Narrative:

For a routine part 91 repositioning leg to 36U for passenger pickup for part 135 revenue; weather was assumed to be good in the slc area during preflight due to a number of optimistic tafs and metars. During descent the one-minute weather was determined to not satisfy the requirements for a visual approach. The weather reported was 2500 ft scattered; ceiling 4100 ft broken; visibility 7 SM; automated station. The aircraft was not authorized to conduct a circling approach for the airport 36U due to its approach speed; placing it firmly in category D. This fact; and the absence of straight-in approach minima were discussed during the transition out of flight levels. The PF (PIC) stated that they thought it reasonable to proceed to the FAF at the crossing altitude stated on the procedure; and I (sic/PNF) stated that I would be comfortable proceeding as low as the intermediate step-down after the FAF. I then said that I would not be comfortable proceeding any lower on the approach; and I mentioned that due to the design of the procedure; I felt it imperative that our airspeed be kept under control; and a prompt turn made at the map; should we not get the airfield in sight. Upon crossing the FAF and descent to the intermediate MDA; it was clear that the automated weather reporting facility had better keep writing for fiction magazines; as its fact finding capabilities were absolutely gutted. The captain then stated as we passed the fix after the FAF that we would proceed to the circling MDA; instead of either leveling off or going missed; as previously discussed. The descent was accomplished in short order; and contact with the ground was made. The prevailing in-flight visibility was no more than a mile and a half. The runway was spotted less than half a mile away; and a circling approach was commenced from the north-west. No consideration was given to any terrain either published or stipulated; as the approach chart showed no significant obstructions within a mile or so of the airport. During the circling approach; altitude was lowered to approximately 600 ft AGL; and a turn was commenced after 45 seconds of a teardrop-like heading away from the runway environment. The runway was not sighted again until less than a mile away; and it was clear that due to our altitude a landing would not be successful. We decided to make a normal left traffic pattern at approximately 600 ft AGL. The PF decided with no discussion to make the pattern quite large; and it was during the turn to base that the taws began to sound the terrain warning. It became apparent that there was a rather large mountain on the south side of the airport; rising abruptly to several thousand ft afe. There was no mention of the terrain on the approach chart; and absolutely no indication there was dangerous terrain immediately; and in close proximity to the south side of the airport. The circling approach as flown was substandard; and covered considerably more ground than was required by conditions or consideration for local terrain. No descent from our altitude was initiated until we were already established on final; and none was required; our pattern was so large. During the second pattern; the PF maneuvered the aircraft in such a way as to position it nearly perfectly between two converging; vertically oriented terrain features; and it was during that turn from downwind to an eventual final that the taws began to sound not just alerts; but warnings. Consideration should be given to the bank angle that the PF deemed necessary to maneuver out of that poor terrain position; and the PF's stated lack of respect for accelerated stalls; as I asked the PF not to lower his airspeed any further; as the aoa indicators were very close to the shaker zone. The PF stated; 'reference plus ten is fine -- we'll be fine.' during the flare and before touchdown; the shaker was activated for over two seconds before touchdown; due to the PF's disorientation I can only attribute to a slightly higher density altitude and weight; and the PF's relative inexperience in that particular airplane. On the ground; we decided independently that we should have gone missed and proceeded to our alternate upon reaching the FAF and finding conditions so much poorer than reported. We also felt that the charting was substandard; and had we understood there was significant terrain so close to the airport; we would have been considerably less inclined to proceed all the way to the map at an MDA our aircraft was not qualified to control from. In the past; I have noticed this pilot's reluctance to bank the aircraft more than 15 degrees for commanded heading changes over 45 degrees; causing significant course errors and requiring large course corrections. I do not feel there is an adequate way of addressing this perceived deficiency at my company; and must be very vigilant to assert my stated requirements for any maneuver or procedure; and my unwillingness to continue in the face of company or crew pressure to complete a flight. Management pressure has been an ongoing problem at company.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A LEAR PLT APCHING 36U DSNDED BELOW ACFT CAT A/B MIN TO FLY AN UNAUTHORIZED CIRCLE APCH NEARLY STALLING AND COLLIDING WITH HIGH TERRAIN.

