Narrative:

While on final realized at about 1000 ft gear was not down. Extended gear. While gear was in transit egpws activated 'too low gear.' extended landing flaps. Landed without incident. Traffic and radio congestion was moderate for ord. While on downwind at 9000 ft extended approach flaps to comply with a descent and airspeed requirement from ord approach. At approximately 15 mi base leg at 5000 ft approach pointed out the airport and traffic to follow to the runway. Approach then said to follow traffic cleared for visual and call tower at the marker. Our attention was focused on finding and maintaining visual contact with the traffic. My attention was split between keeping an eye on the traffic and trying to pinpoint the altitude along the GS that we would be crossing the marker. We had several mi to go before the marker and I was concerned that I would forget. As we approached the marker I became aware of hold short lights across our runway. I didn't remember that being on the ATIS and became focused on verifying the notice on the ATIS; checking the distance required for landing for our aircraft to make sure we could hold short and relaying that fact to the captain/PF. At some point in all this the PF called for the approach check. I had completed the approach flow well before. When he called for the approach check I became concerned that I had not read the descent checklist. I know I had completed the descent flow but could not remember whether I had completed the checklist. The flight went from a very relaxed slow arrival into ord; to very rushed. I completed the descent and approach checklists and called the tower. We were cleared to land. I noticed the annunciator 'rudder travel unrestr' was not on. At approximately 1000 ft AGL I noticed the gear was not extended. I extended the gear and flaps and we landed. While gear was in transit egpws announced 'too low gear.' I do not know whether the PF called for the gear and flaps and I did not hear; or if we both became focused on other things. I just know that when I looked down; the gear was not down. We obviously were not stabilized at our final approach speed in the landing confign at 1000 ft AGL as our operations manual states. I should have announced and the PF should have executed a go around. When the egpws announced the warning; I should have announced and the PF should have executed a go around. I cannot explain the non-compliance with procedures. It was not something that was discussed or planned. Once I put the gear handle down; I don't remember anything other than both of us confirming that the gear was in fact down. There was not any discussion about what to do. I was furious with myself for either not hearing and definitely not confirming the gear was not down earlier. That means I somehow missed it; unbelievable as that seems; on the landing check. Or that the PF never called for the landing check and I did not catch it. It's as if no one was flying the aircraft. I cannot come up with a specific solution because I cannot say where exactly the breakdown happened. I think for me; it comes down to focusing on the task at hand. Right now that is very difficult with the constant attack on the pilot wages; schedules and future.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR CREW ARRIVES AT THE COMPANY MANDATED STABILIZED APCH POINT WITHOUT THE GEAR DOWN BUT DOES NOT COMPLY WITH COMPANY POLICY TO ABANDON THE APCH.

