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Attributes | |
ACN | 715525 |
Time | |
Date | 200610 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : zfw.artcc |
State Reference | TX |
Altitude | msl single value : 30000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zfw.artcc tower : zzz.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | climbout : initial |
Route In Use | departure : on vectors |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zfw.artcc |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | EMB ERJ 145 ER&LR |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | cruise : enroute altitude change |
Route In Use | departure sid : n/s |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | government : faa |
Function | controller : radar |
Qualification | controller : radar |
Experience | controller radar : 12 |
ASRS Report | 715525 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : airborne less severe non adherence : required legal separation |
Independent Detector | atc equipment : conflict alert other controllera |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued alert controller : issued new clearance flight crew : took evasive action |
Consequence | faa : investigated |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 24000 vertical : 600 |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | ATC Human Performance |
Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Operational Error |
Narrative:
Air carrier Y departed dfw on a SID originally requesting FL320. Air carrier X was originally on the same SID also requesting FL320 but was put on a heading of 270 degrees by the low altitude controller. Both were handed off to my high altitude sector. Air carrier Y was given a final altitude of FL300 and left on the SID. Air carrier X was left on the heading of 270 degrees and climbed to FL320. Initially the MD80 had a normal climb rate comparable to other MD80's that day. The WX was fairly cool therefore climb rates were improved. I checked the winds and saw that they were coming from the southwest at around 60 KTS. I then gave the air carrier X the clearance to fly heading of 280 degrees; leaving FL300 cleared back onto the SID to be on top of the air carrier Y. The heading of 280 degrees was slightly less than parallel to the air carrier Y but if the air carrier X kept up the climb rate he was on and turned leaving FL300 for FL320 the aircraft would be separated. Was busy dealing with other aircraft on the southern edge of the airspace. When next checked the air carrier Y and air carrier X; realized that the air carrier X had made its turn back onto the SID. Was now approximately 7.5 NM from the air carrier Y showing an altitude of FL305. Immediately asked the air carrier X its altitude; the pilot responded FL305. Then gave the pilot a left turn 45 degrees immediately; to which no visible turn was seen. Then solicited numerous requests to report leaving FL310 to which the pilot responded that he was not at FL310 yet. Took the air carrier X almost 27 seconds to report leaving FL310. This is an estimated climb rate of 1000 FPM. The turn then was seen on the radar scope after separation had been lost. The MD80 appeared to have turned earlier than the clearance given and appeared to have been leaving FL310 before it was reported. Neither aircraft had a TCAS RA alert. Not sure if this would have prevented the error from occurring; but I believe the aircraft did turn earlier than the clearance and refrained from reporting out of the requested altitude. Climb rate seemed to have been reduced significantly from the originally shown rate on first communications. 3 different radar associates were plugged into the sector while both aircraft were on frequency. 1 veteran fpl; the other two a trainer and trainee. None of these controllers idented the situation as not working. ZFW is currently forcing every open sector to be staffed with a radar associate; traffic not being a factor in this decision. Therefore controllers are being plugged into associate position in a severely increased manner. This is resulting; I believe in a more lackadaisical attitude. Before this change of working conditions; radar associates were plugged into sectors when the controller needed help in relation to the traffic not to meet number requirements. I was slightly distraction by the traffic load on the southern edge of my airspace. But I believe the air carrier X MD80 did turn early at FL298 and purposely did not report when he left FL310. The radar showed him leaving FL310 approximately 2-3 radar hits before he reported. Also; controllers are becoming more and more disgruntled and lax on radar associated position not out of malice; but are being conditioned into boredom. Before the change of conditions in the control room; radar associates were put where needed for traffic. Controllers are getting mentally tired from plugging into sectors for 6 1/2 hours out of an 8 hour day. Most controllers don't mind this when they are actually working traffic. But day after day we are plugged into sectors as radar associates staring at an empty scope with the radar controller for up to 2 hours at a time. This results in 2-3 30 min breaks for the day. Controllers in general love their work and want to move traffic. We take great pride in our abilities and job. This new system of sector time is starting to unfortunately take its toll on morale and performance. I am not trying to excuse my mistake. I did have an error that I should have seen sooner. But it seems that there were also some contributing factors that should be looked at to help other controllers. Controllers don't mind sector time when the traffic demands it. To mentally tire out your workforce just to meet accounting numbers is taking a toll. Controllers are mentally fatigued which may contribute to an increase in operational incidents. We as controllers are just as worried about our performance as our management; however not in the same terms. They seem frightened to have another operational error; we want to stay sharp and focused in order to not have an operational error.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ZFW CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT FL300 WHEN VECTOR HDG TO CLB ABOVE LEVEL TFC WAS NOT ENOUGH TO MAINTAIN SEPARATION.
