Narrative:

Air carrier seems to change policies on a weekly if not daily basis. The latest policy is; as most of them are; poorly thought out and haphazardly implemented. Typically this company makes decisions based on incomplete data and corporate politics instead of sound operating practices. In the past this could sometimes be ignored but this new 'fuel management' program is a real and growing safety hazard. The fuel management program has only been in place for a few weeks but in that time I have noticed numerous cases of planned landing fuel that is simply not reasonable. Having flown these rtes for several yrs; we can anticipate time and WX dependent delays. Unfortunately; the fuel planners/dispatchers seem to make decisions that are questionable at best. If this continues; and it more than likely will unless they are forced to change; there will be an increasing number of diversions and/or requests for priority handling due to low fuel. To minimize required fuel load creative interpretation is used liberally on many planning factors and operational requirements. These include but are not limited to the following: 1) planning departures in desired direction of travel; regardless of WX at departure airport or preferred runway. 2) cruise based on optimal altitudes only when data exists that indicate they may not be available due to peak traffic or WX: flight plan fuel burn adjustment for lower altitudes indicate insufficient fuel. 3) elimination of the alternate at re-dispatch point due to inadequate fuel based on a favorable forecast without regard to micro-climates. This is relevant at several airports; and company services. The marine layer can and often does drift over the airport resulting in minimums WX in a very short time. While this is well known; not having any alternate fuel is just bad policy. 4) frequent climb and speed restrs on departure from busy airports during peak times. 5) not allowing for en route diversions around cumulo nimbus/rertes (rertes are not a big factor on scheduled service) this will become a bigger issue when we start flying more charters. 6) creative user of performance data -- the drag index in the FMC has been changed from 3-4% to zero resulting in overly optimistic FMC estimated fuel burn. This is just 1 facet of a trend that significantly reduces the safety margin. During the last month I have been selectively lied to by maintenance on a serious bleed incident; coerced into violation of part 121.485 by crew scheduling; and now face load planning that eliminates all contingency fuel. Combined with a schedule that makes life as difficult and fatiguing as possible and a hostile management; it's a matter of when -- not if -- an incident will occur. Below is the latest fuel incident; while probably legal; is a shining example of bad policy in action. Low fuel arrival lax. Total fuel: 303160 pounds ramp. Planned burn: 277;934.8. Planned landing fuel: 23;100 pounds. Actual landing fuel: 17;820 pounds. Block fuel: 16;940 pounds. Actual burn: 286;220 pounds. Operational notes: unable to obtain FL290 from icn initially due to conflicting traffic; chose FL270 instead. Many flts diverge over japan in the first hour or so of flight allowing climb; so instead of delaying the flight. Able to climb to FL290 just prior to cvc; on time and about .2 over-burn at cvc. Climbed to FL310 in accordance