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Attributes | |
ACN | 710772 |
Time | |
Date | 200609 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | A321 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | maintenance : technician |
Experience | maintenance technician : 22 |
ASRS Report | 710772 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | maintenance : technician |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical maintenance problem : improper maintenance maintenance problem : improper documentation non adherence : published procedure non adherence : far |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : engine exh gas temp other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | other |
Consequence | other other |
Factors | |
Maintenance | performance deficiency : fault isolation performance deficiency : repair performance deficiency : inspection |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Aircraft Weather Chart Or Publication Company Environmental Factor Flight Crew Human Performance Maintenance Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Ambiguous |
Narrative:
Another mechanic and I were assigned for an engine overtemp condition. We opened the engine to accomplish a vbv (variable bleed valve) inspection. As we were pulling up the procedure to do the vbv inspection; metal was discovered in the tailpipe screen. At this time it was determined to be an engine change. We stopped the vbv inspection and proceeded to start the engine change. We worked the engine change up to lunchtime; at which time we were informed to hold up on the engine change so a borescope could be accomplished. The borescope was completed and no defects were found. Because of their findings; the engine change was canceled. At this point we had to decide how to handle the job card and other forms; up to where we were on the engine change. We stamped the job card for our work and filled out other forms. We then gave a verbal turnover to the next shift lead. I think the contributing factors to this incident is lack of communication between the mechanics; lead mechanics; and foreman. The problem of the in-flight engine shutdown was discovered when the pilot used his nose cowl anti-ice. It burned the fadec harness.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AN A321 INCURRED AN ENG SHUTDOWN DUE TO OVERTEMP CONDITION. PROB WAS NOSE COWL ANTI-ICE VALVE DUCTING BURNED FADEC WIRING HARNESS.
Narrative: ANOTHER MECH AND I WERE ASSIGNED FOR AN ENG OVERTEMP CONDITION. WE OPENED THE ENG TO ACCOMPLISH A VBV (VARIABLE BLEED VALVE) INSPECTION. AS WE WERE PULLING UP THE PROC TO DO THE VBV INSPECTION; METAL WAS DISCOVERED IN THE TAILPIPE SCREEN. AT THIS TIME IT WAS DETERMINED TO BE AN ENG CHANGE. WE STOPPED THE VBV INSPECTION AND PROCEEDED TO START THE ENG CHANGE. WE WORKED THE ENG CHANGE UP TO LUNCHTIME; AT WHICH TIME WE WERE INFORMED TO HOLD UP ON THE ENG CHANGE SO A BORESCOPE COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED. THE BORESCOPE WAS COMPLETED AND NO DEFECTS WERE FOUND. BECAUSE OF THEIR FINDINGS; THE ENG CHANGE WAS CANCELED. AT THIS POINT WE HAD TO DECIDE HOW TO HANDLE THE JOB CARD AND OTHER FORMS; UP TO WHERE WE WERE ON THE ENG CHANGE. WE STAMPED THE JOB CARD FOR OUR WORK AND FILLED OUT OTHER FORMS. WE THEN GAVE A VERBAL TURNOVER TO THE NEXT SHIFT LEAD. I THINK THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS INCIDENT IS LACK OF COM BTWN THE MECHS; LEAD MECHS; AND FOREMAN. THE PROB OF THE INFLT ENG SHUTDOWN WAS DISCOVERED WHEN THE PLT USED HIS NOSE COWL ANTI-ICE. IT BURNED THE FADEC HARNESS.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.