Narrative:

During climb out we noticed a red nose gear light start to flicker. After a short period of time; the ECAM displayed bscu #1 inoperative. The first officer was the PF and I ran the ECAM. Near top of climb the ECAM again sounded with multiple failures to include lgciu #1; lgciu #2; autothrust; flight directors; and autoplt #1 and autoplt #2 and at least 1 bscu. The first officer continued to fly and assumed communications with ATC as I worked the ECAM's and tried to establish communication with dispatch and maintenance. After multiple attempts; I was able to make contact and explained what we were seeing. He had us pull lgciu #1 circuit breaker and reset it. This did not restore the lgciu. He then had us pull and reset lgciu #2 circuit breaker with no success. We then tried to regain the autoplt; flight directors and autothrust and were successful. Maintenance indicated with the number of system involved he would need to research it and get back to us. We used this time to discuss what we may have to contend with upon landing if we could not recover the lgciu's and bscu's. The first officer proceeded to determine the landing performance penalties and pull out the numerous flight handbook irregular checklists that would be required. I contacted the purser and had her come to the cockpit to discuss the possibility of a divert and what to expect on landing. I also let her know that we were still trying to resolve the problem and we would keep her apprised of our status. Prior to maintenance getting back to us; my pfd failed and we got a bleed #2 ECAM fault in addition to the earlier failures. Some of the system faults were recurring and we elected to emergency cancel known prior faults to minimize some of the distrs. I notified maintenance control and dispatch of the additional failures. Because of the number of system involved and the inability to determine what was actually going on with the aircraft I decided that we should divert to ZZZ. Dispatch and maintenance concurred. We were approximately 35-40 mins from landing. The flight attendants were informed and a passenger PA announcement was made. A cabin advisory was issued and we informed the purser that when we lowered the gear we would call her to let her know if we would need to come to a complete stop after landing to prepare for a tow-in. Coordination was handled by dispatch with the station about the possibility of needing to be towed from the runway. We informed ATC of our need to divert and declared an emergency. The first officer and I discussed the duties and the time line of everything that needed to be accomplished based on what system we had after configuring for landing. I then assumed the PF duties. We selected the longest runway into the wind (at ZZZ). The gear did not extend normally; so the first officer proceeded to follow the manual gear extension checklist. With the gear down and locked we informed the flight attendants that we would plan on being towed to the gate. ATC was informed that we would try to clear the runway but that there was a possibility that we might be unable. The approach and overweight landing (approximately 145200 pounds) were normal with a smooth touchdown. We cleared the runway on the high speed with no directional control issues and came to a stop. Exterior inspection was done by the fire department and after a short delay the tug arrived to bring us to the gate. Brake temperatures remained green. ATC did issue us a discrete frequency to communicate with emergency personnel. After arriving at the gate; we briefed the mechanics and were told by operations that there was an aircraft that would fly us on to destination. I then called the crew desk to see if they needed us to remain with the aircraft or continue on with the passenger. I was told that we were the scheduled crew for the continuation to destination. I spoke to the chief pilot and expressed my concerns about the lack of professional courtesy extended to us after a very demanding flight. I feel strongly that we should have received a call from the chief pilot prior to being reassigned after the emergency that we had just handled. If safety is truly our #1 priority; crew contact by flight operations should be mandatory after such an event. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: maintenance could not find a definitive reason for all the ECAM warnings. The brake and landing gear computers were changed which seemed to solve the problem. Why these computers caused autoplt; flight director; and autothrust problems is unknown.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 CREW EXPERIENCES MULTIPLE ECAM WARNINGS CONCERNING BRAKES; STEERING; AND LNDG GEAR.