with the flight plan; step climbed to 'ing' to FL330; later climbed to FL350 (170W)due to over-burn and marginal rdp fuel. Continued to lose ground on both time and fuel burn. Computer showed continually decreasing fuel at rdp (48n140w). Advised dispatch. HF data and voice communication were poor during most of the flight. Flight planned minimum fuel required at 140W was 75;900 pounds. Received rdp is as follows: 48n140w to lax via flight planned route alternate ont; FL350/FL370 west/C P014. Burn 52;800 pounds; reserve 22;200 pounds; minimum fuel required 75;000 pounds. Actual fuel at rdp was 75;000 pounds; continued to lax. Revised dispatch rdp numbers area as follows: received after rdp (49n140w). Burn 52;800 pounds; reserve 21;780 pounds; minimum fuel required 74;580 pounds. Advised that we could eliminate the alternate and land with 15;400 pounds. Estimated fuel burn was overly optimistic for several reasons: the drag index has been set to zero for improved flexibility allowing creative interpretation of data: we were arriving at a busy time just before peak and speed restrs and vectors were likely. And finally; while WX was good and forecast to remain so; coastal fog often drifts into the airport and visibility can go to minimums in a few mins. In fact; this did happen in a very short time and we had near minimums WX for runway 24R arrival. To further complicate the issue; we had a fuel system MEL. Xfeed valves #1 and #4 are wired open with the following results; fuel from #1 and #4 mains migrates to #2 and #3 main tanks when tank to engine which occurs at approximately 112;200 pounds remaining. This is easily balanced with override pumps until 2 and 3 main tanks reach the stand pipe level of 7000 pounds; then the outboard pumps have to be shut down to allow burning of inboard fuel; a procedure I chose not to attempt on approach. This resulted in approximately 2;640 pounds and 2;860 pounds in #1 and #4 an 5;704 pounds and 6;160 pounds in #2 and #3 mains respectively; near the FAF. Xfeed valves #2 and #3 were manually opened before final approach in accordance with QRH. There were not many options at this point. If we had to miss; fuel in #1 and #4 would have been depleted during the go around: this should work but it's not a good position to be in. The alternate; ont; had a planned burn of 7700 pounds more realistically it would be 8;800-9;900 pounds; we landed with 17;820 pounds. If a go around had been required; priority handing or an emergency would have been declared. Performance data appears to be inaccurate. All options were used to be as efficient as possible yet we were unable to match flight planned fuel burn. When this can be corrected by adding a 4;400-8;800 pounds it often is. In cases like this where we are structurally limited; the payload needs to be reduced to allow for adequate fuel. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that his original release airport was sea and the re-release at 48n140w was for lax. Given the fuel usage; the predicted WX at lax; and other factors; the reporter now feels that there was insufficient fuel to cover all contingencies that should have been considered. There is also a question about whether the 10% required by far 121.647(B)(2) is from the re-release point or for the entire flight duration.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767-400 PLT RPTS HIS ACR'S PRACTICE OF UNDER FUELING OCEANIC DISPATCHED ACFT BY NOT CONSIDERING ALL RELEVANT FACTORS DURING DISPATCH RELEASE.

