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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 729763 |
Time | |
Date | 200702 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Weather Elements | Snow |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | SA 330 Puma/332 Super Puma |
Flight Phase | landing : roll |
Flight Plan | None |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | other |
Function | instruction : instructor |
Qualification | pilot : cfi pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 35 flight time total : 12500 flight time type : 500 |
ASRS Report | 729763 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | other |
Function | instruction : trainee |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical ground encounters : gear up landing non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : gear warning light other flight crewa other flight crewb |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance Aircraft |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Narrative:
I was training a new pilot in the S330 aircraft. We had just begun a contact session at the airport. The weather had been on and off snow showers and at the time of the incident approximately 500 broken and 7 miles visibility with a 18 KTS of wind gust from the southwest. We had been trying to complete transitions for 3 pilots in the 330J type aircraft for the last 3 days. Due to intermittent weather we had completed only 2 sessions of contact work prior to departing on the current session. During the current session we had completed general flight orientation in the aircraft and were demonstrating emergency procedures; in particular single engine operations to a minimum ground run. The student was progressing well in the maneuvers and had attained considerable feel for the aircraft. The aircraft was put into training configuration; ie; one engine at idle and the maneuver was thoroughly discussed as to the goal and procedure to follow. On base leg we transitioned into landing attitude. On short final the rate of closure and aircraft handling was progressing well. I had my eyes on the ng gauge to assure proper application of power. On touch down we both heard a metallic crunch as the aircraft landed. This was not good; it took a moment to ascertain what had happened. The aircraft was stable and setting upright. I immediately noticed that the landing gear warning light was illuminated and knew at once what we had done. The aircraft was landed with very low speed on its belly with the gear retracted. The pre landing check had not taken place in the busy time of setting up the single engine approach. I; as the instructor; did not see the illumination of the gear light. It is not very conspicuous in the puma and the aircraft does not normally have an audio warning. My attention was diverted to watching the performance gauges and missed the light. When I explained the problem I elected to lift the aircraft into the air and lower its landing gear in the normal manner. I parked the aircraft on the taxiway and shut it down to ascertain the damage. Upon inspection I noticed the cargo hook had been shoved into the aft bulkhead under the belly into the area of the lh transverse fuel tank. I did not see any fuel leakage and I inspected all the flying control surfaces and the tail rotor and tail boom attaching points. I determined it was safe to reposition the aircraft 4 miles to the hangar facility. I called the company to report the incident and told the owners as to what had happened. I feel that the root cause of this incident was a poor division of attention on the part of the instructor. I was fully aware of the danger in transitioning pilots with limited retractable gear experience and knew what to be aware of in this case. Secondary cause was the poor design of the warning system in the puma; the light is supposed to flash at 50 HZ but was defective in this airframe and did not flash; in addition there is no audio warning system for landing gear up. The light did function normally other than that and did illuminate under 50 KTS with the gear retracted. Prior to the incident in the proceeding 72 hours; student and I both had sufficient rest and proper meals. We were in a waiting mode for weather. I flew approximately 4.1 hours prior to the incident.callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter indicated that the gear warning lights (two) are small and difficult to see visually. Additionally; the flashing mode of the warning lights did not appear to be working which made it more difficult to recognize the gear was not down. The reporter stated that the lights illuminate and normally flash when the aircraft slows below 55 KTS and the gear is not down. He stated that there is no gear aural warning horn associated with the light warning. He stated that he has recommended to his employer that they install an audio system to give an aural warning in addition to the lights. The reporter stated that this is the first aircraft he has flown that does not have an aural warning system to notify the flight crew of the gear not being down.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: SA330J PUMA INSTRUCTOR AND STUDENT EXECUTE A GEAR UP LNDG.