Narrative: FOR A ROUTINE PART 91 REPOSITIONING LEG TO 36U FOR PASSENGER PICKUP FOR PART 135 REVENUE; WEATHER WAS ASSUMED TO BE GOOD IN THE SLC AREA DURING PREFLIGHT DUE TO A NUMBER OF OPTIMISTIC TAFS AND METARS. DURING DESCENT THE ONE-MINUTE WEATHER WAS DETERMINED TO NOT SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A VISUAL APPROACH. THE WEATHER REPORTED WAS 2500 FT SCATTERED; CEILING 4100 FT BROKEN; VISIBILITY 7 SM; AUTOMATED STATION. THE AIRCRAFT WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO CONDUCT A CIRCLING APPROACH FOR THE AIRPORT 36U DUE TO ITS APPROACH SPEED; PLACING IT FIRMLY IN CATEGORY D. THIS FACT; AND THE ABSENCE OF STRAIGHT-IN APPROACH MINIMA WERE DISCUSSED DURING THE TRANSITION OUT OF FLIGHT LEVELS. THE PF (PIC) STATED THAT THEY THOUGHT IT REASONABLE TO PROCEED TO THE FAF AT THE CROSSING ALTITUDE STATED ON THE PROCEDURE; AND I (SIC/PNF) STATED THAT I WOULD BE COMFORTABLE PROCEEDING AS LOW AS THE INTERMEDIATE STEP-DOWN AFTER THE FAF. I THEN SAID THAT I WOULD NOT BE COMFORTABLE PROCEEDING ANY LOWER ON THE APPROACH; AND I MENTIONED THAT DUE TO THE DESIGN OF THE PROCEDURE; I FELT IT IMPERATIVE THAT OUR AIRSPEED BE KEPT UNDER CONTROL; AND A PROMPT TURN MADE AT THE MAP; SHOULD WE NOT GET THE AIRFIELD IN SIGHT. UPON CROSSING THE FAF AND DESCENT TO THE INTERMEDIATE MDA; IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE AUTOMATED WEATHER REPORTING FACILITY HAD BETTER KEEP WRITING FOR FICTION MAGAZINES; AS ITS FACT FINDING CAPABILITIES WERE ABSOLUTELY GUTTED. THE CAPTAIN THEN STATED AS WE PASSED THE FIX AFTER THE FAF THAT WE WOULD PROCEED TO THE CIRCLING MDA; INSTEAD OF EITHER LEVELING OFF OR GOING MISSED; AS PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED. THE DESCENT WAS ACCOMPLISHED IN SHORT ORDER; AND CONTACT WITH THE GROUND WAS MADE. THE PREVAILING IN-FLIGHT VISIBILITY WAS NO MORE THAN A MILE AND A HALF. THE RUNWAY WAS SPOTTED LESS THAN HALF A MILE AWAY; AND A CIRCLING APPROACH WAS COMMENCED FROM THE NORTH-WEST. NO CONSIDERATION WAS GIVEN TO ANY TERRAIN EITHER PUBLISHED OR STIPULATED; AS THE APPROACH CHART SHOWED NO SIGNIFICANT OBSTRUCTIONS WITHIN A MILE OR SO OF THE AIRPORT. DURING THE CIRCLING APPROACH; ALTITUDE WAS LOWERED TO APPROXIMATELY 600 FT AGL; AND A TURN WAS COMMENCED AFTER 45 SECONDS OF A TEARDROP-LIKE HEADING AWAY FROM THE RUNWAY ENVIRONMENT. THE RUNWAY WAS NOT SIGHTED AGAIN UNTIL LESS THAN A MILE AWAY; AND IT WAS CLEAR THAT DUE TO OUR ALTITUDE A LANDING WOULD NOT BE SUCCESSFUL. WE DECIDED TO MAKE A NORMAL LEFT TRAFFIC PATTERN AT APPROXIMATELY 600 FT AGL. THE PF DECIDED WITH NO DISCUSSION TO MAKE THE PATTERN QUITE LARGE; AND IT WAS DURING THE TURN TO BASE THAT THE TAWS BEGAN TO SOUND THE TERRAIN WARNING. IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THERE