Narrative: ACR SEEMS TO CHANGE POLICIES ON A WEEKLY IF NOT DAILY BASIS. THE LATEST POLICY IS; AS MOST OF THEM ARE; POORLY THOUGHT OUT AND HAPHAZARDLY IMPLEMENTED. TYPICALLY THIS COMPANY MAKES DECISIONS BASED ON INCOMPLETE DATA AND CORPORATE POLITICS INSTEAD OF SOUND OPERATING PRACTICES. IN THE PAST THIS COULD SOMETIMES BE IGNORED BUT THIS NEW 'FUEL MGMNT' PROGRAM IS A REAL AND GROWING SAFETY HAZARD. THE FUEL MGMNT PROGRAM HAS ONLY BEEN IN PLACE FOR A FEW WKS BUT IN THAT TIME I HAVE NOTICED NUMEROUS CASES OF PLANNED LNDG FUEL THAT IS SIMPLY NOT REASONABLE. HAVING FLOWN THESE RTES FOR SEVERAL YRS; WE CAN ANTICIPATE TIME AND WX DEPENDENT DELAYS. UNFORTUNATELY; THE FUEL PLANNERS/DISPATCHERS SEEM TO MAKE DECISIONS THAT ARE QUESTIONABLE AT BEST. IF THIS CONTINUES; AND IT MORE THAN LIKELY WILL UNLESS THEY ARE FORCED TO CHANGE; THERE WILL BE AN INCREASING NUMBER OF DIVERSIONS AND/OR REQUESTS FOR PRIORITY HANDLING DUE TO LOW FUEL. TO MINIMIZE REQUIRED FUEL LOAD CREATIVE INTERP IS USED LIBERALLY ON MANY PLANNING FACTORS AND OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS. THESE INCLUDE BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING: 1) PLANNING DEPS IN DESIRED DIRECTION OF TRAVEL; REGARDLESS OF WX AT DEP ARPT OR PREFERRED RWY. 2) CRUISE BASED ON OPTIMAL ALTS ONLY WHEN DATA EXISTS THAT INDICATE THEY MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE DUE TO PEAK TFC OR WX: FLT PLAN FUEL BURN ADJUSTMENT FOR LOWER ALTS INDICATE INSUFFICIENT FUEL. 3) ELIMINATION OF THE ALTERNATE AT RE-DISPATCH POINT DUE TO INADEQUATE FUEL BASED ON A FAVORABLE FORECAST WITHOUT REGARD TO MICRO-CLIMATES. THIS IS RELEVANT AT SEVERAL ARPTS; AND COMPANY SERVICES. THE MARINE LAYER CAN AND OFTEN DOES DRIFT OVER THE ARPT RESULTING IN MINIMUMS WX IN A VERY SHORT TIME. WHILE THIS IS WELL KNOWN; NOT HAVING ANY ALTERNATE FUEL IS JUST BAD POLICY. 4) FREQUENT CLB AND SPD RESTRS ON DEP FROM BUSY ARPTS DURING PEAK TIMES. 5) NOT ALLOWING FOR ENRTE DIVERSIONS AROUND CUMULO NIMBUS/RERTES (RERTES ARE NOT A BIG FACTOR ON SCHEDULED SVC) THIS WILL BECOME A BIGGER ISSUE WHEN WE START FLYING MORE CHARTERS. 6) CREATIVE USER OF PERFORMANCE DATA -- THE DRAG INDEX IN THE FMC HAS BEEN CHANGED FROM 3-4% TO ZERO RESULTING IN OVERLY OPTIMISTIC FMC ESTIMATED FUEL BURN. THIS IS JUST 1 FACET OF A TREND THAT SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCES THE SAFETY MARGIN. DURING THE LAST MONTH I HAVE BEEN SELECTIVELY LIED TO BY MAINT ON A SERIOUS BLEED INCIDENT; COERCED INTO VIOLATION OF PART 121.485 BY CREW SCHEDULING; AND NOW FACE LOAD PLANNING THAT ELIMINATES ALL CONTINGENCY FUEL. COMBINED WITH A SCHEDULE THAT MAKES LIFE AS DIFFICULT AND FATIGUING AS POSSIBLE AND A HOSTILE MGMNT; IT'S A MATTER OF WHEN -- NOT IF -- AN INCIDENT WILL OCCUR. BELOW IS THE LATEST FUEL INCIDENT; WHILE PROBABLY LEGAL; IS A SHINING EXAMPLE OF BAD POLICY IN ACTION. LOW FUEL ARR LAX. TOTAL FUEL: 303160 LBS RAMP. PLANNED BURN: 277;934.8. PLANNED LNDG FUEL: 23;100 LBS. ACTUAL LNDG FUEL: 17;820 LBS. BLOCK FUEL: 16;940 LBS. ACTUAL BURN: 286;220 LBS. OPERATIONAL NOTES: UNABLE TO OBTAIN FL290 FROM ICN INITIALLY DUE TO CONFLICTING TFC; CHOSE FL270 INSTEAD. MANY FLTS DIVERGE OVER JAPAN IN THE FIRST HR OR SO OF FLT ALLOWING CLB; SO INSTEAD OF DELAYING THE