Narrative:

Dfw briefing items #06257 and #06261 were sent to all dfw tower controllers through the automated read and initial (right&I) system. These were mandatory briefing items to be read and acknowledged by all controllers and supervisors. These briefing items contained statements: actual procedural guidance; which were vague and in direct conflict with dfw order 7110.65M. Dfw order 7110.65M paragraph 8-15(a) states that 'aircraft should not be turned prior to 1/2 mi from the approach end of runway' unless otherwise coordinated. The right&I briefing states that 'all climb out/alternate missed approach instructions will be executed at the departure end of the runway.' this creates a ridiculously unsafe missed approach procedure where aircraft are expected to continue descent and overfly an active runway until reaching the departure end. In addition; there are specific instructions regarding runway 13R/13L 'alternate missed approach procedures' contained in the dfw order 7110.65M paragraph 8-15(C). These instructions do not concur with those procedural instructions contained in the right&I briefing items. After having read and initialed for both briefing items; I contacted my supervisor and explained my concern over the discrepancies involved with these very important and conflicting procedures. My supervisor agreed that there were discrepancies and forwarded that information to the appropriate department. Supervisor informed me that no response to the inquiry was made other than that it would be 'looked at.' 4 weeks later; after receiving no further reply or clarification through my supervisor; I prepared a detailed procedural package on this issue; which my supervisor forwarded to the operations manager. My supervisor informed me that operations manager agreed that there was a 'procedural problem with the briefing items and our actual procedures;' and that he would forward to the appropriate persons for resolution. 2 weeks ago my supervisor informed me that the training manager felt 'there were no problems with the briefing items as stated.' further; he said; 'the problems which precipitated the briefing items were really more associated with dallas love and other satellite airports.' as of today; no action to correct these briefing/procedural problems has been taken. My supervisor considers the briefing items to be in error and to follow the dfw 7110.65M procedures regardless of the information contained in the briefing items. It is inherently dangerous and procedurally negligent to allow this type of situation to exist. There is clear and obvious evidence that a significant procedural problem has been created which could cause a serious mishap. Dfw ATC personnel from different working crews now have multiple interps of this ruling and no clear procedural guidance. There have been incidents; including operrors in the past; caused by the differing interps and lack of clear procedural guidance. Prior to the release of the stated right&I items; there had been special training briefings done stressing the actual dfw 7110.65M missed approach procedures. In addition; the continuing trend of issuing procedural directives and multiple procedural interps through haphazard right&I briefing items outside of the normal FAA order/notice policy causes an undue burden on ATC personnel to fully understand what actual procedural directives exist. It is common practice for numerous procedural changes to be made or incorporated through undocumented right&I briefing items and then 'caught up' every year or so in official facility directives (dfw orders/notices). Because these procedural items (contained in the stated briefings) were issued to all dfw tower controllers and supervisors; dfw management should issue clear and concise procedural directives that clarifies its procedural intent on all dfw missed approach procedures and dismisses the previous briefing items as erroneous.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DFW CTLR EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING THE MGMNT PROCESS USED TO INITIATE A PROC CHANGE FOR MISSED APCHS.

