Narrative:

En route; I decided to practice an ILS approach at easton. I intercepted the VOR approximately 8 mi out; but could not pick up the ILS for runway 4. After failing to pick up the ILS; I elected to perform a visual approach and touch-and-go on runway 4. There was another aircraft behind me also performing the ILS runway 4 with a low approach. During the approach there were many calls over CTAF from airports across the region; including calls stepping on other calls. When I was on short final; just before the numbers; just as I got a visual on another aircraft; he alerted on CTAF that he was on short final for runway 33. At the time he was probably 1500 ft at my 2 O'clock position; moving from right to left. I immediately initiated a go around; banking to the left (approximately 15 degree roll). I added forward pressure to compensate for propeller wash; but I was at 30 degree flaps and the stall warning did go off slightly. I do not remember if I added right rudder. The other aircraft performed a go around and banked slightly to the right of runway 33. We were abeam each other until I turned to the left; cleared a bank of trees; reduced flaps and climbed to the south. After passing the other aircraft performing the ILS runway 4 I turned back to the north. I elected to continue flight to baltimore. I identify 2 problems: the inability of both pilots to detect the impending conflict earlier; and my choice to maneuver to the left rather than right. The initial incident arose because of inadequate communication over CTAF. I only made 2 calls during my approach; partly because the frequency was busy. Although I remember the calls from the pilot in the pattern for runway 33; I thought it was for a different airport. I was preoccupied with whether the aircraft behind me on ILS runway 4 had me in sight; and why I could not pick up the ILS. In addition; I was not forceful in instructing my passenger about the sterile cockpit; and although I ignored their occasional comments; it did add another distraction. Afterwards the other pilot stated over CTAF that he thought I was performing a low approach; not a touch and go. I believe he confused me with the other aircraft on ILS runway 4; which said it was performing a low approach. When I recognized the potential conflict; the other aircraft was at my 2 O'clock position. During the go around I instinctively banked to the left. However; since it was traveling right to left; I should have banked to the right. This would have reduced the amount of low-altitude maneuvering that would have been required; reducing the chance of a stall/spin; as well as an encounter with ground obstructions. Indeed; the other aircraft would likely have been cleared of my flight path if I had continued straight. My plan to avoid such situations in the future is more practice communicating at uncontrolled fields. Since my home airport is controled; my experience is limited in communicating at uncontrolled fields. I am also not going to do an approach at an uncontrolled field other than on the active runway until I have further training with an instructor.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PRIVATE PLT OF C172 ON VISUAL APCH TO RWY 04 AT ESN HAS MODERATELY CLOSE ENCOUNTER WITH ACFT ON APCH TO INTERSECTING RWY 33.

Narrative: ENRTE; I DECIDED TO PRACTICE AN ILS APCH AT EASTON. I INTERCEPTED THE VOR APPROX 8 MI OUT; BUT COULD NOT PICK UP THE ILS FOR RWY 4. AFTER FAILING TO PICK UP THE ILS; I ELECTED TO PERFORM A VISUAL APCH AND TOUCH-AND-GO ON RWY 4. THERE WAS ANOTHER ACFT BEHIND ME ALSO PERFORMING THE ILS RWY 4 WITH A LOW APCH. DURING THE APCH THERE WERE MANY CALLS OVER CTAF FROM ARPTS ACROSS THE REGION; INCLUDING CALLS STEPPING ON OTHER CALLS. WHEN I WAS ON SHORT FINAL; JUST BEFORE THE NUMBERS; JUST AS I GOT A VISUAL ON ANOTHER ACFT; HE ALERTED ON CTAF THAT HE WAS ON SHORT FINAL FOR RWY 33. AT THE TIME HE WAS PROBABLY 1500 FT AT MY 2 O'CLOCK POS; MOVING FROM R TO L. I IMMEDIATELY INITIATED A GAR; BANKING TO THE L (APPROX 15 DEG ROLL). I ADDED FORWARD PRESSURE TO COMPENSATE FOR PROP WASH; BUT I WAS AT 30 DEG FLAPS AND THE STALL WARNING DID GO OFF SLIGHTLY. I DO NOT REMEMBER IF I ADDED R RUDDER. THE OTHER ACFT PERFORMED A GAR AND BANKED SLIGHTLY TO THE R OF RWY 33. WE WERE ABEAM EACH OTHER UNTIL I TURNED TO THE L; CLRED A BANK OF TREES; REDUCED FLAPS AND CLBED TO THE S. AFTER PASSING THE OTHER ACFT PERFORMING THE ILS RWY 4 I TURNED BACK TO THE N. I ELECTED TO CONTINUE FLT TO BALTIMORE. I IDENT 2 PROBS: THE INABILITY OF BOTH PLTS TO DETECT THE IMPENDING CONFLICT EARLIER; AND MY CHOICE TO MANEUVER TO THE L RATHER THAN R. THE INITIAL INCIDENT AROSE BECAUSE OF INADEQUATE COM OVER CTAF. I ONLY MADE 2 CALLS DURING MY APCH; PARTLY BECAUSE THE FREQ WAS BUSY. ALTHOUGH I REMEMBER THE CALLS FROM THE PLT IN THE PATTERN FOR RWY 33; I THOUGHT IT WAS FOR A DIFFERENT ARPT. I WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH WHETHER THE ACFT BEHIND ME ON ILS RWY 4 HAD ME IN SIGHT; AND WHY I COULD NOT PICK UP THE ILS. IN ADDITION; I WAS NOT FORCEFUL IN INSTRUCTING MY PAX ABOUT THE STERILE COCKPIT; AND ALTHOUGH I IGNORED THEIR OCCASIONAL COMMENTS; IT DID ADD ANOTHER DISTR. AFTERWARDS THE OTHER PLT STATED OVER CTAF THAT HE THOUGHT I WAS PERFORMING A LOW APCH; NOT A TOUCH AND GO. I BELIEVE HE CONFUSED ME WITH THE OTHER ACFT ON ILS RWY 4; WHICH SAID IT WAS PERFORMING A LOW APCH. WHEN I RECOGNIZED THE POTENTIAL CONFLICT; THE OTHER ACFT WAS AT MY 2 O'CLOCK POS. DURING THE GAR I INSTINCTIVELY BANKED TO THE L. HOWEVER; SINCE IT WAS TRAVELING R TO L; I SHOULD HAVE BANKED TO THE R. THIS WOULD HAVE REDUCED THE AMOUNT OF LOW-ALT MANEUVERING THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN REQUIRED; REDUCING THE CHANCE OF A STALL/SPIN; AS WELL AS AN ENCOUNTER WITH GND OBSTRUCTIONS. INDEED; THE OTHER ACFT WOULD LIKELY HAVE BEEN CLRED OF MY FLT PATH IF I HAD CONTINUED STRAIGHT. MY PLAN TO AVOID SUCH SITUATIONS IN THE FUTURE IS MORE PRACTICE COMMUNICATING AT UNCTLED FIELDS. SINCE MY HOME ARPT IS CTLED; MY EXPERIENCE IS LIMITED IN COMMUNICATING AT UNCTLED FIELDS. I AM ALSO NOT GOING TO DO AN APCH AT AN UNCTLED FIELD OTHER THAN ON THE ACTIVE RWY UNTIL I HAVE FURTHER TRAINING WITH AN INSTRUCTOR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.