An MD80 check was performed by 4 technicians. Check routine requires thrust reverser isolation valve...

Attributes
ACN	725371
Time
Date	200701
Place
Locale Reference	airport : zzz.airport
State Reference	US
Altitude	agl single value : 0
Environment
Light	Night Dawn
Aircraft 1
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	maintenance : technician
ASRS Report	725371
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	maintenance : technician
Events
Anomaly	aircraft equipment problem : critical maintenance problem : improper maintenance maintenance problem : improper documentation non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure
Independent Detector	other other : 5
Resolutory Action	none taken : detected after the fact
Consequence	other other
Factors
Maintenance	contributing factor : work cards contributing factor : schedule pressure performance deficiency : scheduled maintenance performance deficiency : non compliance with legal requirements performance deficiency : logbook entry performance deficiency : inspection
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Chart Or Publication Environmental Factor Maintenance Human Performance Aircraft
Primary Problem	Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative:

Upon completion of a check on aircraft I was left alone to sign off what was not already signed off of the package. Since the gate time for the airplane was fast approaching I took care of what needed to be signed off and took the plane to the gate. After we left it at the gate it was found that one of the thrust reverser's isolation valves had its pin in; leaving the thrust reverser inoperative. It's common practice to do so when doing work around the engine as was done that night. I however was not the one who worked on those engines; nor did I install the pins in the isolation valves. I have been told that I signed off on something to do with removal of those pins; but I was not shown exactly what it was. The only thing I can think of that would involve my stamp would be the final close card in which you verify that all panels; doors; etc; are closed on the airplane; which I did; and I don't recall seeing the access panel for the thrust reverser isolation valve to be open. I don't recall any other signoff specifically naming the thrust reversers. I am sure that there was a requirement on whatever task that required installation of those pins also required the removal of the same. I hope the paperwork can be examined to see where exactly the fault; or multiple faults were with this incident.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN MD80 CHK WAS PERFORMED BY 4 TECHNICIANS. CHK ROUTINE REQUIRES THRUST REVERSER ISOLATION VALVES BE PINNED FOR SAFETY. ACFT RELEASED FOR SVC WITH 1 THRUST REVERSER PINNED INOP.

Narrative: UPON COMPLETION OF A CHK ON ACFT I WAS LEFT ALONE TO SIGN OFF WHAT WAS NOT ALREADY SIGNED OFF OF THE PACKAGE. SINCE THE GATE TIME FOR THE AIRPLANE WAS FAST APCHING I TOOK CARE OF WHAT NEEDED TO BE SIGNED OFF AND TOOK THE PLANE TO THE GATE. AFTER WE LEFT IT AT THE GATE IT WAS FOUND THAT ONE OF THE THRUST REVERSER'S ISOLATION VALVES HAD ITS PIN IN; LEAVING THE THRUST REVERSER INOP. IT'S COMMON PRACTICE TO DO SO WHEN DOING WORK AROUND THE ENG AS WAS DONE THAT NIGHT. I HOWEVER WAS NOT THE ONE WHO WORKED ON THOSE ENGS; NOR DID I INSTALL THE PINS IN THE ISOLATION VALVES. I HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT I SIGNED OFF ON SOMETHING TO DO WITH REMOVAL OF THOSE PINS; BUT I WAS NOT SHOWN EXACTLY WHAT IT WAS. THE ONLY THING I CAN THINK OF THAT WOULD INVOLVE MY STAMP WOULD BE THE FINAL CLOSE CARD IN WHICH YOU VERIFY THAT ALL PANELS; DOORS; ETC; ARE CLOSED ON THE AIRPLANE; WHICH I DID; AND I DON'T RECALL SEEING THE ACCESS PANEL FOR THE THRUST REVERSER ISOLATION VALVE TO BE OPEN. I DON'T RECALL ANY OTHER SIGNOFF SPECIFICALLY NAMING THE THRUST REVERSERS. I AM SURE THAT THERE WAS A REQUIREMENT ON WHATEVER TASK THAT REQUIRED INSTALLATION OF THOSE PINS ALSO REQUIRED THE REMOVAL OF THE SAME. I HOPE THE PAPERWORK CAN BE EXAMINED TO SEE WHERE EXACTLY THE FAULT; OR MULTIPLE FAULTS WERE WITH THIS INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

An MD80 check was performed by 4 technicians. Check routine requires thrust reverser isolation valves be pinned for safety. Aircraft released for service with 1 thrust reverser pinned inoperative.