Narrative:

During an approach to ZZZ runway 15R my captain and I encountered severe WX which; during the course of our arrival; resulted in 2 missed approachs (one of which was due to encountering windshear) and ended up with a flap placard airspeed exceedance and a possible altitude bust. Contributing factors to these events began on day 1 of a 2 day trip. The captain seemed uninterested in any input that I contributed and would let me know so in a dismissive manner (eg; day 1: when going into phx it was a clear day but I choose to brief the visual approach backed up with the ILS. When I began reading out the ILS frequency he cut me off and said that he had no need to hear any of the briefing strip. Day 2: prior to taxiing out at phx I was pointing out that both the inner and the outer taxiway were closed in the direction of the takeoff runway. When I tried to point this out he informed me that this was irrelevant as the ground controller would tell him where to go). This and other exchanges set the stage for the events that took place at ZZZ. I was the PF on the last leg of the sequence into ZZZ. The WX was significant; winds gusting to 38 KTS; rain and IMC conditions along with a PIREP that had just came over the ACARS for severe turbulence at nearby dca. I began to brief the approach when the captain stated that he was very familiar with the approach and he did not need to hear anymore. This shut down an opportunity to discuss the possible challenges that may lie ahead (eg; go around; escape maneuvers; the WX conditions; etc). I asked the captain to inquire how the rides were; was anyone getting in. He did not respond to me. We continued on and initiated the approach. Descending on the glide path we encountered light/moderate turbulence and an airspeed increase of 40 KTS. I pointed this out and I asked if he wanted to go around. The captain did not respond. Instead; he reached down and extended the speed brakes. I was very uncomfortable with this; and stated out loud that we will more than likely lose that airspeed so the speed brakes should be stowed. Again; the captain did not respond. A few moments after the speed brake was stowed at approximately 300-500 ft AGL the windshear alert was activated. I immediately executed the escape maneuver. The climb out of windshear was rapid so I called for flaps and gear retraction. The captain did not respond. I had to repeat the calls several times. This distraction me and the aircraft began to accelerate. After leveling off and correcting the airspeed; I noticed that the flaps had not been retracted and were still at position 1 degree. At this point; I called for flaps up and noted the airspeed was 250 KTS. To my surprise the captain informed ATC that he wanted to immediately try another approach without discussing the happenings of the last approach or if I was comfortable with that plan; which I was not. I suggested that we go and hold and let the WX improve. The captain did not respond. At this point another air carrier flight was cleared for the approach and we were sequenced behind it. I reluctantly went along with this. Conditions on the approach were not that different from the first approach and it was no surprise that the air carrier also went missed approach. I pointed this out and suggested we do the same. The captain did not respond. I said it again; I asked the captain to find out why company went missed approach. It took a few seconds for the captain to respond; but he said that we should just start a regular climb; no need for a full go around. I was relieved that we were abandoning the approach; and called for flap and gear retraction. This did not go smoothly either. During the climb out; I understood that the clearance was to maintain runway heading to 4000 ft. Upon leveloff the altitude window showed 3000 ft (published missed approach is 2500 ft). I mistook that as the last assigned altitude before GS intercept. I thought the captain had simply not reset it yet. We immediately disclosed our altitude ATC and no more was said about it. Therefore in retrospect I am unsure if we broke an altitude or not. We flew back around and requested holding until the WX improved; a few mins later it did and we made an uneventful approach and landing. Lessons learned: 1) I should have insisted that we brief the full approach in less than VMC condition. 2) I should have been more pro-active in the retraction of the flaps and gear. 3) animosity leads to safety being compromised. So avoid it. 4) trust my own judgement and be more assertive about my concerns. Suggestion: perhaps we should consider making it procedure to brief the actual windshear maneuver if the WX conditions warrant. Could have helped things go a lot smoother.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 FLT CREW ENCOUNTERS WINDSHEAR DURING APCH; EXECUTES A MISSED APCH; EXCEEDS FLAP SPD AND UNDERSHOOTS ASSIGNED ALT AT BWI.

