Narrative:

At top of descent; approach briefing and setting of arrival took place. Problem was later discovered that the GLASER16 descent profile was selected in FMC instead of the GLASER34. This is what was set at time of initial programming. Crossing altitude at jackson should have been set to 280 KTS/16000 ft but was originally set to 250 KTS/12000 ft. ATC cleared us to descend via glaser profile landing north as we left about FL250. At that time captain noticed speed in FMC was set to 250 KTS/12000 ft and captain changed the speed to 280 KTS but inadvertently left the altitude at 12000 ft and failed to notice the incorrect STAR was selected. As we descended out of about 14400 ft ATC told us to level off immediately. Captain selected altitude hold on the mode control panel and disconnected the autoplt. No further deviations occurred. Remainder of profile; approach and landing were normal. Both pilots had discussed poor sleep after the previous night's all-nighter. This particular sequence is designed with 12 hours off duty and then finishing with this flight XA25 report time arriving sea XD40. I believe fatigue was a major factor in the failure to properly select the appropriate profile. Another factor was captain's failure to set both speed and altitude when he noticed the improper settings in the FMC or recognize that the wrong STAR was programmed. The selection of the GLASER16 instead of the GLASER34 was the initial error. If the proper runway designator had been selected then the crossing speed/altitude would have been correct. There were no TA/RA events associated. WX was cavu. Flight conditions smooth. I believe it would be a better procedure if ATC would verify the crossing altitude at the time of clearance instead of just clearing the descent for landing north or south. It would only take a few more seconds to have that backup.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 CREW MISPROGRAMS FMC AND DSNDS BELOW SID ALT ON GLASR16 TO SEA.

Narrative: AT TOP OF DSCNT; APCH BRIEFING AND SETTING OF ARR TOOK PLACE. PROB WAS LATER DISCOVERED THAT THE GLASER16 DSCNT PROFILE WAS SELECTED IN FMC INSTEAD OF THE GLASER34. THIS IS WHAT WAS SET AT TIME OF INITIAL PROGRAMMING. XING ALT AT JACKSON SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET TO 280 KTS/16000 FT BUT WAS ORIGINALLY SET TO 250 KTS/12000 FT. ATC CLRED US TO DSND VIA GLASER PROFILE LNDG N AS WE LEFT ABOUT FL250. AT THAT TIME CAPT NOTICED SPD IN FMC WAS SET TO 250 KTS/12000 FT AND CAPT CHANGED THE SPD TO 280 KTS BUT INADVERTENTLY LEFT THE ALT AT 12000 FT AND FAILED TO NOTICE THE INCORRECT STAR WAS SELECTED. AS WE DSNDED OUT OF ABOUT 14400 FT ATC TOLD US TO LEVEL OFF IMMEDIATELY. CAPT SELECTED ALT HOLD ON THE MODE CTL PANEL AND DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT. NO FURTHER DEVS OCCURRED. REMAINDER OF PROFILE; APCH AND LNDG WERE NORMAL. BOTH PLTS HAD DISCUSSED POOR SLEEP AFTER THE PREVIOUS NIGHT'S ALL-NIGHTER. THIS PARTICULAR SEQUENCE IS DESIGNED WITH 12 HRS OFF DUTY AND THEN FINISHING WITH THIS FLT XA25 RPT TIME ARRIVING SEA XD40. I BELIEVE FATIGUE WAS A MAJOR FACTOR IN THE FAILURE TO PROPERLY SELECT THE APPROPRIATE PROFILE. ANOTHER FACTOR WAS CAPT'S FAILURE TO SET BOTH SPD AND ALT WHEN HE NOTICED THE IMPROPER SETTINGS IN THE FMC OR RECOGNIZE THAT THE WRONG STAR WAS PROGRAMMED. THE SELECTION OF THE GLASER16 INSTEAD OF THE GLASER34 WAS THE INITIAL ERROR. IF THE PROPER RWY DESIGNATOR HAD BEEN SELECTED THEN THE XING SPD/ALT WOULD HAVE BEEN CORRECT. THERE WERE NO TA/RA EVENTS ASSOCIATED. WX WAS CAVU. FLT CONDITIONS SMOOTH. I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE A BETTER PROC IF ATC WOULD VERIFY THE XING ALT AT THE TIME OF CLRNC INSTEAD OF JUST CLRING THE DSCNT FOR LNDG N OR S. IT WOULD ONLY TAKE A FEW MORE SECONDS TO HAVE THAT BACKUP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.