. The reporter stated that he checked the approach chart and the FMS could not and could not find the fix. After several attempts to verify the fix; it was determined that the correct fix was fenag IAF not fenim which was the IAF for the RNAV (GPS) runway 22 approach. The reporter indicated that he thought the controller was working several frequencys and that another aircraft was following them into the airport. This seemed to increase the workload along with the similar sounding fixes; causing more confusion than he felt was necessary. He indicated that the controller was a 'bit testy' after he requested verification of the fix along with the phonetic spelling. The reporter felt that the controller's attitude did not help the situation. The reporter feels that the spelling of the fixes should be changed to preclude such an incident from recurring and indicated that he was uncomfortable during the sequence of events that took place and felt it was a safety of flight issue.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DORNIER 328 FLT CREW HAS DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING CTLR AND PRONUNCIATION OF THE IAF AT RWI.

Narrative: AS WE WERE APCHING RWI; I PICKED UP THE CURRENT WX FROM THE RWI ASOS; PER OUR COMPANY'S SOP. THE ASOS INDICATED THAT THE WX WAS VFR; BUT I SUGGESTED TO MY FO THAT WE CONDUCT AN INSTRUMENT APCH DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE FLT CONDITIONS APPEARED WORSE THAN THE ASOS WAS REPORTING. THE CTR CTLR ASKED US WHAT TYPE OF APCH WE WANTED; AND I REQUESTED RADAR VECTORS TO THE ILS RWY 04. THE CTLR PROVIDED US VECTORS; FOLLOWED BY AN APCH CLRNC. WE HAD PREVIOUSLY TUNED AND IDENTIFIED THE LOCALIZER; AND PROCEEDED TO JOIN THE LOCALIZER COURSE. SHORTLY AFTER GLIDESLOPE INTERCEPT; THE CTLR CALLED AND CANCELLED OUR APCH CLRNC. SHE INSTRUCTED US TO CLB TO 3000 FT AND PROCEEDED TO TELL US THAT THE ILS HAD JUST BEEN NOTAMED OUT OF SVC. SHE THEN ASKED US WHAT APCH WE WOULD LIKE AND I REQUESTED THE GPS RWY 04. SHE TOLD US THAT SHE HAD TO GET HER CHART OUT AND REVIEW IT; AND ASKED WHAT TRANSITION WE WOULD LIKE TO USE TO FLY THE APCH. BEFORE I COULD REPLY; SHE CLRED US DIRECTLY TO FENIM FOR THE GPS RWY 04 APCH (AT THIS POINT SHE HAD NOT ISSUED AN APCH CLRNC). I LOOKED AT BOTH THE CHART AND THE FMS; AND FENIM WAS NOT LISTED AS A TRANSITION. I DID SEE FENAG LISTED; AND ASSUMED THAT I MUST NOT HAVE HEARD HER PROPERLY. I PROCEEDED TO VERIFY THE FIX; AND SHE AGAIN SAID WHAT SOUNDED LIKE FENIM. I WAS STILL NOT SATISFIED THAT WE WERE TALKING ABOUT THE SAME FIX; SO I AGAIN ASKED FOR VERIFICATION AND SPELLED FENAG PHONETICALLY. THE CTLR REPLIED; 'AFFIRMATIVE; CLRED FOR APCH.' SHE DID NOT READ BACK THE FIX; OR SPECIFY THE RWY. AT THE SAME TIME I WAS BUSY TRYING TO LOAD THE APCH IN THE FMS; AND BRIEF THE FO ON THE NEW APCH. AS I COMPLETED THESE TASKS; I STUDIED THE APCH PLATE AGAIN; AND NOTICED THAT FENIM WAS THE MISSED APCH FIX FOR THE GPS RWY 04; AND AN IAF FOR THE GPS RWY 22. I NOW REALLY DOUBTED THAT THE CTLR HAD GIVEN US A CLRNC FOR THE GPS RWY 04; SO I QUERIED HER AGAIN; THIS TIME BEING VERY CAREFUL TO CLARIFY THAT WE HAD REQUESTED THE GPS RWY 04 APCH; AND NOT THE GPS RWY 22. SHE IMPATIENTLY SNAPPED BACK AT US OBVIOUSLY FRUSTRATED THAT WE KEPT ASKING FOR CLARIFICATION OF OUR CLRNC. AFTER A PAUSE SHE FINALLY CLRED US DIRECTLY TO FENAG AND ISSUED AND APCH CLRNC FOR THE GPS RWY 04. WE FLEW THE APCH AND LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER CONFUSION. LOOKING BACK; THERE WERE A NUMBER OF PLACES WHERE THE SYSTEM BROKE DOWN. 1) WE WERE BROKEN OFF FROM OUR FIRST APCH; AT A VERY LATE POINT IN THE PROC. 2) I DID NOT MENTION THIS IN MY NARRATIVE; BUT THERE WAS ANOTHER ACFT BEHIND US AWAITING AN APCH TO RWI. THE CTLR WAS PUSHING US TO HURRY; AND SEEMED VERY IMPATIENT. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE SYSTEM NEEDS TO KEEP MOVING; BUT SHE PLACED US IN A VERY HIGH WORKLOAD SITUATION; AND AS THE PIC; IT IS MY RESPONSIBILITY TO SLOW THINGS DOWN SO THAT MISTAKES ARE NOT MADE. I BELIEVE THAT HER HURRYING LED TO HER NOT PAYING ATTENTION TO MY REQUESTS TO CLARIFY OUR CLRNC. IF SHE HAD LISTENED TO MY EARLIER QUERIES; AND ANSWERED THEM MORE CONCISELY; WE COULD HAVE SORTED OUT THIS MISCOMMUNICATION MUCH SOONER. I WAS ESPECIALLY DISTURBED BY HER AMBIGUOUS REPLY TO MY SECOND QUERY; WHEN I SPELLED OUT FENAG. HER REPLY NEITHER VERIFIED THAT WE WERE TALKING ABOUT THE SAME WAYPOINT OR EVEN THE SAME APCH PROC. INSTEAD SHE ISSUED AN APCH CLRNC THAT DID NOT SPECIFY THE APCH PROC WE WERE CLRED FOR. SHE LEFT ME NO CHOICE BUT TO INQUIRE AGAIN; AT WHICH POINT SHE BECAME AUDIBLY ANNOYED BY OUR REPEATED DESIRE TO CLARIFY OUR CLRNC. FOR THIS ISSUE; I SUGGEST THAT CTLRS AND PLTS SLOW DOWN WHEN NECESSARY. I KNOW THAT WE ALL GET BUSY; BUT HURRYING LEADS TO PEOPLE BEING HURT OR KILLED. SOMETIMES IT PAYS TO SLOW DOWN. PROPER TRAINING OF BOTH PLTS AND CTLRS CAN HELP TO INSTILL THIS GOOD HABIT. 3) THERE ARE TWO IAF FIXES AT THE SAME ARPT; BUT ON DIFFERENT APCH PROCS; THAT SOUND VERY SIMILAR ON THE RADIO (ESPECIALLY WHEN THERE IS BACKGROUND NOISE IN THE XMISSION). FENIM AND FENAG SOUND VERY MUCH ALIKE; AND I WOULD SUSPECT THAT THERE WILL BE CONFUSION REGARDING THESE TWO FIXES AGAIN SOMEDAY. HERE THE SOLUTION IS EASY. ONE OF THESEFIXES AT RWI SHOULD BE RENAMED. I DO NOT KNOW IF THE ISSUE OF SIMILAR SOUNDING FIXES AT THE SAME ARPT IS CONSIDERED DURING THE PROCESS OF DESIGNING AN APCH. IF THIS IS NOT SOMETHING THAT IS CONSIDERED; I WOULD SUGGEST THAT THIS CONSIDERATION BE ADDED TO THE APCH DESIGN PROCESS. I HAVE NEVER MADE THIS REQUEST BEFORE; BUT I WOULD REALLY LIKE TO SPEAK WITH A SAFETY ANALYST REGARDING THIS RPT. I FEEL THAT THIS IS ONE OF THE MOST SERIOUS SAFETY DEFICIENCIES I HAVE EVER EXPERIENCED IN AN ACFT. WITH ALL THE EMPHASIS THAT IS CURRENTLY PLACED ON APCH AND LNDG ACCIDENT REDUCTION; I HOPE THAT MY RPT CAN BE SHARED SO THAT OTHER CREWS DON'T GET LED INTO THE SAME TRAP THAT WE ALMOST WERE LED INTO. IF THIS SITUATION HAD TAKEN PLACE IN MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN; I MIGHT NOT HAVE LIVED TO TELL THIS STORY.CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT ZDC WAS CTLING AND AFTER BEING CLRED FOR THE ILS APCH AND HAVING CONFIGURED THE ACFT FOR THE APCH; THE CTLR DETERMINED THAT THE ILS HAD BECOME NOTAMED OUT OF SVC. A MISSED APCH WAS INITIATED AND THE CTLR REQUESTED OF THE RPTR; 'WHAT APCH WOULD YOU LIKE?' THEY DETERMINED THAT WITH THE CEILING/VISIBILITY (600/3) THAT THE RNAV (GPS) RWY 4 WOULD BE SUITABLE. THE CTLR CLEARED THE ACFT TO THE FENIM IAF. THE RPTR STATED THAT HE CHKED THE APCH CHART AND THE FMS COULD NOT AND COULD NOT FIND THE FIX. AFTER SEVERAL ATTEMPTS TO VERIFY THE FIX; IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE CORRECT FIX WAS FENAG IAF NOT FENIM WHICH WAS THE IAF FOR THE RNAV (GPS) RWY 22 APCH. THE RPTR INDICATED THAT HE THOUGHT THE CTLR WAS WORKING SEVERAL FREQS AND THAT ANOTHER ACFT WAS FOLLOWING THEM INTO THE ARPT. THIS SEEMED TO INCREASE THE WORKLOAD ALONG WITH THE SIMILAR SOUNDING FIXES; CAUSING MORE CONFUSION THAN HE FELT WAS NECESSARY. HE INDICATED THAT THE CTLR WAS A 'BIT TESTY' AFTER HE REQUESTED VERIFICATION OF THE FIX ALONG WITH THE PHONETIC SPELLING. THE RPTR FELT THAT THE CTLR'S ATTITUDE DID NOT HELP THE SITUATION. THE RPTR FEELS THAT THE SPELLING OF THE FIXES SHOULD BE CHANGED TO PRECLUDE SUCH AN INCIDENT FROM RECURRING AND INDICATED THAT HE WAS UNCOMFORTABLE DURING THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT TOOK PLACE AND FELT IT WAS A SAFETY OF FLT ISSUE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.