Narrative: DURING AN APCH TO ZZZ RWY 15R MY CAPT AND I ENCOUNTERED SEVERE WX WHICH; DURING THE COURSE OF OUR ARR; RESULTED IN 2 MISSED APCHS (ONE OF WHICH WAS DUE TO ENCOUNTERING WINDSHEAR) AND ENDED UP WITH A FLAP PLACARD AIRSPD EXCEEDANCE AND A POSSIBLE ALT BUST. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THESE EVENTS BEGAN ON DAY 1 OF A 2 DAY TRIP. THE CAPT SEEMED UNINTERESTED IN ANY INPUT THAT I CONTRIBUTED AND WOULD LET ME KNOW SO IN A DISMISSIVE MANNER (EG; DAY 1: WHEN GOING INTO PHX IT WAS A CLR DAY BUT I CHOOSE TO BRIEF THE VISUAL APCH BACKED UP WITH THE ILS. WHEN I BEGAN READING OUT THE ILS FREQ HE CUT ME OFF AND SAID THAT HE HAD NO NEED TO HEAR ANY OF THE BRIEFING STRIP. DAY 2: PRIOR TO TAXIING OUT AT PHX I WAS POINTING OUT THAT BOTH THE INNER AND THE OUTER TXWY WERE CLOSED IN THE DIRECTION OF THE TKOF RWY. WHEN I TRIED TO POINT THIS OUT HE INFORMED ME THAT THIS WAS IRRELEVANT AS THE GND CTLR WOULD TELL HIM WHERE TO GO). THIS AND OTHER EXCHANGES SET THE STAGE FOR THE EVENTS THAT TOOK PLACE AT ZZZ. I WAS THE PF ON THE LAST LEG OF THE SEQUENCE INTO ZZZ. THE WX WAS SIGNIFICANT; WINDS GUSTING TO 38 KTS; RAIN AND IMC CONDITIONS ALONG WITH A PIREP THAT HAD JUST CAME OVER THE ACARS FOR SEVERE TURB AT NEARBY DCA. I BEGAN TO BRIEF THE APCH WHEN THE CAPT STATED THAT HE WAS VERY FAMILIAR WITH THE APCH AND HE DID NOT NEED TO HEAR ANYMORE. THIS SHUT DOWN AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBLE CHALLENGES THAT MAY LIE AHEAD (EG; GAR; ESCAPE MANEUVERS; THE WX CONDITIONS; ETC). I ASKED THE CAPT TO INQUIRE HOW THE RIDES WERE; WAS ANYONE GETTING IN. HE DID NOT RESPOND TO ME. WE CONTINUED ON AND INITIATED THE APCH. DSNDING ON THE GLIDE PATH WE ENCOUNTERED LIGHT/MODERATE TURB AND AN AIRSPD INCREASE OF 40 KTS. I POINTED THIS OUT AND I ASKED IF HE WANTED TO GO AROUND. THE CAPT DID NOT RESPOND. INSTEAD; HE REACHED DOWN AND EXTENDED THE SPD BRAKES. I WAS VERY UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THIS; AND STATED OUT LOUD THAT WE WILL MORE THAN LIKELY LOSE THAT AIRSPD SO THE SPD BRAKES SHOULD BE STOWED. AGAIN; THE CAPT DID NOT RESPOND. A FEW MOMENTS AFTER THE SPD BRAKE WAS STOWED AT APPROX 300-500 FT AGL THE WINDSHEAR ALERT WAS ACTIVATED. I IMMEDIATELY EXECUTED THE ESCAPE MANEUVER. THE CLBOUT OF WINDSHEAR WAS RAPID SO I CALLED FOR FLAPS AND GEAR RETRACTION. THE CAPT DID NOT RESPOND. I HAD TO REPEAT THE CALLS SEVERAL TIMES. THIS DISTR ME AND THE ACFT BEGAN TO ACCELERATE. AFTER LEVELING OFF AND CORRECTING THE AIRSPD; I NOTICED THAT THE FLAPS HAD NOT BEEN RETRACTED AND WERE STILL AT POS 1 DEG. AT THIS POINT; I CALLED FOR FLAPS UP AND NOTED THE AIRSPD WAS 250 KTS. TO MY SURPRISE THE CAPT INFORMED ATC THAT HE WANTED TO IMMEDIATELY TRY ANOTHER APCH WITHOUT DISCUSSING THE HAPPENINGS OF THE LAST APCH OR IF I WAS COMFORTABLE WITH THAT PLAN; WHICH I WAS NOT. I SUGGESTED THAT WE GO AND HOLD AND LET THE WX IMPROVE. THE CAPT DID NOT RESPOND. AT THIS POINT ANOTHER ACR FLT WAS CLRED FOR THE APCH AND WE WERE SEQUENCED BEHIND IT. I RELUCTANTLY WENT ALONG WITH THIS. CONDITIONS ON THE APCH WERE NOT THAT DIFFERENT FROM THE FIRST APCH AND IT WAS NO SURPRISE THAT THE ACR ALSO WENT MISSED APCH. I POINTED THIS OUT AND SUGGESTED WE DO THE SAME. THE CAPT DID NOT RESPOND. I SAID IT AGAIN; I ASKED THE CAPT TO FIND OUT WHY COMPANY WENT MISSED APCH. IT TOOK A FEW SECONDS FOR THE CAPT TO RESPOND; BUT HE SAID THAT WE SHOULD JUST START A REGULAR CLB; NO NEED FOR A FULL GAR. I WAS RELIEVED THAT WE WERE ABANDONING THE APCH; AND CALLED FOR FLAP AND GEAR RETRACTION. THIS DID NOT GO SMOOTHLY EITHER. DURING THE CLBOUT; I UNDERSTOOD THAT THE CLRNC WAS TO MAINTAIN RWY HDG TO 4000 FT. UPON LEVELOFF THE ALT WINDOW SHOWED 3000 FT (PUBLISHED MISSED APCH IS 2500 FT). I MISTOOK THAT AS THE LAST ASSIGNED ALT BEFORE GS INTERCEPT. I THOUGHT THE CAPT HAD SIMPLY NOT RESET IT YET. WE IMMEDIATELY DISCLOSED OUR ALT ATC AND NO MORE WAS SAID ABOUT IT. THEREFORE IN RETROSPECT I AM UNSURE IF WE BROKE AN ALT OR NOT. WE FLEW BACK AROUND AND REQUESTED HOLDING UNTIL THE WX IMPROVED; A FEW MINS LATER IT DID AND WE MADE AN UNEVENTFUL APCH AND LNDG. LESSONS LEARNED: 1) I SHOULD HAVE INSISTED THAT WE BRIEF THE FULL APCH IN LESS THAN VMC CONDITION. 2) I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE PRO-ACTIVE IN THE RETRACTION OF THE FLAPS AND GEAR. 3) ANIMOSITY LEADS TO SAFETY BEING COMPROMISED. SO AVOID IT. 4) TRUST MY OWN JUDGEMENT AND BE MORE ASSERTIVE ABOUT MY CONCERNS. SUGGESTION: PERHAPS WE SHOULD CONSIDER MAKING IT PROC TO BRIEF THE ACTUAL WINDSHEAR MANEUVER IF THE WX CONDITIONS WARRANT. COULD HAVE HELPED THINGS GO A LOT SMOOTHER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.