FLT. ABLE TO CLB TO FL290 JUST PRIOR TO CVC; ON TIME AND ABOUT .2 OVER-BURN AT CVC. CLBED TO FL310 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLT PLAN; STEP CLBED TO 'ING' TO FL330; LATER CLBED TO FL350 (170W)DUE TO OVER-BURN AND MARGINAL RDP FUEL. CONTINUED TO LOSE GND ON BOTH TIME AND FUEL BURN. COMPUTER SHOWED CONTINUALLY DECREASING FUEL AT RDP (48N140W). ADVISED DISPATCH. HF DATA AND VOICE COM WERE POOR DURING MOST OF THE FLT. FLT PLANNED MINIMUM FUEL REQUIRED AT 140W WAS 75;900 LBS. RECEIVED RDP IS AS FOLLOWS: 48N140W TO LAX VIA FLT PLANNED RTE ALTERNATE ONT; FL350/FL370 W/C P014. BURN 52;800 LBS; RESERVE 22;200 LBS; MINIMUM FUEL REQUIRED 75;000 LBS. ACTUAL FUEL AT RDP WAS 75;000 LBS; CONTINUED TO LAX. REVISED DISPATCH RDP NUMBERS AREA AS FOLLOWS: RECEIVED AFTER RDP (49N140W). BURN 52;800 LBS; RESERVE 21;780 LBS; MINIMUM FUEL REQUIRED 74;580 LBS. ADVISED THAT WE COULD ELIMINATE THE ALTERNATE AND LAND WITH 15;400 LBS. ESTIMATED FUEL BURN WAS OVERLY OPTIMISTIC FOR SEVERAL REASONS: THE DRAG INDEX HAS BEEN SET TO ZERO FOR IMPROVED FLEXIBILITY ALLOWING CREATIVE INTERP OF DATA: WE WERE ARRIVING AT A BUSY TIME JUST BEFORE PEAK AND SPD RESTRS AND VECTORS WERE LIKELY. AND FINALLY; WHILE WX WAS GOOD AND FORECAST TO REMAIN SO; COASTAL FOG OFTEN DRIFTS INTO THE ARPT AND VISIBILITY CAN GO TO MINIMUMS IN A FEW MINS. IN FACT; THIS DID HAPPEN IN A VERY SHORT TIME AND WE HAD NEAR MINIMUMS WX FOR RWY 24R ARR. TO FURTHER COMPLICATE THE ISSUE; WE HAD A FUEL SYS MEL. XFEED VALVES #1 AND #4 ARE WIRED OPEN WITH THE FOLLOWING RESULTS; FUEL FROM #1 AND #4 MAINS MIGRATES TO #2 AND #3 MAIN TANKS WHEN TANK TO ENG WHICH OCCURS AT APPROX 112;200 LBS REMAINING. THIS IS EASILY BALANCED WITH OVERRIDE PUMPS UNTIL 2 AND 3 MAIN TANKS REACH THE STAND PIPE LEVEL OF 7000 LBS; THEN THE OUTBOARD PUMPS HAVE TO BE SHUT DOWN TO ALLOW BURNING OF INBOARD FUEL; A PROC I CHOSE NOT TO ATTEMPT ON APCH. THIS RESULTED IN APPROX 2;640 LBS AND 2;860 LBS IN #1 AND #4 AN 5;704 LBS AND 6;160 LBS IN #2 AND #3 MAINS RESPECTIVELY; NEAR THE FAF. XFEED VALVES #2 AND #3 WERE MANUALLY OPENED BEFORE FINAL APCH IN ACCORDANCE WITH QRH. THERE WERE NOT MANY OPTIONS AT THIS POINT. IF WE HAD TO MISS; FUEL IN #1 AND #4 WOULD HAVE BEEN DEPLETED DURING THE GAR: THIS SHOULD WORK BUT IT'S NOT A GOOD POS TO BE IN. THE ALTERNATE; ONT; HAD A PLANNED BURN OF 7700 LBS MORE REALISTICALLY IT WOULD BE 8;800-9;900 LBS; WE LANDED WITH 17;820 LBS. IF A GAR HAD BEEN REQUIRED; PRIORITY HANDING OR AN EMER WOULD HAVE BEEN DECLARED. PERFORMANCE DATA APPEARS TO BE INACCURATE. ALL OPTIONS WERE USED TO BE AS EFFICIENT AS POSSIBLE YET WE WERE UNABLE TO MATCH FLT PLANNED FUEL BURN. WHEN THIS CAN BE CORRECTED BY ADDING A 4;400-8;800 LBS IT OFTEN IS. IN CASES LIKE THIS WHERE WE ARE STRUCTURALLY LIMITED; THE PAYLOAD NEEDS TO BE REDUCED TO ALLOW FOR ADEQUATE FUEL. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT HIS ORIGINAL RELEASE ARPT WAS SEA AND THE RE-RELEASE AT 48N140W WAS FOR LAX. GIVEN THE FUEL USAGE; THE PREDICTED WX AT LAX; AND OTHER FACTORS; THE RPTR NOW FEELS THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT FUEL TO COVER ALL CONTINGENCIES THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED. THERE IS ALSO A QUESTION ABOUT WHETHER THE 10% REQUIRED BY FAR 121.647(B)(2) IS FROM THE RE-RELEASE POINT OR FOR THE ENTIRE FLT DURATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.