Narrative:

After takeoff runway 25R; we made contact with departure control and proceeded on the SID; reference (1). At approximately 1000 ft just after flap retraction both captain's and first officer's navigation displays went blank; and displayed 'no data available.' it was approximately 45 to 50 seconds before we were able to get a break in radio traffic in order to transmit to ATC that our RNAV was inoperative. In the meantime; lacking guidance; we remained on our last heading towards the 'general' direction of hiper intersection. We remained below 3000 ft; as this appeared to be the most common sense thing to do. Fortunately; the weather was cavu. We ultimately contacted ATC; informed them of the outage. They subsequently cleared us to 10000 ft and direct to thermal (trm) VOR. Fortunately I have taken it upon myself to write the frequency of the vors on my RNAV charts just in the event of such a contingency. Thus; we were able to navigation promptly to trm. Issue: 1) there is no immediate action navigation guidance provided except that in (reference 2). 2) the unpublished frequencys for ground navigation facilities on RNAV charts. Comment: the lack of a specific procedure in the event of this type of failure is negligent. The precision navigation that is desired in high-density environments is too critical to be waiting a break in the communications for instructions. This applies to arrs as well as departures. The decision to not publish the frequency for navaids on RNAV charts is a defective one. This policy wholly violates one of the most ardent philosophies in aviation; 'to use all the navigation aids available.' going heads down to retrieve an additional chart in order locate a frequency; is stupid. It does not reflect what we pilots are doing in the field...ie; we are writing them in anyway. Yes; there is a chance of misplaced switchology commanding a guidance system to navigate erroneously. However; it is a minutia argument. Recommendation: 1) provide a specific procedure on each plate to enact in the event of an RNAV failure; in addition to notifying ATC. 2) print the frequencies of all navaids depicted on the RNAV chart.callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that with the loss of both navigation displays (nd's) that there is no other way to navigate an RNAV departure. The controller was extremely busy and the flight crew had a difficult time establishing communications. The reporter was concerned that the RNAV departure charts do not have any VOR frequencys indicated; no lost communication procedures and no loss of navigation equipment procedures. He stated that the WX was VFR; thereby affording some relief; however; if the WX had been IMC the flight crew would have had a far greater task with no place to go and no procedures to follow. The reporter feels that the frequency for the vors and a lost communication/lost navigation procedure would help with the task.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD81 FLT CREW HAS LOSS OF NAV DISPLAY (ND) DURING HOLTZ SEVEN RNAV DEP FROM LAX.

Narrative: AFTER TKOF RWY 25R; WE MADE CONTACT WITH DEP CTL AND PROCEEDED ON THE SID; REF (1). AT APPROX 1000 FT JUST AFTER FLAP RETRACTION BOTH CAPT'S AND FO'S NAV DISPLAYS WENT BLANK; AND DISPLAYED 'NO DATA AVAILABLE.' IT WAS APPROX 45 TO 50 SECONDS BEFORE WE WERE ABLE TO GET A BREAK IN RADIO TFC IN ORDER TO TRANSMIT TO ATC THAT OUR RNAV WAS INOPERATIVE. IN THE MEANTIME; LACKING GUIDANCE; WE REMAINED ON OUR LAST HEADING TOWARDS THE 'GENERAL' DIRECTION OF HIPER INTXN. WE REMAINED BELOW 3000 FT; AS THIS APPEARED TO BE THE MOST COMMON SENSE THING TO DO. FORTUNATELY; THE WEATHER WAS CAVU. WE ULTIMATELY CONTACTED ATC; INFORMED THEM OF THE OUTAGE. THEY SUBSEQUENTLY CLRED US TO 10000 FT AND DIRECT TO THERMAL (TRM) VOR. FORTUNATELY I HAVE TAKEN IT UPON MYSELF TO WRITE THE FREQ OF THE VORS ON MY RNAV CHARTS JUST IN THE EVENT OF SUCH A CONTINGENCY. THUS; WE WERE ABLE TO NAV PROMPTLY TO TRM. ISSUE: 1) THERE IS NO IMMEDIATE ACTION NAVIGATION GUIDANCE PROVIDED EXCEPT THAT IN (REF 2). 2) THE UNPUBLISHED FREQS FOR GND NAVIGATION FACILITIES ON RNAV CHARTS. COMMENT: THE LACK OF A SPECIFIC PROC IN THE EVENT OF THIS TYPE OF FAILURE IS NEGLIGENT. THE PRECISION NAV THAT IS DESIRED IN HIGH-DENSITY ENVIRONMENTS IS TOO CRITICAL TO BE WAITING A BREAK IN THE COMS FOR INSTRUCTIONS. THIS APPLIES TO ARRS AS WELL AS DEPS. THE DECISION TO NOT PUBLISH THE FREQUENCY FOR NAVAIDS ON RNAV CHARTS IS A DEFECTIVE ONE. THIS POLICY WHOLLY VIOLATES ONE OF THE MOST ARDENT PHILOSOPHIES IN AVIATION; 'TO USE ALL THE NAVIGATION AIDS AVAILABLE.' GOING HEADS DOWN TO RETRIEVE AN ADDITIONAL CHART IN ORDER LOCATE A FREQ; IS STUPID. IT DOES NOT REFLECT WHAT WE PLTS ARE DOING IN THE FIELD...IE; WE ARE WRITING THEM IN ANYWAY. YES; THERE IS A CHANCE OF MISPLACED SWITCHOLOGY COMMANDING A GUIDANCE SYSTEM TO NAVIGATE ERRONEOUSLY. HOWEVER; IT IS A MINUTIA ARGUMENT. RECOMMENDATION: 1) PROVIDE A SPECIFIC PROC ON EACH PLATE TO ENACT IN THE EVENT OF AN RNAV FAILURE; IN ADDITION TO NOTIFYING ATC. 2) PRINT THE FREQUENCIES OF ALL NAVAIDS DEPICTED ON THE RNAV CHART.CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT WITH THE LOSS OF BOTH NAV DISPLAYS (ND'S) THAT THERE IS NO OTHER WAY TO NAVIGATE AN RNAV DEP. THE CTLR WAS EXTREMELY BUSY AND THE FLT CREW HAD A DIFFICULT TIME ESTABLISHING COMS. THE RPTR WAS CONCERNED THAT THE RNAV DEP CHARTS DO NOT HAVE ANY VOR FREQS INDICATED; NO LOST COM PROCS AND NO LOSS OF NAV EQUIPMENT PROCS. HE STATED THAT THE WX WAS VFR; THEREBY AFFORDING SOME RELIEF; HOWEVER; IF THE WX HAD BEEN IMC THE FLT CREW WOULD HAVE HAD A FAR GREATER TASK WITH NO PLACE TO GO AND NO PROCS TO FOLLOW. THE RPTR FEELS THAT THE FREQ FOR THE VORS AND A LOST COM/LOST NAV PROC WOULD HELP WITH THE TASK.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.