Narrative: WHILE ON FINAL REALIZED AT ABOUT 1000 FT GEAR WAS NOT DOWN. EXTENDED GEAR. WHILE GEAR WAS IN TRANSIT EGPWS ACTIVATED 'TOO LOW GEAR.' EXTENDED LNDG FLAPS. LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. TFC AND RADIO CONGESTION WAS MODERATE FOR ORD. WHILE ON DOWNWIND AT 9000 FT EXTENDED APCH FLAPS TO COMPLY WITH A DSCNT AND AIRSPD REQUIREMENT FROM ORD APCH. AT APPROX 15 MI BASE LEG AT 5000 FT APCH POINTED OUT THE ARPT AND TFC TO FOLLOW TO THE RWY. APCH THEN SAID TO FOLLOW TFC CLRED FOR VISUAL AND CALL TWR AT THE MARKER. OUR ATTN WAS FOCUSED ON FINDING AND MAINTAINING VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE TFC. MY ATTN WAS SPLIT BTWN KEEPING AN EYE ON THE TFC AND TRYING TO PINPOINT THE ALT ALONG THE GS THAT WE WOULD BE XING THE MARKER. WE HAD SEVERAL MI TO GO BEFORE THE MARKER AND I WAS CONCERNED THAT I WOULD FORGET. AS WE APCHED THE MARKER I BECAME AWARE OF HOLD SHORT LIGHTS ACROSS OUR RWY. I DIDN'T REMEMBER THAT BEING ON THE ATIS AND BECAME FOCUSED ON VERIFYING THE NOTICE ON THE ATIS; CHKING THE DISTANCE REQUIRED FOR LNDG FOR OUR ACFT TO MAKE SURE WE COULD HOLD SHORT AND RELAYING THAT FACT TO THE CAPT/PF. AT SOME POINT IN ALL THIS THE PF CALLED FOR THE APCH CHK. I HAD COMPLETED THE APCH FLOW WELL BEFORE. WHEN HE CALLED FOR THE APCH CHK I BECAME CONCERNED THAT I HAD NOT READ THE DSCNT CHKLIST. I KNOW I HAD COMPLETED THE DSCNT FLOW BUT COULD NOT REMEMBER WHETHER I HAD COMPLETED THE CHKLIST. THE FLT WENT FROM A VERY RELAXED SLOW ARR INTO ORD; TO VERY RUSHED. I COMPLETED THE DSCNT AND APCH CHKLISTS AND CALLED THE TWR. WE WERE CLRED TO LAND. I NOTICED THE ANNUNCIATOR 'RUDDER TRAVEL UNRESTR' WAS NOT ON. AT APPROX 1000 FT AGL I NOTICED THE GEAR WAS NOT EXTENDED. I EXTENDED THE GEAR AND FLAPS AND WE LANDED. WHILE GEAR WAS IN TRANSIT EGPWS ANNOUNCED 'TOO LOW GEAR.' I DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THE PF CALLED FOR THE GEAR AND FLAPS AND I DID NOT HEAR; OR IF WE BOTH BECAME FOCUSED ON OTHER THINGS. I JUST KNOW THAT WHEN I LOOKED DOWN; THE GEAR WAS NOT DOWN. WE OBVIOUSLY WERE NOT STABILIZED AT OUR FINAL APCH SPD IN THE LNDG CONFIGN AT 1000 FT AGL AS OUR OPS MANUAL STATES. I SHOULD HAVE ANNOUNCED AND THE PF SHOULD HAVE EXECUTED A GAR. WHEN THE EGPWS ANNOUNCED THE WARNING; I SHOULD HAVE ANNOUNCED AND THE PF SHOULD HAVE EXECUTED A GAR. I CANNOT EXPLAIN THE NON-COMPLIANCE WITH PROCS. IT WAS NOT SOMETHING THAT WAS DISCUSSED OR PLANNED. ONCE I PUT THE GEAR HANDLE DOWN; I DON'T REMEMBER ANYTHING OTHER THAN BOTH OF US CONFIRMING THAT THE GEAR WAS IN FACT DOWN. THERE WAS NOT ANY DISCUSSION ABOUT WHAT TO DO. I WAS FURIOUS WITH MYSELF FOR EITHER NOT HEARING AND DEFINITELY NOT CONFIRMING THE GEAR WAS NOT DOWN EARLIER. THAT MEANS I SOMEHOW MISSED IT; UNBELIEVABLE AS THAT SEEMS; ON THE LNDG CHK. OR THAT THE PF NEVER CALLED FOR THE LNDG CHK AND I DID NOT CATCH IT. IT'S AS IF NO ONE WAS FLYING THE ACFT. I CANNOT COME UP WITH A SPECIFIC SOLUTION BECAUSE I CANNOT SAY WHERE EXACTLY THE BREAKDOWN HAPPENED. I THINK FOR ME; IT COMES DOWN TO FOCUSING ON THE TASK AT HAND. RIGHT NOW THAT IS VERY DIFFICULT WITH THE CONSTANT ATTACK ON THE PLT WAGES; SCHEDULES AND FUTURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.