Narrative:

After a 35 min departure delay due to aircraft loading; we taxied to runway 17R for departure. It was my leg. All checklists were run and no delay was encountered prior to taking the runway. We had briefed and utilized the autothrottles for takeoff. During the takeoff roll; in the high-speed regime (approximately 100 KTS) the first officer and so simultaneously advised that the #1 thrust reverser in-transit light was illuminated. I responded that the aircraft was tracking normally and that the takeoff would be continued. A normal departure was accomplished. I advised the crew that after flap retraction I would xfer control to the first officer and work the problem with the so. We continued the normal climb profile toward destination while accomplishing the appropriate checklist. The aircraft was not exhibiting adverse yaw and with the exception of the flashing in-transit light; all engine indications were normal. Due to the fact that this light is designed to alert the crew of movement of the reverser sleeve; we were concerned about the possible consequences should the sleeve fully translate. As a precaution I elected to reduce thrust on the #1 engine to 1.00 EPR while we continued to discuss our options. I asked the so to contact flight control and advise them of our situation. A report from flight control indicated that this call came at 7 mins into the flight. The so informed flight control of our reverser in-transit light as well as another abnormal light indication on the lower equipment bay electrical abnormalities. Clearly; the corrective actions had thus far failed to resolve the problem. Maintenance control suggested that the indication was at fault; however; when I asked if they could rule out the possibility that this was an impending reverser deployment; they were reluctant to do so. The reverser checklist allowed for a continuation to destination if necessary. This option was discussed among the crew. Concern was expressed about this course of action. As we were facing a long flight of 4 hours into possible IMC conditions at destination; in an aircraft with a history of abnormal thrust reverser indications that previous troubleshooting had thus far not resolved; I made the decision that the prudent course of action would be to make the short flight back to ZZZ where the thrust reverser could be locked out and deferred. No fuel dump would be required and the entire crew was ready and able to continue with the flight as soon as possible. Maintenance control did not disagree with this assessment. Flight control was informed of this decision. An artr (airborne re-route release) for a change in destination was obtained via ACARS during the descent. ATC was informed that we required a clearance to ZZZ for mechanical reasons but that no emergency would be declared. Once the aircraft was headed back to ZZZ; the decision was made to secure the #1 engine as a further precautionary measure. This was accomplished during the descent and ATC was advised. Flight control sent an ACARS message asking if an emergency was being declared and if the engine was being secured. We responded via ACARS that the engine had been secured as a precaution but that an emergency had not been declared. An uneventful 3 engine approach and landing was made in VFR conditions to runway 17R. The flashing reverser in-transit light remained illuminated throughout the flight and was still illuminated when the aircraft was turned over to maintenance on ramp xa. As to whether or not an air turn back was warranted under these circumstances will no doubt generate considerable debate. At the time; we felt that while it may be viewed as conservative thinking; it was the most prudent course of action. I accept full responsibility for this decision and would like to commend my crew on the professionalism they displayed in their performance of these abnormal procedures. The thrust reverser discrepancy was entered in the aircraft logbook. As I was cognizant of the impact an air turn back can have on service; I was interested in getting the deferral accomplished and proceeding on to destination in the minimum amount of time. It is partly because of this mindset that I feel I committed my greatest error. My focus was on the thrust reverser issue and my attention was directed toward finishing the mission. The fact that the engine was shut down was a peripheral consequence of the original abnormal and I inadvertently failed to make the required logbook entry as required in the fom. I know better but allowed myself to become distraction by other issues. The deferral was accomplished and we departed again to ZZZ2 2 hours and 52 mins after our original block time. Unfortunately; due to my oversight; the required inspections; post engine shutdown; were not accomplished. I accept responsibility for this oversight and hope that this will serve as a reminder to others to not allow distrs to interfere with their required duties. Supplemental information from acn 720819: precautionary in-flight engine shutdown was accomplished; but was not noted in the logbook as required in the fom. We simply missed it. I believe we were so consumed with being able to justify our air-turn-back; the logbook write-up for the engine shutdown was omitted. Callback conversation with reporter acn 720819 revealed the following information: the reporter amplified on his written report to include the fact that the reason for the shutdown was a reverser unlock indication. The reporter clarified that the intent of this report was to note that the discrepancy was entered in the logbook; but that the engine shutdown event was omitted in error as per his air carrier fom requirement.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B747 CREW RETURNED TO LAND WITH A REVERSER IN-TRANSIT LIGHT LOGGED BUT THEY FAILED TO ALSO LOG THE ENG SHUTDOWN EVENT AS THEIR ACR REQUIRED.