Narrative: DFW BRIEFING ITEMS #06257 AND #06261 WERE SENT TO ALL DFW TWR CTLRS THROUGH THE AUTOMATED READ AND INITIAL (R&I) SYS. THESE WERE MANDATORY BRIEFING ITEMS TO BE READ AND ACKNOWLEDGED BY ALL CTLRS AND SUPVRS. THESE BRIEFING ITEMS CONTAINED STATEMENTS: ACTUAL PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE; WHICH WERE VAGUE AND IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH DFW ORDER 7110.65M. DFW ORDER 7110.65M PARAGRAPH 8-15(A) STATES THAT 'ACFT SHOULD NOT BE TURNED PRIOR TO 1/2 MI FROM THE APCH END OF RWY' UNLESS OTHERWISE COORDINATED. THE R&I BRIEFING STATES THAT 'ALL CLBOUT/ALTERNATE MISSED APCH INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE EXECUTED AT THE DEP END OF THE RWY.' THIS CREATES A RIDICULOUSLY UNSAFE MISSED APCH PROC WHERE ACFT ARE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE DSCNT AND OVERFLY AN ACTIVE RWY UNTIL REACHING THE DEP END. IN ADDITION; THERE ARE SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING RWY 13R/13L 'ALTERNATE MISSED APCH PROCS' CONTAINED IN THE DFW ORDER 7110.65M PARAGRAPH 8-15(C). THESE INSTRUCTIONS DO NOT CONCUR WITH THOSE PROCEDURAL INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN THE R&I BRIEFING ITEMS. AFTER HAVING READ AND INITIALED FOR BOTH BRIEFING ITEMS; I CONTACTED MY SUPVR AND EXPLAINED MY CONCERN OVER THE DISCREPANCIES INVOLVED WITH THESE VERY IMPORTANT AND CONFLICTING PROCS. MY SUPVR AGREED THAT THERE WERE DISCREPANCIES AND FORWARDED THAT INFO TO THE APPROPRIATE DEPT. SUPVR INFORMED ME THAT NO RESPONSE TO THE INQUIRY WAS MADE OTHER THAN THAT IT WOULD BE 'LOOKED AT.' 4 WKS LATER; AFTER RECEIVING NO FURTHER REPLY OR CLARIFICATION THROUGH MY SUPVR; I PREPARED A DETAILED PROCEDURAL PACKAGE ON THIS ISSUE; WHICH MY SUPVR FORWARDED TO THE OPS MGR. MY SUPVR INFORMED ME THAT OPS MGR AGREED THAT THERE WAS A 'PROCEDURAL PROB WITH THE BRIEFING ITEMS AND OUR ACTUAL PROCS;' AND THAT HE WOULD FORWARD TO THE APPROPRIATE PERSONS FOR RESOLUTION. 2 WKS AGO MY SUPVR INFORMED ME THAT THE TRAINING MGR FELT 'THERE WERE NO PROBS WITH THE BRIEFING ITEMS AS STATED.' FURTHER; HE SAID; 'THE PROBS WHICH PRECIPITATED THE BRIEFING ITEMS WERE REALLY MORE ASSOCIATED WITH DALLAS LOVE AND OTHER SATELLITE ARPTS.' AS OF TODAY; NO ACTION TO CORRECT THESE BRIEFING/PROCEDURAL PROBS HAS BEEN TAKEN. MY SUPVR CONSIDERS THE BRIEFING ITEMS TO BE IN ERROR AND TO FOLLOW THE DFW 7110.65M PROCS REGARDLESS OF THE INFO CONTAINED IN THE BRIEFING ITEMS. IT IS INHERENTLY DANGEROUS AND PROCEDURALLY NEGLIGENT TO ALLOW THIS TYPE OF SITUATION TO EXIST. THERE IS CLR AND OBVIOUS EVIDENCE THAT A SIGNIFICANT PROCEDURAL PROB HAS BEEN CREATED WHICH COULD CAUSE A SERIOUS MISHAP. DFW ATC PERSONNEL FROM DIFFERENT WORKING CREWS NOW HAVE MULTIPLE INTERPS OF THIS RULING AND NO CLR PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE. THERE HAVE BEEN INCIDENTS; INCLUDING OPERRORS IN THE PAST; CAUSED BY THE DIFFERING INTERPS AND LACK OF CLR PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE. PRIOR TO THE RELEASE OF THE STATED R&I ITEMS; THERE HAD BEEN SPECIAL TRAINING BRIEFINGS DONE STRESSING THE ACTUAL DFW 7110.65M MISSED APCH PROCS. IN ADDITION; THE CONTINUING TREND OF ISSUING PROCEDURAL DIRECTIVES AND MULTIPLE PROCEDURAL INTERPS THROUGH HAPHAZARD R&I BRIEFING ITEMS OUTSIDE OF THE NORMAL FAA ORDER/NOTICE POLICY CAUSES AN UNDUE BURDEN ON ATC PERSONNEL TO FULLY UNDERSTAND WHAT ACTUAL PROCEDURAL DIRECTIVES EXIST. IT IS COMMON PRACTICE FOR NUMEROUS PROCEDURAL CHANGES TO BE MADE OR INCORPORATED THROUGH UNDOCUMENTED R&I BRIEFING ITEMS AND THEN 'CAUGHT UP' EVERY YEAR OR SO IN OFFICIAL FACILITY DIRECTIVES (DFW ORDERS/NOTICES). BECAUSE THESE PROCEDURAL ITEMS (CONTAINED IN THE STATED BRIEFINGS) WERE ISSUED TO ALL DFW TWR CTLRS AND SUPVRS; DFW MGMNT SHOULD ISSUE CLR AND CONCISE PROCEDURAL DIRECTIVES THAT CLARIFIES ITS PROCEDURAL INTENT ON ALL DFW MISSED APCH PROCS AND DISMISSES THE PREVIOUS BRIEFING ITEMS AS ERRONEOUS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.