Narrative:

Background: two professionals (30 yrs+) who pride themselves on their planning; execution and attention to detail. Highly experienced in make and model. I have flown this departure (teb 5) hundreds of times including sim training. I have read the press about emphasis on these procedures at this airport. I felt I was primed and ready. Event: typical afternoon departure. Gate holds. Long taxi time...number eight for runway 24. We briefed the departure at least four times; programmed the FMS. Rechecked it...set the flight director...completed a takeoff briefing with emphasis on the departure. We had lots of time and were not rushed. Co-captain was pilot flying from the left seat. I was in the right seat (PNF). Takeoff was normal. Climb was brisk...we were light. PF started back with the power almost immediately after liftoff to decrease ascent. We made and acknowledged 'thousand to go call' for the mandatory 1500 foot level off. Level off was initiated on the flight director queue. Aircraft was being hand flown. Tower calls the frequency change to departure. I switch radios and begin to contact departure....and glanced at the altimeter only to see we're passing through 1700 ft! I was so dumbfounded that I couldn't speak just push the yoke forward. Total elapsed time from liftoff to this point was about 25 seconds. ATC (and I can't remember if it was tower or departure; it happened fast) commented on the climb above the mandatory altitude; chastised us and cleared us to 2000 ft. I acknowledged and got a short lecture that we need to level for traffic overhead. TCAS was clear at this time and I think the lecture was about procedures and not a comment on an actual separation issue. The controller was absolutely correct. We screwed up! I have no idea if formal action will be taken on this error. Aftermath: this incident shook both of us. We debriefed at length and still cannot figure out how we did it. My confidence has taken a serious blow because I think we did everything we could to follow procedures and fly a safe departure. The potential for FAA action is real and not something either of us want to face. Lesson learned: we've gone over this event for hours. We've arrived at two possible changes that might have prevented it. First is use of the autopilot. It's uncommon and not considered a good operating practice to select the autopilot in the first 30 seconds of flight but doing so might have prevented this infraction. Second is an ATC issue. Things happen fast in this environment and the perception of ATC load and urgency leads one to respond immediately to ATC instructions....at the expense of other priorities. Had I ignored the frequency change to departure directive or postponed my response for ten seconds; I might have been better help to the PF by focusing my attention on the pfd rather than the radio.719468 syn

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CE56 CREW EXCEEDS SID ALT ON DEP FOR TEB.

Narrative: BACKGROUND: TWO PROFESSIONALS (30 YRS+) WHO PRIDE THEMSELVES ON THEIR PLANNING; EXECUTION AND ATTENTION TO DETAIL. HIGHLY EXPERIENCED IN MAKE AND MODEL. I HAVE FLOWN THIS DEPARTURE (TEB 5) HUNDREDS OF TIMES INCLUDING SIM TRAINING. I HAVE READ THE PRESS ABOUT EMPHASIS ON THESE PROCEDURES AT THIS AIRPORT. I FELT I WAS PRIMED AND READY. EVENT: TYPICAL AFTERNOON DEP. GATE HOLDS. LONG TAXI TIME...NUMBER EIGHT FOR RWY 24. WE BRIEFED THE DEPARTURE AT LEAST FOUR TIMES; PROGRAMMED THE FMS. RECHECKED IT...SET THE FLIGHT DIRECTOR...COMPLETED A TAKEOFF BRIEFING WITH EMPHASIS ON THE DEPARTURE. WE HAD LOTS OF TIME AND WERE NOT RUSHED. CO-CAPT WAS PILOT FLYING FROM THE LEFT SEAT. I WAS IN THE RIGHT SEAT (PNF). TAKEOFF WAS NORMAL. CLIMB WAS BRISK...WE WERE LIGHT. PF STARTED BACK WITH THE POWER ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER LIFTOFF TO DECREASE ASCENT. WE MADE AND ACKNOWLEDGED 'THOUSAND TO GO CALL' FOR THE MANDATORY 1500 FOOT LEVEL OFF. LEVEL OFF WAS INITIATED ON THE FLIGHT DIRECTOR QUEUE. AIRCRAFT WAS BEING HAND FLOWN. TOWER CALLS THE FREQUENCY CHANGE TO DEP. I SWITCH RADIOS AND BEGIN TO CONTACT DEPARTURE....AND GLANCED AT THE ALTIMETER ONLY TO SEE WE'RE PASSING THROUGH 1700 FT! I WAS SO DUMBFOUNDED THAT I COULDN'T SPEAK JUST PUSH THE YOKE FORWARD. TOTAL ELAPSED TIME FROM LIFTOFF TO THIS POINT WAS ABOUT 25 SECONDS. ATC (AND I CAN'T REMEMBER IF IT WAS TOWER OR DEP; IT HAPPENED FAST) COMMENTED ON THE CLIMB ABOVE THE MANDATORY ALTITUDE; CHASTISED US AND CLEARED US TO 2000 FT. I ACKNOWLEDGED AND GOT A SHORT LECTURE THAT WE NEED TO LEVEL FOR TRAFFIC OVERHEAD. TCAS WAS CLEAR AT THIS TIME AND I THINK THE LECTURE WAS ABOUT PROCEDURES AND NOT A COMMENT ON AN ACTUAL SEPARATION ISSUE. THE CONTROLLER WAS ABSOLUTELY CORRECT. WE SCREWED UP! I HAVE NO IDEA IF FORMAL ACTION WILL BE TAKEN ON THIS ERROR. AFTERMATH: THIS INCIDENT SHOOK BOTH OF US. WE DEBRIEFED AT LENGTH AND STILL CANNOT FIGURE OUT HOW WE DID IT. MY CONFIDENCE HAS TAKEN A SERIOUS BLOW BECAUSE I THINK WE DID EVERYTHING WE COULD TO FOLLOW PROCS AND FLY A SAFE DEP. THE POTENTIAL FOR FAA ACTION IS REAL AND NOT SOMETHING EITHER OF US WANT TO FACE. LESSON LEARNED: WE'VE GONE OVER THIS EVENT FOR HOURS. WE'VE ARRIVED AT TWO POSSIBLE CHANGES THAT MIGHT HAVE PREVENTED IT. FIRST IS USE OF THE AUTOPILOT. IT'S UNCOMMON AND NOT CONSIDERED A GOOD OPERATING PRACTICE TO SELECT THE AUTOPILOT IN THE FIRST 30 SECONDS OF FLIGHT BUT DOING SO MIGHT HAVE PREVENTED THIS INFRACTION. SECOND IS AN ATC ISSUE. THINGS HAPPEN FAST IN THIS ENVIRONMENT AND THE PERCEPTION OF ATC LOAD AND URGENCY LEADS ONE TO RESPOND IMMEDIATELY TO ATC INSTRUCTIONS....AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHER PRIORITIES. HAD I IGNORED THE FREQUENCY CHANGE TO DEPARTURE DIRECTIVE OR POSTPONED MY RESPONSE FOR TEN SECONDS; I MIGHT HAVE BEEN BETTER HELP TO THE PF BY FOCUSING MY ATTENTION ON THE PFD RATHER THAN THE RADIO.719468 SYN

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.