Narrative:

On this aircraft the automatic pressurization was deferred and we had to use manual controls. The previous crew told us that the control was very erratic and slow to respond to their corrections. On start up we immediately had problems controling the initial pressurization of the vessel. The spikes in pressure were extreme and both of us had problems adjusting our bodies to it; at times it was even painful to the ears and sinuses. Once taxiing we had the system under control. On takeoff; during the initial climb; the manual system started to act up again; with sudden surges in rate of climb and cabin pressure. I didn't see the values on the EICAS panel; but I certainly felt them on my ear canals. Captain responded to my request for flaps up and then climb checks but by then he was so busy trying to stabilize the manual pressurization and reduce the risk of injuring us or the passenger that he/we didn't notice the IAS was set too high at 240 KIAS instead of 200 KIAS as by climb profile; consequently our rate of climb was lower than normal. I was flying manually at this point and I was instinctively trying to reduce the rate of climb to help with the pressurization. At this point we still didn't have time to read and respond to the climb checklist. In our RNAV departure there is a crossing restr of 5000 ft at abc; ATC asked us to expedite the climb and we told them we had a hard time controling our pressurization to a comfortable and safe level and that we requested a slower rate of climb; by then we were at abc at 4200 ft; I overlooked it. ATC warned us to let him know earlier if we had such problems because of the altitude restr; we apologized and few mins later he handed us to center. Many factors were involved. The erratic pressurization system created a high workload and a physical condition (to the point of discomfort and pain) that distraction both of us from our primary duties. Captain was too quick in doing his climb flow; trying to go back to working the manual pressurization; in a very critical part of the flight; interrupting the climb profile. As the PF I didn't focus on flying the aircraft and follow the RNAV procedure; instead I was distraction by the pressurization problems and how it was affecting our body. Not using the autoplt created an additional task saturation for me. When ATC requested to expedite the climb (in response we told them we needed a lower rate of climb). ATC pointed out that we were going to miss the required altitude restr of 5000 ft in the RNAV departure. At that point ATC was aware of our pressurization problem and allowed us to climb at a lower rate. Departure then informed ZFW of it and they accommodated our rates of climb and descent. We should have requested a lower rate of climb to ATC before takeoff; giving us more time to adjust the system. We should have discussed the pressurization problem and how to handle it in flight before takeoff. As soon as I noticed the problem I should have selected the autoplt; giving me and the captain more time to focus on the flight itself.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN EMB145 CREW DEPARTED WITH THE PRESSURIZATION SYS MEL'ED. THE HIGH RATE OF CLB CAUSED PHYSICAL DISCOMFORT AND AN RNAV ALT XING RESTR WAS MISSED.

Narrative: ON THIS ACFT THE AUTO PRESSURIZATION WAS DEFERRED AND WE HAD TO USE MANUAL CTLS. THE PREVIOUS CREW TOLD US THAT THE CTL WAS VERY ERRATIC AND SLOW TO RESPOND TO THEIR CORRECTIONS. ON START UP WE IMMEDIATELY HAD PROBS CTLING THE INITIAL PRESSURIZATION OF THE VESSEL. THE SPIKES IN PRESSURE WERE EXTREME AND BOTH OF US HAD PROBS ADJUSTING OUR BODIES TO IT; AT TIMES IT WAS EVEN PAINFUL TO THE EARS AND SINUSES. ONCE TAXIING WE HAD THE SYS UNDER CTL. ON TKOF; DURING THE INITIAL CLB; THE MANUAL SYS STARTED TO ACT UP AGAIN; WITH SUDDEN SURGES IN RATE OF CLB AND CABIN PRESSURE. I DIDN'T SEE THE VALUES ON THE EICAS PANEL; BUT I CERTAINLY FELT THEM ON MY EAR CANALS. CAPT RESPONDED TO MY REQUEST FOR FLAPS UP AND THEN CLB CHKS BUT BY THEN HE WAS SO BUSY TRYING TO STABILIZE THE MANUAL PRESSURIZATION AND REDUCE THE RISK OF INJURING US OR THE PAX THAT HE/WE DIDN'T NOTICE THE IAS WAS SET TOO HIGH AT 240 KIAS INSTEAD OF 200 KIAS AS BY CLB PROFILE; CONSEQUENTLY OUR RATE OF CLB WAS LOWER THAN NORMAL. I WAS FLYING MANUALLY AT THIS POINT AND I WAS INSTINCTIVELY TRYING TO REDUCE THE RATE OF CLB TO HELP WITH THE PRESSURIZATION. AT THIS POINT WE STILL DIDN'T HAVE TIME TO READ AND RESPOND TO THE CLB CHKLIST. IN OUR RNAV DEP THERE IS A XING RESTR OF 5000 FT AT ABC; ATC ASKED US TO EXPEDITE THE CLB AND WE TOLD THEM WE HAD A HARD TIME CTLING OUR PRESSURIZATION TO A COMFORTABLE AND SAFE LEVEL AND THAT WE REQUESTED A SLOWER RATE OF CLB; BY THEN WE WERE AT ABC AT 4200 FT; I OVERLOOKED IT. ATC WARNED US TO LET HIM KNOW EARLIER IF WE HAD SUCH PROBS BECAUSE OF THE ALT RESTR; WE APOLOGIZED AND FEW MINS LATER HE HANDED US TO CTR. MANY FACTORS WERE INVOLVED. THE ERRATIC PRESSURIZATION SYS CREATED A HIGH WORKLOAD AND A PHYSICAL CONDITION (TO THE POINT OF DISCOMFORT AND PAIN) THAT DISTR BOTH OF US FROM OUR PRIMARY DUTIES. CAPT WAS TOO QUICK IN DOING HIS CLB FLOW; TRYING TO GO BACK TO WORKING THE MANUAL PRESSURIZATION; IN A VERY CRITICAL PART OF THE FLT; INTERRUPTING THE CLB PROFILE. AS THE PF I DIDN'T FOCUS ON FLYING THE ACFT AND FOLLOW THE RNAV PROC; INSTEAD I WAS DISTR BY THE PRESSURIZATION PROBS AND HOW IT WAS AFFECTING OUR BODY. NOT USING THE AUTOPLT CREATED AN ADDITIONAL TASK SATURATION FOR ME. WHEN ATC REQUESTED TO EXPEDITE THE CLB (IN RESPONSE WE TOLD THEM WE NEEDED A LOWER RATE OF CLB). ATC POINTED OUT THAT WE WERE GOING TO MISS THE REQUIRED ALT RESTR OF 5000 FT IN THE RNAV DEP. AT THAT POINT ATC WAS AWARE OF OUR PRESSURIZATION PROB AND ALLOWED US TO CLB AT A LOWER RATE. DEP THEN INFORMED ZFW OF IT AND THEY ACCOMMODATED OUR RATES OF CLB AND DSCNT. WE SHOULD HAVE REQUESTED A LOWER RATE OF CLB TO ATC BEFORE TKOF; GIVING US MORE TIME TO ADJUST THE SYS. WE SHOULD HAVE DISCUSSED THE PRESSURIZATION PROB AND HOW TO HANDLE IT IN FLT BEFORE TKOF. AS SOON AS I NOTICED THE PROB I SHOULD HAVE SELECTED THE AUTOPLT; GIVING ME AND THE CAPT MORE TIME TO FOCUS ON THE FLT ITSELF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.