Narrative:

My first officer was flying climbing out to 2000 ft. We were given a traffic report by ATC of an aircraft at 2500 ft at our 1-2 O'clock position. We leveled off at 2000 ft and our TCAS display was showing the conflict aircraft at +400 ft. A few seconds later our TCAS gave us a TA warning and we were scanning for traffic. A few seconds later; our TCAS gave us an RA command of 'monitor vertical track' or something close to that. When we heard vertical; there was some confusion on climb or descend and we failed to reference our vsi. I am not sure what command I told my first officer but my first officer started a climb (I believe 'vertical' was taken as a climb command). I was scanning for traffic and referencing the TCAS display. When I (PNF and captain) saw the aircraft's altitude getting 'closer' than before on the display I told my first officer to descend. At that time; the display showed the aircraft +200 ft and off our right side. My first officer got the traffic in sight and maintained visual separation. We believe the traffic was 300-400 ft vertical and 200 ft horizontally from our aircraft. I (captain) notified ATC of our RA and he asked if it was an RA climb and I said yes. At the time of confusion and after the close call; that is initially what we thought. Looking at it now; I believe the confusing terminology of the RA using 'vertical' in the aural warning at a busy and stressful time in the cockpit initially caused an incorrect interpretation of the action to be taken (climbing when we should have descended). I believe the correct terminology when the words 'monitor vertical' are in the warning should also include 'descend or climb.' for example: a more helpful aural warning in our case and would of helped. The correct aircraft action should be 'monitor vertical descent.' the word descent would have told us with no confusion that a descent should be started. I also believe the air traffic controller vectoring us was a contributing factor. I am puzzled why ATC would vector us right at VFR traffic only a difference of 400-500 ft vertical separation when airspace to the south was available and a turn of 10-20 degrees would have prevented this entire situation. I believe ATC needs to be more cautious with traffic separations less than 1000 ft and avoid any close proximity when the airspace allows at all costs. Also; an earlier traffic callout by ATC instead of literally 5 or 10 seconds or so before an RA would have been helpful.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A HAWKER 800 DEPARTING DFW EXPERIENCED AN NMAC AND MAY HAVE INCORRECTLY RESPONDED TO A TCAS COMMAND.

Narrative: MY FO WAS FLYING CLBING OUT TO 2000 FT. WE WERE GIVEN A TFC RPT BY ATC OF AN ACFT AT 2500 FT AT OUR 1-2 O'CLOCK POS. WE LEVELED OFF AT 2000 FT AND OUR TCAS DISPLAY WAS SHOWING THE CONFLICT ACFT AT +400 FT. A FEW SECONDS LATER OUR TCAS GAVE US A TA WARNING AND WE WERE SCANNING FOR TFC. A FEW SECONDS LATER; OUR TCAS GAVE US AN RA COMMAND OF 'MONITOR VERT TRACK' OR SOMETHING CLOSE TO THAT. WHEN WE HEARD VERT; THERE WAS SOME CONFUSION ON CLB OR DSND AND WE FAILED TO REF OUR VSI. I AM NOT SURE WHAT COMMAND I TOLD MY FO BUT MY FO STARTED A CLB (I BELIEVE 'VERT' WAS TAKEN AS A CLB COMMAND). I WAS SCANNING FOR TFC AND REFING THE TCAS DISPLAY. WHEN I (PNF AND CAPT) SAW THE ACFT'S ALT GETTING 'CLOSER' THAN BEFORE ON THE DISPLAY I TOLD MY FO TO DSND. AT THAT TIME; THE DISPLAY SHOWED THE ACFT +200 FT AND OFF OUR R SIDE. MY FO GOT THE TFC IN SIGHT AND MAINTAINED VISUAL SEPARATION. WE BELIEVE THE TFC WAS 300-400 FT VERT AND 200 FT HORIZONTALLY FROM OUR ACFT. I (CAPT) NOTIFIED ATC OF OUR RA AND HE ASKED IF IT WAS AN RA CLB AND I SAID YES. AT THE TIME OF CONFUSION AND AFTER THE CLOSE CALL; THAT IS INITIALLY WHAT WE THOUGHT. LOOKING AT IT NOW; I BELIEVE THE CONFUSING TERMINOLOGY OF THE RA USING 'VERT' IN THE AURAL WARNING AT A BUSY AND STRESSFUL TIME IN THE COCKPIT INITIALLY CAUSED AN INCORRECT INTERP OF THE ACTION TO BE TAKEN (CLBING WHEN WE SHOULD HAVE DSNDED). I BELIEVE THE CORRECT TERMINOLOGY WHEN THE WORDS 'MONITOR VERT' ARE IN THE WARNING SHOULD ALSO INCLUDE 'DSND OR CLB.' FOR EXAMPLE: A MORE HELPFUL AURAL WARNING IN OUR CASE AND WOULD OF HELPED. THE CORRECT ACFT ACTION SHOULD BE 'MONITOR VERT DSCNT.' THE WORD DSCNT WOULD HAVE TOLD US WITH NO CONFUSION THAT A DSCNT SHOULD BE STARTED. I ALSO BELIEVE THE AIR TFC CTLR VECTORING US WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR. I AM PUZZLED WHY ATC WOULD VECTOR US RIGHT AT VFR TFC ONLY A DIFFERENCE OF 400-500 FT VERT SEPARATION WHEN AIRSPACE TO THE S WAS AVAILABLE AND A TURN OF 10-20 DEGS WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS ENTIRE SITUATION. I BELIEVE ATC NEEDS TO BE MORE CAUTIOUS WITH TFC SEPARATIONS LESS THAN 1000 FT AND AVOID ANY CLOSE PROX WHEN THE AIRSPACE ALLOWS AT ALL COSTS. ALSO; AN EARLIER TFC CALLOUT BY ATC INSTEAD OF LITERALLY 5 OR 10 SECONDS OR SO BEFORE AN RA WOULD HAVE BEEN HELPFUL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.