Narrative:

The captain and I were flying passenger from billings bil to ZZZ to glendive gdv. The entire trip was forecasted to be VMC; calm and clear at all 3 airports. I; the first officer; was the PNF on the first leg of the trip from bil to ZZZ. This was the captain's second trip following IOE as captain; having upgraded with less than 300 hours in type. Having been in initial new hire class with him 6 months earlier; I made mention on our taxi out in billings that he seemed unusually nervous. He shrugged it off with a grin and did not have a response. I had to prompt the captain a few times on the way over for callouts such as 'flaps up; climb power' and to turn on course. He was slightly behind the airplane; but nothing I felt was unsafe at that time. On our descent into ZZZ; we were cleared for the visual approximately 20 mi out and canceled IFR at the same time. Winds were 10 degrees off the runway at 6 KTS. At 500 ft AGL; with the gear down and before landing checklist complete and slightly high on the GS; I called (reference speed 116 KTS) 'reference minus 10!' he responded 'correcting' and added approximately 300 pounds torque. We gained about 5 KTS airspeed; remained high on the GS and about 3 seconds later he began to reduce torque again. At approximately 200 ft AGL I said; 'we are almost 100 KTS!' I leaned back to look at his airspeed indicator to confirm that it was indicating the same as mine; and it was. He noticed me doing that and made a comment (which I cannot remember) and I responded; 'yeh; I'm checking to see if yours is indicating the same as mine and it is.' by this time we were less than 50 ft AGL and the airplane began sinking rapidly (I did not note vertical speed). He made no further attempt to correct for loss of airspeed. Upon landing the red gear unsafe lights in the gear handle illuminated; the gear warning horn sounded; and the 2 green lights on the main gear extinguished. He said; 'that was interesting!' the captain was visibly shaken and stressed. I attempted to silence the horn for passenger comfort but was initially unable to get it to silence. He began to hand pump the gear; presumably because he was afraid it would collapse. I asked for the flight controls on the ground since he appeared frightened an confused. Upon parking at the terminal; I conducted a post flight walkaround while he exited the aircraft to call and inform dispatch of a maintenance issue. After the walkaround; I returned to the cockpit and told the remaining passenger to go inside because we'd be on the ground for a while. Everyone deplaned and the captain contacted maintenance. The flight for ZZZ1 was canceled and we overnighted in ZZZ. While on the phone with maintenance control; the captain found a nut missing from a bolt on the right main gear that connected the drag brace. Maintenance drove to ZZZ in the middle of the night to repair the aircraft. The next morning; we were scheduled to fly from ZZZ to ZZZ1 and then back to billings. Upon retracting the gear on takeoff from ZZZ; the red unsafe lights in the gear handle would not extinguish. The captain chose to continue the flight to ZZZ1 where the gear extended properly and we landed without incident. He once again contacted maintenance and we were granted a ferry permit to return the aircraft with the gear extended to ZZZ to meet maintenance personnel. We returned again without incident. When the mechanic arrived he found several problems related to switches on the right main and nose gear. Realizing that I never heard him mention anything about a hard landing to anyone; I asked the captain if he ever mentioned the hard landing to 'them.' he said 'yes.' a few hours later we returned the aircraft to billings on a ferry permit without incident. After having time to think it over; I chose to call maintenance control from home to ask a couple of questions and to make sure they knew that the aircraft had sustained a hard hit. The mechanic I talked to was not aware of that detail and said the ELT had not been triggered; but the maintenance was still in control of the aircraft and said they would 'look the wings over good.' I think this situation occurred due mostly to lack of experience in the airplane and in a crew environment; as this captain has no previous 121 experience and only 200-300 hours in type. I feel as though my 2 comments in reference to airspeed were not given proper consideration by the captain; who has exhibited an argumentative behavior in the past with others at the company; including company instructors.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B1900D FLT CREW EXPERIENCED A HARD LANDING FOLLOWING AN UNSTABILIZED APPROACH.

