Narrative:

I believe I failed to properly secure the tail stand because I rushed to complete my duties. Had I taken more time to ensure that the tail stand was in place and that the cargo was properly secured; the incident would not have occurred. Contributing to the incident was that the 'after start' checklist was not completed in the presence of both cockpit crew members in an attempt to save time. Had the checklist been completed with both crew members present; the mistake would have been caught and the tail stand would have been properly secured prior to departure. Also contributing to the incident was the pace required to maintain an on time schedule. Planned ground times are often inadequate to complete fueling and aircraft loading. Thus a fast pace must be maintained to remain on schedule and often make up time. I; the first officer; was finishing loading cargo. Captain started the right engine. We had been keeping a very efficient pace on the ground and upon hearing the engine start; I began to rush. I quickly closed the aft cargo door and walked forward to enter the cabin. Upon finishing my preflight cabin duties; I entered the cockpit and was informed that the 'after start' checklist had been completed by the captain. This had occurred once before that day and I thought nothing of it. I then continued with my 'before takeoff' check. The flight continued normally to destination. Upon landing I climbed out of the copilot's station and instructed the passenger to remain seated until the tail stand was in place. I then began looking for the tail stand pin; which I usually stow in the copilot seatback pocket. Not finding the pin; I opened the forward door and I looked under the tail. I saw the tail stand still in place. I then informed the captain that the tail stand had been left in place during flight and walked outside to open the aft cargo hatch. I examined the tail stand; pin; and attachment point for damage. I observed no damage or deformity at that point or during the post flight walkaround. I inspected the tail stand to ensure security and for damage. To avoid repeating the incident; I will refrain from rushing myself while securing cockpit doors. A visual check could be done before closing the cabin door to make sure that the pin is in the aircraft. Most importantly; the 'after takeoff' checklist must be completed in the presence of both cockpit crew members to ensure that each item is properly completed. The additional time required to complete the checklist is minimal and does not outweigh the safety benefits achieved by both cockpit crew members completing the checklist.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BE19 FLT CREW DEPARTS WITH TAIL STAND STILL IN PLACE.

Narrative: I BELIEVE I FAILED TO PROPERLY SECURE THE TAIL STAND BECAUSE I RUSHED TO COMPLETE MY DUTIES. HAD I TAKEN MORE TIME TO ENSURE THAT THE TAIL STAND WAS IN PLACE AND THAT THE CARGO WAS PROPERLY SECURED; THE INCIDENT WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED. CONTRIBUTING TO THE INCIDENT WAS THAT THE 'AFTER START' CHKLIST WAS NOT COMPLETED IN THE PRESENCE OF BOTH COCKPIT CREW MEMBERS IN AN ATTEMPT TO SAVE TIME. HAD THE CHKLIST BEEN COMPLETED WITH BOTH CREW MEMBERS PRESENT; THE MISTAKE WOULD HAVE BEEN CAUGHT AND THE TAIL STAND WOULD HAVE BEEN PROPERLY SECURED PRIOR TO DEP. ALSO CONTRIBUTING TO THE INCIDENT WAS THE PACE REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN AN ON TIME SCHEDULE. PLANNED GND TIMES ARE OFTEN INADEQUATE TO COMPLETE FUELING AND ACFT LOADING. THUS A FAST PACE MUST BE MAINTAINED TO REMAIN ON SCHEDULE AND OFTEN MAKE UP TIME. I; THE FO; WAS FINISHING LOADING CARGO. CAPT STARTED THE R ENG. WE HAD BEEN KEEPING A VERY EFFICIENT PACE ON THE GND AND UPON HEARING THE ENG START; I BEGAN TO RUSH. I QUICKLY CLOSED THE AFT CARGO DOOR AND WALKED FORWARD TO ENTER THE CABIN. UPON FINISHING MY PREFLT CABIN DUTIES; I ENTERED THE COCKPIT AND WAS INFORMED THAT THE 'AFTER START' CHKLIST HAD BEEN COMPLETED BY THE CAPT. THIS HAD OCCURRED ONCE BEFORE THAT DAY AND I THOUGHT NOTHING OF IT. I THEN CONTINUED WITH MY 'BEFORE TKOF' CHK. THE FLT CONTINUED NORMALLY TO DEST. UPON LNDG I CLBED OUT OF THE COPLT'S STATION AND INSTRUCTED THE PAX TO REMAIN SEATED UNTIL THE TAIL STAND WAS IN PLACE. I THEN BEGAN LOOKING FOR THE TAIL STAND PIN; WHICH I USUALLY STOW IN THE COPLT SEATBACK POCKET. NOT FINDING THE PIN; I OPENED THE FORWARD DOOR AND I LOOKED UNDER THE TAIL. I SAW THE TAIL STAND STILL IN PLACE. I THEN INFORMED THE CAPT THAT THE TAIL STAND HAD BEEN LEFT IN PLACE DURING FLT AND WALKED OUTSIDE TO OPEN THE AFT CARGO HATCH. I EXAMINED THE TAIL STAND; PIN; AND ATTACHMENT POINT FOR DAMAGE. I OBSERVED NO DAMAGE OR DEFORMITY AT THAT POINT OR DURING THE POST FLT WALKAROUND. I INSPECTED THE TAIL STAND TO ENSURE SECURITY AND FOR DAMAGE. TO AVOID REPEATING THE INCIDENT; I WILL REFRAIN FROM RUSHING MYSELF WHILE SECURING COCKPIT DOORS. A VISUAL CHK COULD BE DONE BEFORE CLOSING THE CABIN DOOR TO MAKE SURE THAT THE PIN IS IN THE ACFT. MOST IMPORTANTLY; THE 'AFTER TKOF' CHKLIST MUST BE COMPLETED IN THE PRESENCE OF BOTH COCKPIT CREW MEMBERS TO ENSURE THAT EACH ITEM IS PROPERLY COMPLETED. THE ADDITIONAL TIME REQUIRED TO COMPLETE THE CHKLIST IS MINIMAL AND DOES NOT OUTWEIGH THE SAFETY BENEFITS ACHIEVED BY BOTH COCKPIT CREW MEMBERS COMPLETING THE CHKLIST.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.