Narrative:

The captain reviewed the flight plan aware of the fuel awareness program and the pressure that management put its flight crew in. Measures like 'the chief pilot forbids any crew from putting excess fuel on the aircraft without the approval of dispatch or flight control.' the captain's authority is eroded and certain individual capts 'will not' put more fuel on board because of the 'environment' the 'fuel saving program' and its forces 'in place.' the co-shared 'responsibility' between captain and dispatcher. Dispatchers 'will not' add any additional fuel regardless of compromising or potential changing WX conditions. Quite often an alternate less than 25 NM away is planned. Both dispatch and company X maintenance control have 'coerced flight crews' into 'taking a flight or continuing to destination.' this environment exists because of a lame FAA safety effort. If there is no incident or accident 'it's ok.' this flight was operated successfully because we were fortunate. However this report attempts to identify a dispatcher and 'weak' captain or coerced captain through the 'culture' that exists. We were dispatched into severe WX with no NOTAMS or 'pilot reports.' the jet stream was over sweden and dropped very low affecting the destination. I seriously doubt there were 'no operational NOTAMS for this date.' on approach we experienced 60 KTS of wind at 2000 ft MSL and moderate turbulence to ground level along with blowing rain. Forecast identified F br and a 'wet' runway. The conditions were strong and an air carrier X diverted due to a windshear warning in the cockpit. The air carrier X experienced this approximately 500 ft AGL. We -- a B747-400 landing around 300000 kilos or 660000 pounds equipped with '3' autoplts were bouncing around like a bucking bronco. At one point on the approach from 500 ft to landing we had plus or minus 20 KTS airspeed fluctuation. It was a controled approach and the autoplts and autothrottles performed very well. Had we disconnect and manually flown this; a missed approach would be the result. The WX we experienced did not show on the WX package we received from company dispatch. Had 'we' pilots been given the FAA required 'all available WX' 'we pilots' would have been able to assess that we needed an alternate 'not in the same WX system.' as it was we were given ZZZZ 75 NM away. Their WX would have been similar. We received no updates via ACARS or satcom en route on our 6 hour flight. It is my opinion that there is a culture that exists at this air carrier through the director of operations; vp of flight operations; chief pilot that they will only give the FAA required fuel for dispatching and the dispatchers will not intervene. All too often capts will not add fuel and remove freight to accommodate the need to. Upon our approach which was very close to 'my limits' of comfort; we pilots would not have the FAA min fuel requirements to miss approach and go to ZZZZ; our alternate; and block in with the air carrier fom minimum of 550 kilos (which is a boeing figure that is established from the boeing flight manual). This report identifies a culture of management coercion to influence the dispatchers and flight crew to operate and move the freight by restricting information (lack of operational NOTAMS). It also identifies the fuel saving program takes preference over safety (compromising meteorological flight situations).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B747-400 FO DESCRIBES HIS ACR'S FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY BRIEF FLT CREWS ABOUT WX CONDITIONS AND SO ENABLE PLTS OR DISPATCHERS TO MODIFY FUEL LOADS.