Narrative: ACR Y DEPARTED DFW ON A SID ORIGINALLY REQUESTING FL320. ACR X WAS ORIGINALLY ON THE SAME SID ALSO REQUESTING FL320 BUT WAS PUT ON A HDG OF 270 DEGS BY THE LOW ALT CTLR. BOTH WERE HANDED OFF TO MY HIGH ALT SECTOR. ACR Y WAS GIVEN A FINAL ALT OF FL300 AND LEFT ON THE SID. ACR X WAS LEFT ON THE HDG OF 270 DEGS AND CLBED TO FL320. INITIALLY THE MD80 HAD A NORMAL CLB RATE COMPARABLE TO OTHER MD80'S THAT DAY. THE WX WAS FAIRLY COOL THEREFORE CLB RATES WERE IMPROVED. I CHKED THE WINDS AND SAW THAT THEY WERE COMING FROM THE SW AT AROUND 60 KTS. I THEN GAVE THE ACR X THE CLRNC TO FLY HDG OF 280 DEGS; LEAVING FL300 CLRED BACK ONTO THE SID TO BE ON TOP OF THE ACR Y. THE HDG OF 280 DEGS WAS SLIGHTLY LESS THAN PARALLEL TO THE ACR Y BUT IF THE ACR X KEPT UP THE CLB RATE HE WAS ON AND TURNED LEAVING FL300 FOR FL320 THE ACFT WOULD BE SEPARATED. WAS BUSY DEALING WITH OTHER ACFT ON THE SOUTHERN EDGE OF THE AIRSPACE. WHEN NEXT CHKED THE ACR Y AND ACR X; REALIZED THAT THE ACR X HAD MADE ITS TURN BACK ONTO THE SID. WAS NOW APPROX 7.5 NM FROM THE ACR Y SHOWING AN ALT OF FL305. IMMEDIATELY ASKED THE ACR X ITS ALT; THE PLT RESPONDED FL305. THEN GAVE THE PLT A L TURN 45 DEGS IMMEDIATELY; TO WHICH NO VISIBLE TURN WAS SEEN. THEN SOLICITED NUMEROUS REQUESTS TO RPT LEAVING FL310 TO WHICH THE PLT RESPONDED THAT HE WAS NOT AT FL310 YET. TOOK THE ACR X ALMOST 27 SECONDS TO RPT LEAVING FL310. THIS IS AN ESTIMATED CLB RATE OF 1000 FPM. THE TURN THEN WAS SEEN ON THE RADAR SCOPE AFTER SEPARATION HAD BEEN LOST. THE MD80 APPEARED TO HAVE TURNED EARLIER THAN THE CLRNC GIVEN AND APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN LEAVING FL310 BEFORE IT WAS RPTED. NEITHER ACFT HAD A TCAS RA ALERT. NOT SURE IF THIS WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THE ERROR FROM OCCURRING; BUT I BELIEVE THE ACFT DID TURN EARLIER THAN THE CLRNC AND REFRAINED FROM RPTING OUT OF THE REQUESTED ALT. CLB RATE SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN REDUCED SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THE ORIGINALLY SHOWN RATE ON FIRST COMS. 3 DIFFERENT RADAR ASSOCIATES WERE PLUGGED INTO THE SECTOR WHILE BOTH ACFT WERE ON FREQ. 1 VETERAN FPL; THE OTHER TWO A TRAINER AND TRAINEE. NONE