Narrative: I WAS TRAINING A NEW PILOT IN THE S330 AIRCRAFT. WE HAD JUST BEGUN A CONTACT SESSION AT THE AIRPORT. THE WEATHER HAD BEEN ON AND OFF SNOW SHOWERS AND AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT APPROX 500 BKN AND 7 MILES VIS WITH A 18 KTS OF WIND GUST FROM THE SW. WE HAD BEEN TRYING TO COMPLETE TRANSITIONS FOR 3 PILOTS IN THE 330J TYPE AIRCRAFT FOR THE LAST 3 DAYS. DUE TO INTERMITTENT WEATHER WE HAD COMPLETED ONLY 2 SESSIONS OF CONTACT WORK PRIOR TO DEPARTING ON THE CURRENT SESSION. DURING THE CURRENT SESSION WE HAD COMPLETED GENERAL FLIGHT ORIENTATION IN THE AIRCRAFT AND WERE DEMONSTRATING EMERGENCY PROCEDURES; IN PARTICULAR SINGLE ENGINE OPERATIONS TO A MINIMUM GROUND RUN. THE STUDENT WAS PROGRESSING WELL IN THE MANEUVERS AND HAD ATTAINED CONSIDERABLE FEEL FOR THE AIRCRAFT. THE AIRCRAFT WAS PUT INTO TRAINING CONFIGURATION; IE; ONE ENGINE AT IDLE AND THE MANEUVER WAS THOROUGHLY DISCUSSED AS TO THE GOAL AND PROCEDURE TO FOLLOW. ON BASE LEG WE TRANSITIONED INTO LANDING ATTITUDE. ON SHORT FINAL THE RATE OF CLOSURE AND AIRCRAFT HANDLING WAS PROGRESSING WELL. I HAD MY EYES ON THE NG GAUGE TO ASSURE PROPER APPLICATION OF POWER. ON TOUCH DOWN WE BOTH HEARD A METALLIC CRUNCH AS THE AIRCRAFT LANDED. THIS WAS NOT GOOD; IT TOOK A MOMENT TO ASCERTAIN WHAT HAD HAPPENED. THE AIRCRAFT WAS STABLE AND SETTING UPRIGHT. I IMMEDIATELY NOTICED THAT THE LANDING GEAR WARNING LIGHT WAS ILLUMINATED AND KNEW AT ONCE WHAT WE HAD DONE. THE AIRCRAFT WAS LANDED WITH VERY LOW SPEED ON ITS BELLY WITH THE GEAR RETRACTED. THE PRE LANDING CHECK HAD NOT TAKEN PLACE IN THE BUSY TIME OF SETTING UP THE SINGLE ENGINE APPROACH. I; AS THE INSTRUCTOR; DID NOT SEE THE ILLUMINATION OF THE GEAR LIGHT. IT IS NOT VERY CONSPICUOUS IN THE PUMA AND THE AIRCRAFT DOES NOT NORMALLY HAVE AN AUDIO WARNING. MY ATTENTION WAS DIVERTED TO WATCHING THE PERFORMANCE GAUGES AND MISSED THE LIGHT. WHEN I EXPLAINED THE PROBLEM I ELECTED TO LIFT THE AIRCRAFT INTO THE AIR AND LOWER ITS LANDING GEAR IN THE NORMAL MANNER. I PARKED THE AIRCRAFT ON THE TAXIWAY AND SHUT IT DOWN TO ASCERTAIN THE DAMAGE. UPON INSPECTION I NOTICED THE CARGO HOOK HAD BEEN SHOVED INTO THE AFT BULKHEAD UNDER THE BELLY INTO THE AREA OF THE LH TRANSVERSE FUEL TANK. I DID NOT SEE ANY FUEL LEAKAGE AND I INSPECTED ALL THE FLYING CONTROL SURFACES AND THE TAIL ROTOR AND TAIL BOOM ATTACHING POINTS. I DETERMINED IT WAS SAFE TO REPOSITION THE AIRCRAFT 4 MILES TO THE HANGAR FACILITY. I CALLED THE COMPANY TO REPORT THE INCIDENT AND TOLD THE OWNERS AS TO WHAT HAD HAPPENED. I FEEL THAT THE ROOT CAUSE OF THIS INCIDENT WAS A POOR DIVISION OF ATTENTION ON THE PART OF THE INSTRUCTOR. I WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE DANGER IN TRANSITIONING PILOTS WITH LIMITED RETRACTABLE GEAR EXPERIENCE AND KNEW WHAT TO BE AWARE OF IN THIS CASE. SECONDARY CAUSE WAS THE POOR DESIGN OF THE WARNING SYSTEM IN THE PUMA; THE LIGHT IS SUPPOSED TO FLASH AT 50 HZ BUT WAS DEFECTIVE IN THIS AIRFRAME AND DID NOT FLASH; IN ADDITION THERE IS NO AUDIO WARNING SYSTEM FOR LANDING GEAR UP. THE LIGHT DID FUNCTION NORMALLY OTHER THAN THAT AND DID ILLUMINATE UNDER 50 KTS WITH THE GEAR RETRACTED. PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT IN THE PROCEEDING 72 HOURS; STUDENT AND I BOTH HAD SUFFICIENT REST AND PROPER MEALS. WE WERE IN A WAITING MODE FOR WEATHER. I FLEW APPROX 4.1 HOURS PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT.CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR INDICATED THAT THE GEAR WARNING LIGHTS (TWO) ARE SMALL AND DIFFICULT TO SEE VISUALLY. ADDITIONALLY; THE FLASHING MODE OF THE WARNING LIGHTS DID NOT APPEAR TO BE WORKING WHICH MADE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO RECOGNIZE THE GEAR WAS NOT DOWN. THE RPTR STATED THAT THE LIGHTS ILLUMINATE AND NORMALLY FLASH WHEN THE ACFT SLOWS BELOW 55 KTS AND THE GEAR IS NOT DOWN. HE STATED THAT THERE IS NO GEAR AURAL WARNING HORN ASSOCIATED WITH THE LIGHT WARNING. HE STATED THAT HE HAS RECOMMENDED TO HIS EMPLOYER THAT THEY INSTALL AN AUDIO SYSTEM TO GIVE AN AURAL WARNING IN ADDITION TO THE LIGHTS. THE RPTR STATED THAT THIS IS THE FIRST ACFT HE HAS FLOWN THAT DOES NOT HAVE AN AURAL WARNING SYSTEM TO NOTIFY THE FLT CREW OF THE GEAR NOT BEING DOWN.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.