37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 708118 |
Time | |
Date | 200608 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : lgb.airport |
State Reference | CA |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time total : 15 flight time type : 6000 |
ASRS Report | 708118 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Events | |
Anomaly | other anomaly other anomaly |
Independent Detector | other other : 3 |
Resolutory Action | aircraft : evacuated |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Aircraft |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Narrative:
Shortly after a normal landing; the first officer and I heard what we perceived to be circuit breakers opening. These sounds were quickly followed by many chimes in the cabin I believe to have emanated from passenger using the flight attendant call buttons on their passenger service units. The cabin chimes were quickly followed by emergency interphone call chimes from the 'a' flight attendant notifying the flight deck of electrical smelling smoke filling the passenger cabin. I brought the aircraft to a stop set the parking brake and after considering security and concluding it not a risk decided to open the flight deck door to assess the situation. The first officer and I agreed an evacuate/evacuation was necessary and notified ATC. The after landing checklist was discontinued and the engines and APU were shut down. I directed an evacuate/evacuation be initiated on the interphone with the 'a' flight attendant and repeated the order over the PA system. The evacuate/evacuation checklist was completed with the exception of lowering the flaps due to the quick egress of some using the overwing exits and their proximity to moving parts. The R1; L1; all over wing and the tail cone exits were utilized. After the aircraft was evacuate/evacuationed; assistance was requested and the required notifications made via personal cell phone as the crew continued their duties outside the aircraft until help arrived and all passenger were bussed to the terminal. After the aircraft logbook entries completed and the airplane secured; the crew debriefed amd was released. The crew; station personnel; critical incident response team; dispatch; maintenance control; and first on the scene the 2 pilots waiting for the plane performed well individually and as a team and the quality of our training was evident. I think a more positive shift in command; or a formal action taken to relieve the crew of duties related to passenger care. The cabin crew should not be expected to perform duties like loading passenger onto busses leaving the scene.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: MD80 FLT CREW HAS SMOKE FUMES AFTER LNDG; NOTIFIES CTLR; STOPS ACFT AND EVACS.
Narrative: SHORTLY AFTER A NORMAL LNDG; THE FO AND I HEARD WHAT WE PERCEIVED TO BE CIRCUIT BREAKERS OPENING. THESE SOUNDS WERE QUICKLY FOLLOWED BY MANY CHIMES IN THE CABIN I BELIEVE TO HAVE EMANATED FROM PAX USING THE FLT ATTENDANT CALL BUTTONS ON THEIR PAX SVC UNITS. THE CABIN CHIMES WERE QUICKLY FOLLOWED BY EMER INTERPHONE CALL CHIMES FROM THE 'A' FLT ATTENDANT NOTIFYING THE FLT DECK OF ELECTRICAL SMELLING SMOKE FILLING THE PAX CABIN. I BROUGHT THE ACFT TO A STOP SET THE PARKING BRAKE AND AFTER CONSIDERING SECURITY AND CONCLUDING IT NOT A RISK DECIDED TO OPEN THE FLT DECK DOOR TO ASSESS THE SIT. THE FO AND I AGREED AN EVAC WAS NECESSARY AND NOTIFIED ATC. THE AFTER LNDG CHKLIST WAS DISCONTINUED AND THE ENGS AND APU WERE SHUT DOWN. I DIRECTED AN EVAC BE INITIATED ON THE INTERPHONE WITH THE 'A' FLT ATTENDANT AND REPEATED THE ORDER OVER THE PA SYS. THE EVAC CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED WITH THE EXCEPTION OF LOWERING THE FLAPS DUE TO THE QUICK EGRESS OF SOME USING THE OVERWING EXITS AND THEIR PROX TO MOVING PARTS. THE R1; L1; ALL OVER WING AND THE TAIL CONE EXITS WERE UTILIZED. AFTER THE ACFT WAS EVACED; ASSISTANCE WAS REQUESTED AND THE REQUIRED NOTIFICATIONS MADE VIA PERSONAL CELL PHONE AS THE CREW CONTINUED THEIR DUTIES OUTSIDE THE ACFT UNTIL HELP ARRIVED AND ALL PAX WERE BUSSED TO THE TERMINAL. AFTER THE ACFT LOGBOOK ENTRIES COMPLETED AND THE AIRPLANE SECURED; THE CREW DEBRIEFED AMD WAS RELEASED. THE CREW; STATION PERSONNEL; CRITICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE TEAM; DISPATCH; MAINT CTL; AND FIRST ON THE SCENE THE 2 PLTS WAITING FOR THE PLANE PERFORMED WELL INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A TEAM AND THE QUALITY OF OUR TRAINING WAS EVIDENT. I THINK A MORE POSITIVE SHIFT IN COMMAND; OR A FORMAL ACTION TAKEN TO RELIEVE THE CREW OF DUTIES RELATED TO PAX CARE. THE CABIN CREW SHOULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO PERFORM DUTIES LIKE LOADING PAX ONTO BUSSES LEAVING THE SCENE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.