Narrative:

I was working local control at omaha airport. I was very busy with a lot of things going on simultaneously. Runway 14L was closed. All aircraft were using runway 18 or runway 14R. I had an aircraft in closed traffic; touch-and-goes on runway 18; a helicopter transitioning my airspace as well as an aircraft with a gear problem. At XA39 I told air carrier Y to 'hold short of runway 14R.' at XA41:40 I asked air carrier Y if he could make an immediate departure; he said yes; so I said 'air carrier Y cleared for immediate takeoff runway 14R; traffic 3 mi final landing runway 18.' the wind was almost directly out of the south 180-210 degrees at 10-12 KTS. The aircraft on final was a pc-12/left turbo propeller; fairly slow. Aircraft X as I recall. He was doing about 110 KTS on final. At XA42:33; aircraft X asked if he should hold short of runway 14R; I said affirmative. I then realized that air carrier Y was just starting his takeoff roll 54 seconds after he said he could make an immediate departure. We can't use 'position and hold anymore;' so I feel this air carrier Y was a direct contributor to this error. Granted I should have seen it; but I was also working to keep airborne aircraft apart. Supplemental information from acn 730561: I was inbound for landing at oma. Visibility was about 7 mi with clear skies. Runways in use were runway 14L; 14R; and 18. Approach assigned me runway 18. I joined the localizer and was handed off from approach to tower control at the marker. Upon landing; I planned to clear the runway with a left turn at taxiway C. Note: runways 18; 14R and taxiway C all intersect at the same point. I touched down on the touchdown zone. On the rollout; something didn't feel right and I slowed as I approached the runway 14R/C intersection. As I slowly approached and stopped short of the runway 14R/C intersection; someone keyed the microphone and I heard 'is that guy gonna hold short?' 2 or 3 seconds later; as I attempted to look over my right shoulder from the left seat; another voice came on frequency with 1 word 'jeesus.' within 3 seconds of that transmission I observed a crj taking off runway 14R from my right to left. They overflew the intersection directly ahead of me at an approximately altitude of 70-100 ft. I remained stopped on runway 18 short of the runway 14R/C intersection for 5-7 seconds at which point the tower controller transmitted 'aircraft X; turn left at taxiway C; no delay....' I responded 'left on charlie.' I proceeded in to the intersection; turned left on taxiway C and taxied to and held short of runway 14L. After 5-10 seconds of holding; I transmitted 'is aircraft X cleared to cross one-four left?' tower responded 'aircraft X; cross one-four left; contact ground point niner.' I crossed the runway and taxied to the FBO. After shutdown; and upon reflection; I wondered 'why in the world didn't I hear the tower clear that jet for takeoff on runway 14R and catch his mistake?' I must have heard the takeoff clearance while on short final and fail to process it. On the other hand; during my rollout; I had a strong feeling that 'something just wasn't right' and was slowed down and nearly stopped before that first transmission of 'is that guy gonna hold short.' important notes: I was cleared to land on runway 18. I was not issued and did not accept a lahso clearance. Factors that contributed to my failure to recognize the controller's mistake and the conflict it created: cumulative fatigue -- I was 11+ hours into my third long day in a row. I was on my 12TH of 13 legs in the previous 3 days including multiple instrument approachs. I was single pilot for all of these flts. The current ATIS aid 'landing and departing runways 14L; 14R and 18.' there was no special note such as 'operations to intersecting runways are in use.' any time operations involving intersecting runways are in use -- especially in VMC -- the potential for catastrophic traffic incursions exists.