Narrative: DURING CLBOUT WE NOTICED A RED NOSE GEAR LIGHT START TO FLICKER. AFTER A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME; THE ECAM DISPLAYED BSCU #1 INOP. THE FO WAS THE PF AND I RAN THE ECAM. NEAR TOP OF CLB THE ECAM AGAIN SOUNDED WITH MULTIPLE FAILURES TO INCLUDE LGCIU #1; LGCIU #2; AUTOTHRUST; FLT DIRECTORS; AND AUTOPLT #1 AND AUTOPLT #2 AND AT LEAST 1 BSCU. THE FO CONTINUED TO FLY AND ASSUMED COMS WITH ATC AS I WORKED THE ECAM'S AND TRIED TO ESTABLISH COM WITH DISPATCH AND MAINT. AFTER MULTIPLE ATTEMPTS; I WAS ABLE TO MAKE CONTACT AND EXPLAINED WHAT WE WERE SEEING. HE HAD US PULL LGCIU #1 CIRCUIT BREAKER AND RESET IT. THIS DID NOT RESTORE THE LGCIU. HE THEN HAD US PULL AND RESET LGCIU #2 CIRCUIT BREAKER WITH NO SUCCESS. WE THEN TRIED TO REGAIN THE AUTOPLT; FLT DIRECTORS AND AUTOTHRUST AND WERE SUCCESSFUL. MAINT INDICATED WITH THE NUMBER OF SYS INVOLVED HE WOULD NEED TO RESEARCH IT AND GET BACK TO US. WE USED THIS TIME TO DISCUSS WHAT WE MAY HAVE TO CONTEND WITH UPON LNDG IF WE COULD NOT RECOVER THE LGCIU'S AND BSCU'S. THE FO PROCEEDED TO DETERMINE THE LNDG PERFORMANCE PENALTIES AND PULL OUT THE NUMEROUS FLT HANDBOOK IRREGULAR CHKLISTS THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED. I CONTACTED THE PURSER AND HAD HER COME TO THE COCKPIT TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF A DIVERT AND WHAT TO EXPECT ON LNDG. I ALSO LET HER KNOW THAT WE WERE STILL TRYING TO RESOLVE THE PROB AND WE WOULD KEEP HER APPRISED OF OUR STATUS. PRIOR TO MAINT GETTING BACK TO US; MY PFD FAILED AND WE GOT A BLEED #2 ECAM FAULT IN ADDITION TO THE EARLIER FAILURES. SOME OF THE SYS FAULTS WERE RECURRING AND WE ELECTED TO EMER CANCEL KNOWN PRIOR FAULTS TO MINIMIZE SOME OF THE DISTRS. I NOTIFIED MAINT CTL AND DISPATCH OF THE ADDITIONAL FAILURES. BECAUSE OF THE NUMBER OF SYS INVOLVED AND THE INABILITY TO DETERMINE WHAT WAS ACTUALLY GOING ON WITH THE ACFT I DECIDED THAT WE SHOULD DIVERT TO ZZZ. DISPATCH AND MAINT CONCURRED. WE WERE APPROX 35-40 MINS FROM LNDG. THE FLT ATTENDANTS WERE INFORMED AND A PAX PA ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE. A CABIN ADVISORY WAS ISSUED AND WE INFORMED THE PURSER THAT WHEN WE LOWERED THE GEAR WE WOULD CALL HER TO LET HER KNOW IF WE WOULD NEED TO COME TO A COMPLETE STOP AFTER LNDG TO PREPARE FOR A TOW-IN. COORD WAS HANDLED BY DISPATCH WITH THE STATION ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF NEEDING TO BE TOWED FROM THE RWY. WE INFORMED ATC OF OUR NEED TO DIVERT AND DECLARED AN EMER. THE FO AND I DISCUSSED THE DUTIES AND THE TIME LINE OF EVERYTHING THAT NEEDED TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BASED ON WHAT SYS WE HAD AFTER CONFIGURING FOR LNDG. I THEN ASSUMED THE PF DUTIES. WE SELECTED THE LONGEST RWY INTO THE WIND (AT ZZZ). THE GEAR DID NOT EXTEND NORMALLY; SO THE FO PROCEEDED TO FOLLOW THE MANUAL GEAR EXTENSION CHKLIST. WITH THE GEAR DOWN AND LOCKED WE INFORMED THE FLT ATTENDANTS THAT WE WOULD PLAN ON BEING TOWED TO THE GATE. ATC WAS INFORMED THAT WE WOULD TRY TO CLR THE RWY BUT THAT THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY THAT WE MIGHT BE UNABLE. THE APCH AND OVERWT LNDG (APPROX 145200 LBS) WERE NORMAL WITH A SMOOTH TOUCHDOWN. WE CLRED THE RWY ON THE HIGH SPD WITH NO DIRECTIONAL CTL ISSUES AND CAME TO A STOP. EXTERIOR INSPECTION WAS DONE BY THE FIRE DEPT AND AFTER A SHORT DELAY THE TUG ARRIVED TO BRING US TO THE GATE. BRAKE TEMPS REMAINED GREEN. ATC DID ISSUE US A DISCRETE FREQ TO COMMUNICATE WITH EMER PERSONNEL. AFTER ARRIVING AT THE GATE; WE BRIEFED THE MECHS AND WERE TOLD BY OPS THAT THERE WAS AN ACFT THAT WOULD FLY US ON TO DEST. I THEN CALLED THE CREW DESK TO SEE IF THEY NEEDED US TO REMAIN WITH THE ACFT OR CONTINUE ON WITH THE PAX. I WAS TOLD THAT WE WERE THE SCHEDULED CREW FOR THE CONTINUATION TO DEST. I SPOKE TO THE CHIEF PLT AND EXPRESSED MY CONCERNS ABOUT THE LACK OF PROFESSIONAL COURTESY EXTENDED TO US AFTER A VERY DEMANDING FLT. I FEEL STRONGLY THAT WE SHOULD HAVE RECEIVED A CALL FROM THE CHIEF PLT PRIOR TO BEING REASSIGNED AFTER THE EMER THAT WE HAD JUST HANDLED. IF SAFETY IS TRULY OUR #1 PRIORITY; CREW CONTACT BY FLT OPS SHOULD BE MANDATORY AFTER SUCH AN EVENT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: MAINT COULD NOT FIND A DEFINITIVE REASON FOR ALL THE ECAM WARNINGS. THE BRAKE AND LNDG GEAR COMPUTERS WERE CHANGED WHICH SEEMED TO SOLVE THE PROB. WHY THESE COMPUTERS CAUSED AUTOPLT; FLT DIRECTOR; AND AUTOTHRUST PROBS IS UNKNOWN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.