Narrative: THE CAPT AND I WERE FLYING PAX FROM BILLINGS BIL TO ZZZ TO GLENDIVE GDV. THE ENTIRE TRIP WAS FORECASTED TO BE VMC; CALM AND CLR AT ALL 3 ARPTS. I; THE FO; WAS THE PNF ON THE FIRST LEG OF THE TRIP FROM BIL TO ZZZ. THIS WAS THE CAPT'S SECOND TRIP FOLLOWING IOE AS CAPT; HAVING UPGRADED WITH LESS THAN 300 HRS IN TYPE. HAVING BEEN IN INITIAL NEW HIRE CLASS WITH HIM 6 MONTHS EARLIER; I MADE MENTION ON OUR TAXI OUT IN BILLINGS THAT HE SEEMED UNUSUALLY NERVOUS. HE SHRUGGED IT OFF WITH A GRIN AND DID NOT HAVE A RESPONSE. I HAD TO PROMPT THE CAPT A FEW TIMES ON THE WAY OVER FOR CALLOUTS SUCH AS 'FLAPS UP; CLB PWR' AND TO TURN ON COURSE. HE WAS SLIGHTLY BEHIND THE AIRPLANE; BUT NOTHING I FELT WAS UNSAFE AT THAT TIME. ON OUR DSCNT INTO ZZZ; WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APPROX 20 MI OUT AND CANCELED IFR AT THE SAME TIME. WINDS WERE 10 DEGS OFF THE RWY AT 6 KTS. AT 500 FT AGL; WITH THE GEAR DOWN AND BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST COMPLETE AND SLIGHTLY HIGH ON THE GS; I CALLED (REF SPD 116 KTS) 'REF MINUS 10!' HE RESPONDED 'CORRECTING' AND ADDED APPROX 300 LBS TORQUE. WE GAINED ABOUT 5 KTS AIRSPD; REMAINED HIGH ON THE GS AND ABOUT 3 SECONDS LATER HE BEGAN TO REDUCE TORQUE AGAIN. AT APPROX 200 FT AGL I SAID; 'WE ARE ALMOST 100 KTS!' I LEANED BACK TO LOOK AT HIS AIRSPD INDICATOR TO CONFIRM THAT IT WAS INDICATING THE SAME AS MINE; AND IT WAS. HE NOTICED ME DOING THAT AND MADE A COMMENT (WHICH I CANNOT REMEMBER) AND I RESPONDED; 'YEH; I'M CHKING TO SEE IF YOURS IS INDICATING THE SAME AS MINE AND IT IS.' BY THIS TIME WE WERE LESS THAN 50 FT AGL AND THE AIRPLANE BEGAN SINKING RAPIDLY (I DID NOT NOTE VERT SPD). HE MADE NO FURTHER ATTEMPT TO CORRECT FOR LOSS OF AIRSPD. UPON LNDG THE RED GEAR UNSAFE LIGHTS IN THE GEAR HANDLE ILLUMINATED; THE GEAR WARNING HORN SOUNDED; AND THE 2 GREEN LIGHTS ON THE MAIN GEAR EXTINGUISHED. HE SAID; 'THAT WAS INTERESTING!' THE CAPT WAS VISIBLY SHAKEN AND STRESSED. I ATTEMPTED TO SILENCE THE HORN FOR PAX COMFORT BUT WAS INITIALLY UNABLE TO GET IT TO SILENCE. HE BEGAN TO HAND PUMP THE GEAR; PRESUMABLY BECAUSE HE WAS AFRAID IT WOULD COLLAPSE. I ASKED FOR THE FLT CTLS ON THE GND SINCE HE APPEARED FRIGHTENED AN CONFUSED. UPON PARKING AT THE TERMINAL; I CONDUCTED A POST FLT WALKAROUND WHILE HE EXITED THE ACFT TO CALL AND INFORM DISPATCH OF A MAINT ISSUE. AFTER THE WALKAROUND; I RETURNED TO THE COCKPIT AND TOLD THE REMAINING PAX TO GO INSIDE BECAUSE WE'D BE ON THE GND FOR A WHILE. EVERYONE DEPLANED AND THE CAPT CONTACTED MAINT. THE FLT FOR ZZZ1 WAS CANCELED AND WE OVERNIGHTED IN ZZZ. WHILE ON THE PHONE WITH MAINT CTL; THE CAPT FOUND A NUT MISSING FROM A BOLT ON THE R MAIN GEAR THAT CONNECTED THE DRAG BRACE. MAINT DROVE TO ZZZ IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT TO REPAIR THE ACFT. THE NEXT MORNING; WE WERE SCHEDULED TO FLY FROM ZZZ TO ZZZ1 AND THEN BACK TO BILLINGS. UPON RETRACTING THE GEAR ON TKOF FROM ZZZ; THE RED UNSAFE LIGHTS IN THE GEAR HANDLE WOULD NOT EXTINGUISH. THE CAPT CHOSE TO CONTINUE THE FLT TO ZZZ1 WHERE THE GEAR EXTENDED PROPERLY AND WE LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. HE ONCE AGAIN CONTACTED MAINT AND WE WERE GRANTED A FERRY PERMIT TO RETURN THE ACFT WITH THE GEAR EXTENDED TO ZZZ TO MEET MAINT PERSONNEL. WE RETURNED AGAIN WITHOUT INCIDENT. WHEN THE MECH ARRIVED HE FOUND SEVERAL PROBS RELATED TO SWITCHES ON THE R MAIN AND NOSE GEAR. REALIZING THAT I NEVER HEARD HIM MENTION ANYTHING ABOUT A HARD LNDG TO ANYONE; I ASKED THE CAPT IF HE EVER MENTIONED THE HARD LNDG TO 'THEM.' HE SAID 'YES.' A FEW HRS LATER WE RETURNED THE ACFT TO BILLINGS ON A FERRY PERMIT WITHOUT INCIDENT. AFTER HAVING TIME TO THINK IT OVER; I CHOSE TO CALL MAINT CTL FROM HOME TO ASK A COUPLE OF QUESTIONS AND TO MAKE SURE THEY KNEW THAT THE ACFT HAD SUSTAINED A HARD HIT. THE MECH I TALKED TO WAS NOT AWARE OF THAT DETAIL AND SAID THE ELT HAD NOT BEEN TRIGGERED; BUT THE MAINT WAS STILL IN CTL OF THE ACFT AND SAID THEY WOULD 'LOOK THE WINGS OVER GOOD.' I THINK THIS SIT OCCURRED DUE MOSTLY TO LACK OF EXPERIENCE IN THE AIRPLANE AND IN A CREW ENVIRONMENT; AS THIS CAPT HAS NO PREVIOUS 121 EXPERIENCE AND ONLY 200-300 HRS IN TYPE. I FEEL AS THOUGH MY 2 COMMENTS IN REF TO AIRSPD WERE NOT GIVEN PROPER CONSIDERATION BY THE CAPT; WHO HAS EXHIBITED AN ARGUMENTATIVE BEHAVIOR IN THE PAST WITH OTHERS AT THE COMPANY; INCLUDING COMPANY INSTRUCTORS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.