WAS A RATHER LARGE MOUNTAIN ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE AIRPORT; RISING ABRUPTLY TO SEVERAL THOUSAND FT AFE. THERE WAS NO MENTION OF THE TERRAIN ON THE APPROACH CHART; AND ABSOLUTELY NO INDICATION THERE WAS DANGEROUS TERRAIN IMMEDIATELY; AND IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE AIRPORT. THE CIRCLING APPROACH AS FLOWN WAS SUBSTANDARD; AND COVERED CONSIDERABLY MORE GROUND THAN WAS REQUIRED BY CONDITIONS OR CONSIDERATION FOR LOCAL TERRAIN. NO DESCENT FROM OUR ALTITUDE WAS INITIATED UNTIL WE WERE ALREADY ESTABLISHED ON FINAL; AND NONE WAS REQUIRED; OUR PATTERN WAS SO LARGE. DURING THE SECOND PATTERN; THE PF MANEUVERED THE AIRCRAFT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO POSITION IT NEARLY PERFECTLY BETWEEN TWO CONVERGING; VERTICALLY ORIENTED TERRAIN FEATURES; AND IT WAS DURING THAT TURN FROM DOWNWIND TO AN EVENTUAL FINAL THAT THE TAWS BEGAN TO SOUND NOT JUST ALERTS; BUT WARNINGS. CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE BANK ANGLE THAT THE PF DEEMED NECESSARY TO MANEUVER OUT OF THAT POOR TERRAIN POSITION; AND THE PF'S STATED LACK OF RESPECT FOR ACCELERATED STALLS; AS I ASKED THE PF NOT TO LOWER HIS AIRSPEED ANY FURTHER; AS THE AOA INDICATORS WERE VERY CLOSE TO THE SHAKER ZONE. THE PF STATED; 'REF PLUS TEN IS FINE -- WE'LL BE FINE.' DURING THE FLARE AND BEFORE TOUCHDOWN; THE SHAKER WAS ACTIVATED FOR OVER TWO SECONDS BEFORE TOUCHDOWN; DUE TO THE PF'S DISORIENTATION I CAN ONLY ATTRIBUTE TO A SLIGHTLY HIGHER DENSITY ALTITUDE AND WEIGHT; AND THE PF'S RELATIVE INEXPERIENCE IN THAT PARTICULAR AIRPLANE. ON THE GROUND; WE DECIDED INDEPENDENTLY THAT WE SHOULD HAVE GONE MISSED AND PROCEEDED TO OUR ALTERNATE UPON REACHING THE FAF AND FINDING CONDITIONS SO MUCH POORER THAN REPORTED. WE ALSO FELT THAT THE CHARTING WAS SUBSTANDARD; AND HAD WE UNDERSTOOD THERE WAS SIGNIFICANT TERRAIN SO CLOSE TO THE AIRPORT; WE WOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERABLY LESS INCLINED TO PROCEED ALL THE WAY TO THE MAP AT AN MDA OUR AIRCRAFT WAS NOT QUALIFIED TO CTL FROM. IN THE PAST; I HAVE NOTICED THIS PILOT'S RELUCTANCE TO BANK THE AIRCRAFT MORE THAN 15 DEGREES FOR COMMANDED HEADING CHANGES OVER 45 DEGREES; CAUSING SIGNIFICANT COURSE ERRORS AND REQUIRING LARGE COURSE CORRECTIONS. I DO NOT FEEL THERE IS AN ADEQUATE WAY OF ADDRESSING THIS PERCEIVED DEFICIENCY AT MY COMPANY; AND MUST BE VERY VIGILANT TO ASSERT MY STATED REQUIREMENTS FOR ANY MANEUVER OR PROCEDURE; AND MY UNWILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE IN THE FACE OF COMPANY OR CREW PRESSURE TO COMPLETE A FLIGHT. MANAGEMENT PRESSURE HAS BEEN AN ONGOING PROBLEM AT COMPANY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.