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: OMA LCL CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR WHEN DEP FROM RWY 14R CONFLICTED WITH LNDG ON RWY 18.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING LCL CTL AT OMAHA ARPT. I WAS VERY BUSY WITH A LOT OF THINGS GOING ON SIMULTANEOUSLY. RWY 14L WAS CLOSED. ALL ACFT WERE USING RWY 18 OR RWY 14R. I HAD AN ACFT IN CLOSED TFC; TOUCH-AND-GOES ON RWY 18; A HELI TRANSITIONING MY AIRSPACE AS WELL AS AN ACFT WITH A GEAR PROB. AT XA39 I TOLD ACR Y TO 'HOLD SHORT OF RWY 14R.' AT XA41:40 I ASKED ACR Y IF HE COULD MAKE AN IMMEDIATE DEP; HE SAID YES; SO I SAID 'ACR Y CLRED FOR IMMEDIATE TKOF RWY 14R; TFC 3 MI FINAL LNDG RWY 18.' THE WIND WAS ALMOST DIRECTLY OUT OF THE S 180-210 DEGS AT 10-12 KTS. THE ACFT ON FINAL WAS A PC-12/L TURBO PROP; FAIRLY SLOW. ACFT X AS I RECALL. HE WAS DOING ABOUT 110 KTS ON FINAL. AT XA42:33; ACFT X ASKED IF HE SHOULD HOLD SHORT OF RWY 14R; I SAID AFFIRMATIVE. I THEN REALIZED THAT ACR Y WAS JUST STARTING HIS TKOF ROLL 54 SECONDS AFTER HE SAID HE COULD MAKE AN IMMEDIATE DEP. WE CAN'T USE 'POS AND HOLD ANYMORE;' SO I FEEL THIS ACR Y WAS A DIRECT CONTRIBUTOR TO THIS ERROR. GRANTED I SHOULD HAVE SEEN IT; BUT I WAS ALSO WORKING TO KEEP AIRBORNE ACFT APART. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 730561: I WAS INBOUND FOR LNDG AT OMA. VISIBILITY WAS ABOUT 7 MI WITH CLR SKIES. RWYS IN USE WERE RWY 14L; 14R; AND 18. APCH ASSIGNED ME RWY 18. I JOINED THE LOC AND WAS HANDED OFF FROM APCH TO TWR CTL AT THE MARKER. UPON LNDG; I PLANNED TO CLR THE RWY WITH A L TURN AT TXWY C. NOTE: RWYS 18; 14R AND TXWY C ALL INTERSECT AT THE SAME POINT. I TOUCHED DOWN ON THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE. ON THE ROLLOUT; SOMETHING DIDN'T FEEL RIGHT AND I SLOWED AS I APCHED THE RWY 14R/C INTXN. AS I SLOWLY APCHED AND STOPPED SHORT OF THE RWY 14R/C INTXN; SOMEONE KEYED THE MIKE AND I HEARD 'IS THAT GUY GONNA HOLD SHORT?' 2 OR 3 SECONDS LATER; AS I ATTEMPTED TO LOOK OVER MY R SHOULDER FROM THE L SEAT; ANOTHER VOICE CAME ON FREQ WITH 1 WORD 'JEESUS.' WITHIN 3 SECONDS OF THAT XMISSION I OBSERVED A CRJ TAKING OFF RWY 14R FROM MY R TO L. THEY OVERFLEW THE INTXN DIRECTLY AHEAD OF ME AT AN APPROX ALT OF 70-100 FT. I REMAINED STOPPED ON RWY 18 SHORT OF THE RWY 14R/C INTXN FOR 5-7 SECONDS AT WHICH POINT THE TWR CTLR XMITTED 'ACFT X; TURN L AT TXWY C; NO DELAY....' I RESPONDED 'L ON CHARLIE.' I PROCEEDED IN TO THE INTXN; TURNED L ON TXWY C AND TAXIED TO AND HELD SHORT OF RWY 14L. AFTER 5-10 SECONDS OF HOLDING; I XMITTED 'IS ACFT X CLRED TO CROSS ONE-FOUR L?' TWR RESPONDED 'ACFT X; CROSS ONE-FOUR L; CONTACT GND POINT NINER.' I CROSSED THE RWY AND TAXIED TO THE FBO. AFTER SHUTDOWN; AND UPON REFLECTION; I WONDERED 'WHY IN THE WORLD DIDN'T I HEAR THE TWR CLR THAT JET FOR TKOF ON RWY 14R AND CATCH HIS MISTAKE?' I MUST HAVE HEARD THE TKOF CLRNC WHILE ON SHORT FINAL AND FAIL TO PROCESS IT. ON THE OTHER HAND; DURING MY ROLLOUT; I HAD A STRONG FEELING THAT 'SOMETHING JUST WASN'T RIGHT' AND WAS SLOWED DOWN AND NEARLY STOPPED BEFORE THAT FIRST XMISSION OF 'IS THAT GUY GONNA HOLD SHORT.' IMPORTANT NOTES: I WAS CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 18. I WAS NOT ISSUED AND DID NOT ACCEPT A LAHSO CLRNC. FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO MY FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THE CTLR'S MISTAKE AND THE CONFLICT IT CREATED: CUMULATIVE FATIGUE -- I WAS 11+ HRS INTO MY THIRD LONG DAY IN A ROW. I WAS ON MY 12TH OF 13 LEGS IN THE PREVIOUS 3 DAYS INCLUDING MULTIPLE INST APCHS. I WAS SINGLE PLT FOR ALL OF THESE FLTS. THE CURRENT ATIS AID 'LNDG AND DEPARTING RWYS 14L; 14R AND 18.' THERE WAS NO SPECIAL NOTE SUCH AS 'OPS TO INTERSECTING RWYS ARE IN USE.' ANY TIME OPS INVOLVING INTERSECTING RWYS ARE IN USE -- ESPECIALLY IN VMC -- THE POTENTIAL FOR CATASTROPHIC TFC INCURSIONS EXISTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.