OF THESE CTLRS IDENTED THE SITUATION AS NOT WORKING. ZFW IS CURRENTLY FORCING EVERY OPEN SECTOR TO BE STAFFED WITH A RADAR ASSOCIATE; TFC NOT BEING A FACTOR IN THIS DECISION. THEREFORE CTLRS ARE BEING PLUGGED INTO ASSOCIATE POS IN A SEVERELY INCREASED MANNER. THIS IS RESULTING; I BELIEVE IN A MORE LACKADAISICAL ATTITUDE. BEFORE THIS CHANGE OF WORKING CONDITIONS; RADAR ASSOCIATES WERE PLUGGED INTO SECTORS WHEN THE CTLR NEEDED HELP IN RELATION TO THE TFC NOT TO MEET NUMBER REQUIREMENTS. I WAS SLIGHTLY DISTR BY THE TFC LOAD ON THE SOUTHERN EDGE OF MY AIRSPACE. BUT I BELIEVE THE ACR X MD80 DID TURN EARLY AT FL298 AND PURPOSELY DID NOT RPT WHEN HE LEFT FL310. THE RADAR SHOWED HIM LEAVING FL310 APPROX 2-3 RADAR HITS BEFORE HE RPTED. ALSO; CTLRS ARE BECOMING MORE AND MORE DISGRUNTLED AND LAX ON RADAR ASSOCIATED POS NOT OUT OF MALICE; BUT ARE BEING CONDITIONED INTO BOREDOM. BEFORE THE CHANGE OF CONDITIONS IN THE CTL ROOM; RADAR ASSOCIATES WERE PUT WHERE NEEDED FOR TFC. CTLRS ARE GETTING MENTALLY TIRED FROM PLUGGING INTO SECTORS FOR 6 1/2 HRS OUT OF AN 8 HR DAY. MOST CTLRS DON'T MIND THIS WHEN THEY ARE ACTUALLY WORKING TFC. BUT DAY AFTER DAY WE ARE PLUGGED INTO SECTORS AS RADAR ASSOCIATES STARING AT AN EMPTY SCOPE WITH THE RADAR CTLR FOR UP TO 2 HRS AT A TIME. THIS RESULTS IN 2-3 30 MIN BREAKS FOR THE DAY. CTLRS IN GENERAL LOVE THEIR WORK AND WANT TO MOVE TFC. WE TAKE GREAT PRIDE IN OUR ABILITIES AND JOB. THIS NEW SYS OF SECTOR TIME IS STARTING TO UNFORTUNATELY TAKE ITS TOLL ON MORALE AND PERFORMANCE. I AM NOT TRYING TO EXCUSE MY MISTAKE. I DID HAVE AN ERROR THAT I SHOULD HAVE SEEN SOONER. BUT IT SEEMS THAT THERE WERE ALSO SOME CONTRIBUTING FACTORS THAT SHOULD BE LOOKED AT TO HELP OTHER CTLRS. CTLRS DON'T MIND SECTOR TIME WHEN THE TFC DEMANDS IT. TO MENTALLY TIRE OUT YOUR WORKFORCE JUST TO MEET ACCOUNTING NUMBERS IS TAKING A TOLL. CTLRS ARE MENTALLY FATIGUED WHICH MAY CONTRIBUTE TO AN INCREASE IN OPERATIONAL INCIDENTS. WE AS CTLRS ARE JUST AS WORRIED ABOUT OUR PERFORMANCE AS OUR MGMNT; HOWEVER NOT IN THE SAME TERMS. THEY SEEM FRIGHTENED TO HAVE ANOTHER OPERROR; WE WANT TO STAY SHARP AND FOCUSED IN ORDER TO NOT HAVE AN OPERROR.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.