Narrative:

It was the first officer's leg; VMC conditions; inbound to nashville from the northeast. We were vectored to a base leg and traffic was pointed out on final approach to runway 2R. We called the airport and traffic in sight; and were cleared the visual to runway 2L. The first officer disconnected autoplt and deselected flight directors while maneuvering to line up on the runway to the left of runway 2R. We were switched to tower and immediately 'cleared to land; you're #1.' I looked at my pfd as he approached the final course from the right and saw a left deflection of needle. It was deflected to the correct side; but I had a brief thought that the deflection was too big for the visual picture. Looking back outside we were lined up and I watched the approach continue. At 500 ft; I noticed a single light PAPI on the left side of the runway. We had not briefed this; and checked our 2L approach plate and did not see it depicted. We commented about how the charts had another error and continued to an uneventful landing. As we rolled out; the first officer commented aloud; 'did we just land on runway 2C?' we realized that we had landed runway 2C though cleared to land runway 2L. Unfamiliarity; I had only been to nashville once in the last 12 yrs and though we briefed the approach did not identify the threat of 3 runways. I did review our airport briefing guide and the layout was not mentioned as a threat. Smyrna airport was listed as a threat and we briefed this and idented the airport during our arrival. Complacency -- I had a lot of faith in the first officer's knowledge/experience as he briefed flying into bna repeatedly for the last 5 yrs. I relaxed and was enjoying his arrival without really backing him up. Briefing -- this is probably the biggest factor. If we had idented the true picture of the runway layout in our brief; we would have not made this mistake. We were not sure which runway to expect when briefing so we mentioned it could be runway 2R or runway 2L. This left me with a 2 runway mindset even though there were obviously 3 (plus 31). Airport layout -- the center runway extends several thousand ft further south than either runway 2L or runway 2R; so immediately grabs your vision when watching (from southeast of the airport) an aircraft line up on runway 2R and then shifting your view west for runway 2L. Being focused on the landing zone for runway 2C; runway 2L never comes into view throughout the final approach because it is so far north. Charts -- we are still learning these new charts; and while they are overall pretty nice; have had errors idented that lower confidence in them.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN E190 ON VISUAL APCH TO BNA WAS CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 2L BUT LANDED ON RWY 2C.

Narrative: IT WAS THE FO'S LEG; VMC CONDITIONS; INBOUND TO NASHVILLE FROM THE NE. WE WERE VECTORED TO A BASE LEG AND TFC WAS POINTED OUT ON FINAL APCH TO RWY 2R. WE CALLED THE ARPT AND TFC IN SIGHT; AND WERE CLRED THE VISUAL TO RWY 2L. THE FO DISCONNECTED AUTOPLT AND DESELECTED FLT DIRECTORS WHILE MANEUVERING TO LINE UP ON THE RWY TO THE L OF RWY 2R. WE WERE SWITCHED TO TWR AND IMMEDIATELY 'CLRED TO LAND; YOU'RE #1.' I LOOKED AT MY PFD AS HE APCHED THE FINAL COURSE FROM THE R AND SAW A L DEFLECTION OF NEEDLE. IT WAS DEFLECTED TO THE CORRECT SIDE; BUT I HAD A BRIEF THOUGHT THAT THE DEFLECTION WAS TOO BIG FOR THE VISUAL PICTURE. LOOKING BACK OUTSIDE WE WERE LINED UP AND I WATCHED THE APCH CONTINUE. AT 500 FT; I NOTICED A SINGLE LIGHT PAPI ON THE L SIDE OF THE RWY. WE HAD NOT BRIEFED THIS; AND CHKED OUR 2L APCH PLATE AND DID NOT SEE IT DEPICTED. WE COMMENTED ABOUT HOW THE CHARTS HAD ANOTHER ERROR AND CONTINUED TO AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG. AS WE ROLLED OUT; THE FO COMMENTED ALOUD; 'DID WE JUST LAND ON RWY 2C?' WE REALIZED THAT WE HAD LANDED RWY 2C THOUGH CLRED TO LAND RWY 2L. UNFAMILIARITY; I HAD ONLY BEEN TO NASHVILLE ONCE IN THE LAST 12 YRS AND THOUGH WE BRIEFED THE APCH DID NOT IDENT THE THREAT OF 3 RWYS. I DID REVIEW OUR ARPT BRIEFING GUIDE AND THE LAYOUT WAS NOT MENTIONED AS A THREAT. SMYRNA ARPT WAS LISTED AS A THREAT AND WE BRIEFED THIS AND IDENTED THE ARPT DURING OUR ARR. COMPLACENCY -- I HAD A LOT OF FAITH IN THE FO'S KNOWLEDGE/EXPERIENCE AS HE BRIEFED FLYING INTO BNA REPEATEDLY FOR THE LAST 5 YRS. I RELAXED AND WAS ENJOYING HIS ARR WITHOUT REALLY BACKING HIM UP. BRIEFING -- THIS IS PROBABLY THE BIGGEST FACTOR. IF WE HAD IDENTED THE TRUE PICTURE OF THE RWY LAYOUT IN OUR BRIEF; WE WOULD HAVE NOT MADE THIS MISTAKE. WE WERE NOT SURE WHICH RWY TO EXPECT WHEN BRIEFING SO WE MENTIONED IT COULD BE RWY 2R OR RWY 2L. THIS LEFT ME WITH A 2 RWY MINDSET EVEN THOUGH THERE WERE OBVIOUSLY 3 (PLUS 31). ARPT LAYOUT -- THE CTR RWY EXTENDS SEVERAL THOUSAND FT FURTHER S THAN EITHER RWY 2L OR RWY 2R; SO IMMEDIATELY GRABS YOUR VISION WHEN WATCHING (FROM SE OF THE ARPT) AN ACFT LINE UP ON RWY 2R AND THEN SHIFTING YOUR VIEW W FOR RWY 2L. BEING FOCUSED ON THE LNDG ZONE FOR RWY 2C; RWY 2L NEVER COMES INTO VIEW THROUGHOUT THE FINAL APCH BECAUSE IT IS SO FAR N. CHARTS -- WE ARE STILL LEARNING THESE NEW CHARTS; AND WHILE THEY ARE OVERALL PRETTY NICE; HAVE HAD ERRORS IDENTED THAT LOWER CONFIDENCE IN THEM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.