Narrative: AFTER A 35 MIN DEP DELAY DUE TO ACFT LOADING; WE TAXIED TO RWY 17R FOR DEP. IT WAS MY LEG. ALL CHKLISTS WERE RUN AND NO DELAY WAS ENCOUNTERED PRIOR TO TAKING THE RWY. WE HAD BRIEFED AND UTILIZED THE AUTOTHROTTLES FOR TKOF. DURING THE TKOF ROLL; IN THE HIGH-SPD REGIME (APPROX 100 KTS) THE FO AND SO SIMULTANEOUSLY ADVISED THAT THE #1 THRUST REVERSER IN-TRANSIT LIGHT WAS ILLUMINATED. I RESPONDED THAT THE ACFT WAS TRACKING NORMALLY AND THAT THE TKOF WOULD BE CONTINUED. A NORMAL DEP WAS ACCOMPLISHED. I ADVISED THE CREW THAT AFTER FLAP RETRACTION I WOULD XFER CTL TO THE FO AND WORK THE PROB WITH THE SO. WE CONTINUED THE NORMAL CLB PROFILE TOWARD DEST WHILE ACCOMPLISHING THE APPROPRIATE CHKLIST. THE ACFT WAS NOT EXHIBITING ADVERSE YAW AND WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE FLASHING IN-TRANSIT LIGHT; ALL ENG INDICATIONS WERE NORMAL. DUE TO THE FACT THAT THIS LIGHT IS DESIGNED TO ALERT THE CREW OF MOVEMENT OF THE REVERSER SLEEVE; WE WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES SHOULD THE SLEEVE FULLY TRANSLATE. AS A PRECAUTION I ELECTED TO REDUCE THRUST ON THE #1 ENG TO 1.00 EPR WHILE WE CONTINUED TO DISCUSS OUR OPTIONS. I ASKED THE SO TO CONTACT FLT CTL AND ADVISE THEM OF OUR SITUATION. A RPT FROM FLT CTL INDICATED THAT THIS CALL CAME AT 7 MINS INTO THE FLT. THE SO INFORMED FLT CTL OF OUR REVERSER IN-TRANSIT LIGHT AS WELL AS ANOTHER ABNORMAL LIGHT INDICATION ON THE LOWER EQUIP BAY ELECTRICAL ABNORMALITIES. CLRLY; THE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS HAD THUS FAR FAILED TO RESOLVE THE PROB. MAINT CTL SUGGESTED THAT THE INDICATION WAS AT FAULT; HOWEVER; WHEN I ASKED IF THEY COULD RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THIS WAS AN IMPENDING REVERSER DEPLOYMENT; THEY WERE RELUCTANT TO DO SO. THE REVERSER CHKLIST ALLOWED FOR A CONTINUATION TO DEST IF NECESSARY. THIS OPTION WAS DISCUSSED AMONG THE CREW. CONCERN WAS EXPRESSED ABOUT THIS COURSE OF ACTION. AS WE WERE FACING A LONG FLT OF 4 HRS INTO POSSIBLE IMC CONDITIONS AT DEST; IN AN ACFT WITH A HISTORY OF ABNORMAL THRUST REVERSER INDICATIONS THAT PREVIOUS TROUBLESHOOTING HAD THUS FAR NOT RESOLVED; I MADE THE DECISION THAT THE PRUDENT COURSE OF ACTION WOULD BE TO MAKE THE SHORT FLT BACK TO ZZZ WHERE THE THRUST REVERSER COULD BE LOCKED OUT AND DEFERRED. NO FUEL DUMP WOULD BE REQUIRED AND THE ENTIRE CREW WAS READY AND ABLE TO CONTINUE WITH THE FLT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. MAINT CTL DID NOT DISAGREE WITH THIS ASSESSMENT. FLT CTL WAS INFORMED OF THIS DECISION. AN ARTR (AIRBORNE RE-RTE RELEASE) FOR A CHANGE IN DEST WAS OBTAINED VIA ACARS DURING THE DSCNT. ATC WAS INFORMED THAT WE REQUIRED A CLRNC TO ZZZ FOR MECHANICAL REASONS BUT THAT NO EMER WOULD BE DECLARED. ONCE THE ACFT WAS HEADED BACK TO ZZZ; THE DECISION WAS MADE TO SECURE THE #1 ENG AS A FURTHER PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE. THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED DURING THE DSCNT AND ATC WAS ADVISED. FLT CTL SENT AN ACARS MESSAGE ASKING IF AN EMER WAS BEING DECLARED AND IF THE ENG WAS BEING SECURED. WE RESPONDED VIA ACARS THAT THE ENG HAD BEEN SECURED AS A PRECAUTION BUT THAT AN EMER HAD NOT BEEN DECLARED. AN UNEVENTFUL 3 ENG APCH AND LNDG WAS MADE IN VFR CONDITIONS TO RWY 17R. THE FLASHING REVERSER IN-TRANSIT LIGHT REMAINED ILLUMINATED THROUGHOUT THE FLT AND WAS STILL ILLUMINATED WHEN THE ACFT WAS TURNED OVER TO MAINT ON RAMP XA. AS TO WHETHER OR NOT AN AIR TURN BACK WAS WARRANTED UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WILL NO DOUBT GENERATE CONSIDERABLE DEBATE. AT THE TIME; WE FELT THAT WHILE IT MAY BE VIEWED AS CONSERVATIVE THINKING; IT WAS THE MOST PRUDENT COURSE OF ACTION. I ACCEPT FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS DECISION AND WOULD LIKE TO COMMEND MY CREW ON THE PROFESSIONALISM THEY DISPLAYED IN THEIR PERFORMANCE OF THESE ABNORMAL PROCS. THE THRUST REVERSER DISCREPANCY WAS ENTERED IN THE ACFT LOGBOOK. AS I WAS COGNIZANT OF THE IMPACT AN AIR TURN BACK CAN HAVE ON SVC; I WAS INTERESTED IN GETTING THE DEFERRAL ACCOMPLISHED AND PROCEEDING ON TO DEST IN THE MINIMUM AMOUNT OF TIME. IT IS PARTLY BECAUSE OF THIS MINDSET THAT I FEEL I COMMITTED MY GREATEST ERROR. MY FOCUS WAS ON THE THRUST REVERSER ISSUE AND MY ATTN WAS DIRECTED TOWARD FINISHING THE MISSION. THE FACT THAT THE ENG WAS SHUT DOWN WAS A PERIPHERAL CONSEQUENCE OF THE ORIGINAL ABNORMAL AND I INADVERTENTLY FAILED TO MAKE THE REQUIRED LOGBOOK ENTRY AS REQUIRED IN THE FOM. I KNOW BETTER BUT ALLOWED MYSELF TO BECOME DISTR BY OTHER ISSUES. THE DEFERRAL WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND WE DEPARTED AGAIN TO ZZZ2 2 HRS AND 52 MINS AFTER OUR ORIGINAL BLOCK TIME. UNFORTUNATELY; DUE TO MY OVERSIGHT; THE REQUIRED INSPECTIONS; POST ENG SHUTDOWN; WERE NOT ACCOMPLISHED. I ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS OVERSIGHT AND HOPE THAT THIS WILL SERVE AS A REMINDER TO OTHERS TO NOT ALLOW DISTRS TO INTERFERE WITH THEIR REQUIRED DUTIES. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 720819: PRECAUTIONARY INFLT ENG SHUTDOWN WAS ACCOMPLISHED; BUT WAS NOT NOTED IN THE LOGBOOK AS REQUIRED IN THE FOM. WE SIMPLY MISSED IT. I BELIEVE WE WERE SO CONSUMED WITH BEING ABLE TO JUSTIFY OUR AIR-TURN-BACK; THE LOGBOOK WRITE-UP FOR THE ENG SHUTDOWN WAS OMITTED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 720819 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR AMPLIFIED ON HIS WRITTEN RPT TO INCLUDE THE FACT THAT THE REASON FOR THE SHUTDOWN WAS A REVERSER UNLOCK INDICATION. THE RPTR CLARIFIED THAT THE INTENT OF THIS RPT WAS TO NOTE THAT THE DISCREPANCY WAS ENTERED IN THE LOGBOOK; BUT THAT THE ENG SHUTDOWN EVENT WAS OMITTED IN ERROR AS PER HIS ACR FOM REQUIREMENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.