Narrative:

I provided radar associate training for approximately 2 1/2 hours. At the end of that time it became apparent that there were several people who were at the end of their shift; but there were no controllers to relieve them. The supervisor asked me to terminate training and relieve one of the controllers from a radar position. My trainee; who had also been on position for 2 1/2 hours; was assigned as my radar associate. The supervisor did ask us if we felt ok to work the position; and we both said yes. We worked the new position for an additional 1 1/2 hours. For nearly that entire period we worked a holding pattern for atl. We were continually clearing aircraft into holding and 'stepping them down' in 1000 ft increments. My desire to help my fellow controllers get position relief at the end of their shift caused me and my trainee to make an error in judgement to say it was ok to work this complex traffic after already working a position for 2 1/2 hours without a mental break. The FAA's new operating methods of running at bare minimum staffing or lower is creating these types of safety situations on a more regular basis and placing controllers in position to make these bad judgements. An operational error or accident did not occur. However; the stage was set for that type of occurrence and happens more and more frequently.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZTL CTLR EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING AVAILABILITY OF STAFFING AND POSSIBLE CTLR JUDGEMENT ERRORS.

Narrative: I PROVIDED RADAR ASSOCIATE TRAINING FOR APPROX 2 1/2 HRS. AT THE END OF THAT TIME IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THERE WERE SEVERAL PEOPLE WHO WERE AT THE END OF THEIR SHIFT; BUT THERE WERE NO CTLRS TO RELIEVE THEM. THE SUPVR ASKED ME TO TERMINATE TRAINING AND RELIEVE ONE OF THE CTLRS FROM A RADAR POS. MY TRAINEE; WHO HAD ALSO BEEN ON POS FOR 2 1/2 HRS; WAS ASSIGNED AS MY RADAR ASSOCIATE. THE SUPVR DID ASK US IF WE FELT OK TO WORK THE POS; AND WE BOTH SAID YES. WE WORKED THE NEW POS FOR AN ADDITIONAL 1 1/2 HRS. FOR NEARLY THAT ENTIRE PERIOD WE WORKED A HOLDING PATTERN FOR ATL. WE WERE CONTINUALLY CLRING ACFT INTO HOLDING AND 'STEPPING THEM DOWN' IN 1000 FT INCREMENTS. MY DESIRE TO HELP MY FELLOW CTLRS GET POS RELIEF AT THE END OF THEIR SHIFT CAUSED ME AND MY TRAINEE TO MAKE AN ERROR IN JUDGEMENT TO SAY IT WAS OK TO WORK THIS COMPLEX TFC AFTER ALREADY WORKING A POS FOR 2 1/2 HRS WITHOUT A MENTAL BREAK. THE FAA'S NEW OPERATING METHODS OF RUNNING AT BARE MINIMUM STAFFING OR LOWER IS CREATING THESE TYPES OF SAFETY SITUATIONS ON A MORE REGULAR BASIS AND PLACING CTLRS IN POS TO MAKE THESE BAD JUDGEMENTS. AN OPERROR OR ACCIDENT DID NOT OCCUR. HOWEVER; THE STAGE WAS SET FOR THAT TYPE OF OCCURRENCE AND HAPPENS MORE AND MORE FREQUENTLY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.