Narrative:

This report covers different topics; but they are all related to 1 operational event; so I am combining everything into 1 report. Aircraft had ACARS placarded inoperative before departing ZZZ1 for ZZZ2 on prior leg. MEL requires both HF's to be operative if ACARS is inoperative (which they were). SELCAL check before departure from ZZZ2 was unsuccessful. Made the decision to go ahead and depart; assuming that HF's would operate normally en route. At top of climb; got good SELCAL check from new york and made successful HF company position reports en route. During the climb out; I questioned the wisdom of my decision to depart without a known working HF. Granted; the HF's were not placarded; but that is no guarantee that they actually do work. I believe that if I had this to do over again; I would elect to have ACARS repaired before departing without a known good HF. Another issue here is that I felt safety was somewhat compromised during ground operations departing ZZZ2. When the first officer attempted to obtain the load closeout from operations; it took the entire time from the beginning of taxi to taking the runway for takeoff to copy all of the numbers. It started with just getting the agent to understand; 'yes; we are ready to copy; go ahead.' when the closeout finally was read to us; it was read phonetically by the agent in an excruciatingly slow manner; taking an extremely long time; and then initially the agent did not include the stabilizer trim setting. The first officer asked him for it; and had a bit of a challenge getting the agent to realize what he was requesting. Apparently 'stabilizer trim' is not a term that the agent is familiar with; as he had some difficulty understanding what was being requested. While all this was going on; tower inquired if we would be ready at the end; and I replied affirmatively; he then cleared us for takeoff; which was unexpected as we still had quite a ways to taxi. But the first officer was still having closeout issues with operations so I then told tower we would need another min; ensuring we were both in the loop. After finally obtaining the requested data and completing the checklist; tower again granted takeoff clearance. Then during climb out; when the first officer passed the off-time to operations; it took longer than usual due to a communication problem similar to what we had experienced earlier. The bottom line is this: I believe that an aircraft with an inoperative ACARS should not be sent to south america; period. It causes too many distrs and takes too much time away from other; more critical cockpit tasks -- both on the ground and in the air.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757-200 PILOT QUESTIONS INTL S AMERICAN OPERATIONS WITHOUT ACARS OPERATIONAL BECAUSE OF LANGUAGE AND HF EQUIPMENT DIFFICULTIES.

Narrative: THIS RPT COVERS DIFFERENT TOPICS; BUT THEY ARE ALL RELATED TO 1 OPERATIONAL EVENT; SO I AM COMBINING EVERYTHING INTO 1 RPT. ACFT HAD ACARS PLACARDED INOP BEFORE DEPARTING ZZZ1 FOR ZZZ2 ON PRIOR LEG. MEL REQUIRES BOTH HF'S TO BE OPERATIVE IF ACARS IS INOP (WHICH THEY WERE). SELCAL CHK BEFORE DEP FROM ZZZ2 WAS UNSUCCESSFUL. MADE THE DECISION TO GO AHEAD AND DEPART; ASSUMING THAT HF'S WOULD OPERATE NORMALLY ENRTE. AT TOP OF CLB; GOT GOOD SELCAL CHK FROM NEW YORK AND MADE SUCCESSFUL HF COMPANY POS RPTS ENRTE. DURING THE CLBOUT; I QUESTIONED THE WISDOM OF MY DECISION TO DEPART WITHOUT A KNOWN WORKING HF. GRANTED; THE HF'S WERE NOT PLACARDED; BUT THAT IS NO GUARANTEE THAT THEY ACTUALLY DO WORK. I BELIEVE THAT IF I HAD THIS TO DO OVER AGAIN; I WOULD ELECT TO HAVE ACARS REPAIRED BEFORE DEPARTING WITHOUT A KNOWN GOOD HF. ANOTHER ISSUE HERE IS THAT I FELT SAFETY WAS SOMEWHAT COMPROMISED DURING GND OPS DEPARTING ZZZ2. WHEN THE FO ATTEMPTED TO OBTAIN THE LOAD CLOSEOUT FROM OPS; IT TOOK THE ENTIRE TIME FROM THE BEGINNING OF TAXI TO TAKING THE RWY FOR TKOF TO COPY ALL OF THE NUMBERS. IT STARTED WITH JUST GETTING THE AGENT TO UNDERSTAND; 'YES; WE ARE READY TO COPY; GO AHEAD.' WHEN THE CLOSEOUT FINALLY WAS READ TO US; IT WAS READ PHONETICALLY BY THE AGENT IN AN EXCRUCIATINGLY SLOW MANNER; TAKING AN EXTREMELY LONG TIME; AND THEN INITIALLY THE AGENT DID NOT INCLUDE THE STABILIZER TRIM SETTING. THE FO ASKED HIM FOR IT; AND HAD A BIT OF A CHALLENGE GETTING THE AGENT TO REALIZE WHAT HE WAS REQUESTING. APPARENTLY 'STABILIZER TRIM' IS NOT A TERM THAT THE AGENT IS FAMILIAR WITH; AS HE HAD SOME DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING WHAT WAS BEING REQUESTED. WHILE ALL THIS WAS GOING ON; TWR INQUIRED IF WE WOULD BE READY AT THE END; AND I REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY; HE THEN CLRED US FOR TKOF; WHICH WAS UNEXPECTED AS WE STILL HAD QUITE A WAYS TO TAXI. BUT THE FO WAS STILL HAVING CLOSEOUT ISSUES WITH OPS SO I THEN TOLD TWR WE WOULD NEED ANOTHER MIN; ENSURING WE WERE BOTH IN THE LOOP. AFTER FINALLY OBTAINING THE REQUESTED DATA AND COMPLETING THE CHKLIST; TWR AGAIN GRANTED TKOF CLRNC. THEN DURING CLBOUT; WHEN THE FO PASSED THE OFF-TIME TO OPS; IT TOOK LONGER THAN USUAL DUE TO A COM PROB SIMILAR TO WHAT WE HAD EXPERIENCED EARLIER. THE BOTTOM LINE IS THIS: I BELIEVE THAT AN ACFT WITH AN INOP ACARS SHOULD NOT BE SENT TO SOUTH AMERICA; PERIOD. IT CAUSES TOO MANY DISTRS AND TAKES TOO MUCH TIME AWAY FROM OTHER; MORE CRITICAL COCKPIT TASKS -- BOTH ON THE GND AND IN THE AIR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.