Narrative:

I was vectoring the H/C17 in the radar downwind at 1600 ft. The operational supervisor (os) instructed another controller to relieve me off position since I was on for over 2.25 hours without a break. I was too busy to complete the briefing so the operational supervisor instructed this same controller to open up the 'west handoff' position instead of relieving me. The telephone rang and the operational supervisor answered it and at the time I did not know that he issued a departure clearance to the BE36 with instructions to enter my airspace. I was never informed that this had been done nor had anyone signed on the handoff position or received a position briefing prior to issuing this clearance. The first I knew about it was when I turned the H/C17 to base leg about 12 mi from the airport and the radar data tag of the BE36 popped up on my scope. I immediately issued traffic to the H/C17 and turned him further away from the BE36. By the time I radar idented the BE36 required radar/wake turbulence separation existed and I immediately informed the operational supervisor of a possible operational error. What I believed caused the problem was poor supervision and poor management of the operation and the controller workforce. The operational supervisor had to be called into the radar room since he was out briefing another controller for more than 1 hour and 47 mins without setting foot in the radar room. He had to be paged. Also this same operational supervisor is not fully certified in the radar yet he issued the BE36 his clearance to enter my airspace with instructions from the controller who was going to relieve me but was then instructed to open the handoff position. During this confusion no one informed me of the departing BE36. That's how it unfolded. How can this be prevented in the future...easy: only certified controllers should issue clrncs and only after they have received a position briefing and assumed responsibility for the position. No one should be the operational supervisor in a facility unless they are fully certified on all position and are physically in the radar room while performing duties as an operational supervisor.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CHS CTLR DESCRIBED OPERROR WHEN SUPVR FAILED TO COORDINATE RELEASE OF CONFLICTING TFC.

Narrative: I WAS VECTORING THE H/C17 IN THE RADAR DOWNWIND AT 1600 FT. THE OPERATIONAL SUPVR (OS) INSTRUCTED ANOTHER CTLR TO RELIEVE ME OFF POS SINCE I WAS ON FOR OVER 2.25 HRS WITHOUT A BREAK. I WAS TOO BUSY TO COMPLETE THE BRIEFING SO THE OPERATIONAL SUPVR INSTRUCTED THIS SAME CTLR TO OPEN UP THE 'W HDOF' POS INSTEAD OF RELIEVING ME. THE TELEPHONE RANG AND THE OPERATIONAL SUPVR ANSWERED IT AND AT THE TIME I DID NOT KNOW THAT HE ISSUED A DEP CLRNC TO THE BE36 WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO ENTER MY AIRSPACE. I WAS NEVER INFORMED THAT THIS HAD BEEN DONE NOR HAD ANYONE SIGNED ON THE HDOF POS OR RECEIVED A POS BRIEFING PRIOR TO ISSUING THIS CLRNC. THE FIRST I KNEW ABOUT IT WAS WHEN I TURNED THE H/C17 TO BASE LEG ABOUT 12 MI FROM THE ARPT AND THE RADAR DATA TAG OF THE BE36 POPPED UP ON MY SCOPE. I IMMEDIATELY ISSUED TFC TO THE H/C17 AND TURNED HIM FURTHER AWAY FROM THE BE36. BY THE TIME I RADAR IDENTED THE BE36 REQUIRED RADAR/WAKE TURB SEPARATION EXISTED AND I IMMEDIATELY INFORMED THE OPERATIONAL SUPVR OF A POSSIBLE OPERROR. WHAT I BELIEVED CAUSED THE PROB WAS POOR SUPERVISION AND POOR MGMNT OF THE OP AND THE CTLR WORKFORCE. THE OPERATIONAL SUPVR HAD TO BE CALLED INTO THE RADAR ROOM SINCE HE WAS OUT BRIEFING ANOTHER CTLR FOR MORE THAN 1 HR AND 47 MINS WITHOUT SETTING FOOT IN THE RADAR ROOM. HE HAD TO BE PAGED. ALSO THIS SAME OPERATIONAL SUPVR IS NOT FULLY CERTIFIED IN THE RADAR YET HE ISSUED THE BE36 HIS CLRNC TO ENTER MY AIRSPACE WITH INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CTLR WHO WAS GOING TO RELIEVE ME BUT WAS THEN INSTRUCTED TO OPEN THE HDOF POS. DURING THIS CONFUSION NO ONE INFORMED ME OF THE DEPARTING BE36. THAT'S HOW IT UNFOLDED. HOW CAN THIS BE PREVENTED IN THE FUTURE...EASY: ONLY CERTIFIED CTLRS SHOULD ISSUE CLRNCS AND ONLY AFTER THEY HAVE RECEIVED A POS BRIEFING AND ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE POS. NO ONE SHOULD BE THE OPERATIONAL SUPVR IN A FACILITY UNLESS THEY ARE FULLY CERTIFIED ON ALL POS AND ARE PHYSICALLY IN THE RADAR ROOM WHILE PERFORMING DUTIES AS AN OPERATIONAL SUPVR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.