Narrative: THE CAPT REVIEWED THE FLT PLAN AWARE OF THE FUEL AWARENESS PROGRAM AND THE PRESSURE THAT MANAGEMENT PUT ITS FLT CREW IN. MEASURES LIKE 'THE CHIEF PLT FORBIDS ANY CREW FROM PUTTING EXCESS FUEL ON THE ACFT WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF DISPATCH OR FLT CTL.' THE CAPT'S AUTHORITY IS ERODED AND CERTAIN INDIVIDUAL CAPTS 'WILL NOT' PUT MORE FUEL ON BOARD BECAUSE OF THE 'ENVIRONMENT' THE 'FUEL SAVING PROGRAM' AND ITS FORCES 'IN PLACE.' THE CO-SHARED 'RESPONSIBILITY' BETWEEN CAPT AND DISPATCHER. DISPATCHERS 'WILL NOT' ADD ANY ADDITIONAL FUEL REGARDLESS OF COMPROMISING OR POTENTIAL CHANGING WX CONDITIONS. QUITE OFTEN AN ALTERNATE LESS THAN 25 NM AWAY IS PLANNED. BOTH DISPATCH AND COMPANY X MAINT CTL HAVE 'COERCED FLT CREWS' INTO 'TAKING A FLT OR CONTINUING TO DEST.' THIS ENVIRONMENT EXISTS BECAUSE OF A LAME FAA SAFETY EFFORT. IF THERE IS NO INCIDENT OR ACCIDENT 'IT'S OK.' THIS FLT WAS OPERATED SUCCESSFULLY BECAUSE WE WERE FORTUNATE. HOWEVER THIS RPT ATTEMPTS TO IDENTIFY A DISPATCHER AND 'WEAK' CAPT OR COERCED CAPT THROUGH THE 'CULTURE' THAT EXISTS. WE WERE DISPATCHED INTO SEVERE WX WITH NO NOTAMS OR 'PLT RPTS.' THE JET STREAM WAS OVER SWEDEN AND DROPPED VERY LOW AFFECTING THE DEST. I SERIOUSLY DOUBT THERE WERE 'NO OPERATIONAL NOTAMS FOR THIS DATE.' ON APCH WE EXPERIENCED 60 KTS OF WIND AT 2000 FT MSL AND MODERATE TURB TO GND LEVEL ALONG WITH BLOWING RAIN. FORECAST IDENTIFIED F BR AND A 'WET' RWY. THE CONDITIONS WERE STRONG AND AN ACR X DIVERTED DUE TO A WINDSHEAR WARNING IN THE COCKPIT. THE ACR X EXPERIENCED THIS APPROX 500 FT AGL. WE -- A B747-400 LNDG AROUND 300000 KILOS OR 660000 LBS EQUIPPED WITH '3' AUTOPLTS WERE BOUNCING AROUND LIKE A BUCKING BRONCO. AT ONE POINT ON THE APCH FROM 500 FT TO LNDG WE HAD PLUS OR MINUS 20 KTS AIRSPD FLUCTUATION. IT WAS A CTLED APCH AND THE AUTOPLTS AND AUTOTHROTTLES PERFORMED VERY WELL. HAD WE DISCONNECT AND MANUALLY FLOWN THIS; A MISSED APCH WOULD BE THE RESULT. THE WX WE EXPERIENCED DID NOT SHOW ON THE WX PACKAGE WE RECEIVED FROM COMPANY DISPATCH. HAD 'WE' PLTS BEEN GIVEN THE FAA REQUIRED 'ALL AVAILABLE WX' 'WE PLTS' WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ASSESS THAT WE NEEDED AN ALTERNATE 'NOT IN THE SAME WX SYSTEM.' AS IT WAS WE WERE GIVEN ZZZZ 75 NM AWAY. THEIR WX WOULD HAVE BEEN SIMILAR. WE RECEIVED NO UPDATES VIA ACARS OR SATCOM ENRTE ON OUR 6 HR FLT. IT IS MY OPINION THAT THERE IS A CULTURE THAT EXISTS AT THIS ACR THROUGH THE DIRECTOR OF OPS; VP OF FLT OPS; CHIEF PLT THAT THEY WILL ONLY GIVE THE FAA REQUIRED FUEL FOR DISPATCHING AND THE DISPATCHERS WILL NOT INTERVENE. ALL TOO OFTEN CAPTS WILL NOT ADD FUEL AND REMOVE FREIGHT TO ACCOMMODATE THE NEED TO. UPON OUR APCH WHICH WAS VERY CLOSE TO 'MY LIMITS' OF COMFORT; WE PLTS WOULD NOT HAVE THE FAA MIN FUEL REQUIREMENTS TO MISS APCH AND GO TO ZZZZ; OUR ALTERNATE; AND BLOCK IN WITH THE ACR FOM MINIMUM OF 550 KILOS (WHICH IS A BOEING FIGURE THAT IS ESTABLISHED FROM THE BOEING FLT MANUAL). THIS RPT IDENTIFIES A CULTURE OF MANAGEMENT COERCION TO INFLUENCE THE DISPATCHERS AND FLT CREW TO OPERATE AND MOVE THE FREIGHT BY RESTRICTING INFO (LACK OF OPERATIONAL NOTAMS). IT ALSO IDENTIFIES THE FUEL SAVING PROGRAM TAKES PREFERENCE OVER SAFETY (COMPROMISING METEOROLOGICAL FLT SITUATIONS).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.