Narrative:

On mar/fri/07; picked up the aircraft in iad. The inbound captain included in his briefing that a line check had been performed in ZZZ just before they left and the mechanic in charge of it expressed some concerns about the left engine oil consumption but that it was 'within limits.' a review of the logbook indicated that the oil had been replenished in the morning and then 6.2 hours later during the line check; 1.25 quarts had been added to this engine and 0.75 quarts on the right side. My flight between iad and ZZZ was uneventful. Once in ZZZ the first officer checked the oil as part of the last flight of the day with an overnight in an outside station. He reported adding 2 quarts of oil and the light was still off. According to the limitation section; he then stopped and informed me. I called company maintenance and basically was told that it was normal; and later; that I did not know how to refill the oil. After my insisting heavily company maintenance agreed on sending a local mechanic to assess the situation. A few mins later a mechanic showed up in the cockpit and basically started on the same foot. He also stated that oil was only added to the tank and not the engines during a line check. I then pointed out that the logbook was indicating a quantity for the left and right sides but as far as I knew we had only 1 oil tank. The mechanic finally agreed on going back and assessing the situation. He came back a few mins later and told us that he added 1.75 quarts of oil. After a call to company maintenance it was agreed upon to perform an oil consumption run. We initially ran the engine for 5 mins at idle and then the oil was drained. Next the engine was refilled with a known quantity of oil and ran for 20 mins at idle. At the end of this procedure; the mechanic determined that 0.5 quart was missing and this quantity was indeed out of limits. We then switched airplanes and continued on with the rest of our trip. On the following day when I got back to ZZZ; my trip had been extended with a ferry flight. I showed up at the airplane and checked the logbook. On top of my previous write-up was a new one indicating an engine run-up for about 45 mins for which absolutely no oil consumption was noted; and therefore; the airplane was considered safe for a 1-TIME ferry flight. But no other maintenance procedure was noted. As the mechanic who dealt with the problem was inspecting the engine for oil dripping reported by my first officer before my arrival; I went back and discussed the issue. He was able to confirm the absence of any procedure beside the run-up. Because I could not believe that an engine could have gone from burning 10.4 times the limit of oil to none at all; I called maintenance and talked to a supervisor. In conclusion of which conversation; I refused the airplane. The chief pilot on duty called me to hear our side of the story. I then deduced that maintenance was systematically occulting any event showing a discrepancy in oil consumption to focus on the new normal run up. I then had to read verbatim to the chief pilot the different write up and logbook entries in order for him to forge his own opinion. We finally agreed on the fact that based on flight time with oil consumption at a rate of over 2 quarts per hour; the engine would have all the likelihood of shutting down in-flight before reaching destination. Moreover; the decision also considered the fact that consumption rate was way above the limitations specified by the fsm (engine service manual). Therefore; we would wait for an additional maintenance investigation before this airplane could be flown.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ-200 PILOT REPORTS CONCERNS ABOUT MAINT SYSTEMATICALLY 'OCCULTING' ANY EVENT THAT SHOWED DISCREPANCY ABOUT HIS ACFT'S HIGH OIL CONSUMPTION

Narrative: ON MAR/FRI/07; PICKED UP THE ACFT IN IAD. THE INBOUND CAPT INCLUDED IN HIS BRIEFING THAT A LINE CHK HAD BEEN PERFORMED IN ZZZ JUST BEFORE THEY LEFT AND THE MECH IN CHARGE OF IT EXPRESSED SOME CONCERNS ABOUT THE L ENG OIL CONSUMPTION BUT THAT IT WAS 'WITHIN LIMITS.' A REVIEW OF THE LOGBOOK INDICATED THAT THE OIL HAD BEEN REPLENISHED IN THE MORNING AND THEN 6.2 HRS LATER DURING THE LINE CHK; 1.25 QUARTS HAD BEEN ADDED TO THIS ENG AND 0.75 QUARTS ON THE R SIDE. MY FLT BTWN IAD AND ZZZ WAS UNEVENTFUL. ONCE IN ZZZ THE FO CHKED THE OIL AS PART OF THE LAST FLT OF THE DAY WITH AN OVERNIGHT IN AN OUTSIDE STATION. HE RPTED ADDING 2 QUARTS OF OIL AND THE LIGHT WAS STILL OFF. ACCORDING TO THE LIMITATION SECTION; HE THEN STOPPED AND INFORMED ME. I CALLED COMPANY MAINT AND BASICALLY WAS TOLD THAT IT WAS NORMAL; AND LATER; THAT I DID NOT KNOW HOW TO REFILL THE OIL. AFTER MY INSISTING HEAVILY COMPANY MAINT AGREED ON SENDING A LCL MECH TO ASSESS THE SITUATION. A FEW MINS LATER A MECH SHOWED UP IN THE COCKPIT AND BASICALLY STARTED ON THE SAME FOOT. HE ALSO STATED THAT OIL WAS ONLY ADDED TO THE TANK AND NOT THE ENGS DURING A LINE CHK. I THEN POINTED OUT THAT THE LOGBOOK WAS INDICATING A QUANTITY FOR THE L AND R SIDES BUT AS FAR AS I KNEW WE HAD ONLY 1 OIL TANK. THE MECH FINALLY AGREED ON GOING BACK AND ASSESSING THE SITUATION. HE CAME BACK A FEW MINS LATER AND TOLD US THAT HE ADDED 1.75 QUARTS OF OIL. AFTER A CALL TO COMPANY MAINT IT WAS AGREED UPON TO PERFORM AN OIL CONSUMPTION RUN. WE INITIALLY RAN THE ENG FOR 5 MINS AT IDLE AND THEN THE OIL WAS DRAINED. NEXT THE ENG WAS REFILLED WITH A KNOWN QUANTITY OF OIL AND RAN FOR 20 MINS AT IDLE. AT THE END OF THIS PROC; THE MECH DETERMINED THAT 0.5 QUART WAS MISSING AND THIS QUANTITY WAS INDEED OUT OF LIMITS. WE THEN SWITCHED AIRPLANES AND CONTINUED ON WITH THE REST OF OUR TRIP. ON THE FOLLOWING DAY WHEN I GOT BACK TO ZZZ; MY TRIP HAD BEEN EXTENDED WITH A FERRY FLT. I SHOWED UP AT THE AIRPLANE AND CHKED THE LOGBOOK. ON TOP OF MY PREVIOUS WRITE-UP WAS A NEW ONE INDICATING AN ENG RUN-UP FOR ABOUT 45 MINS FOR WHICH ABSOLUTELY NO OIL CONSUMPTION WAS NOTED; AND THEREFORE; THE AIRPLANE WAS CONSIDERED SAFE FOR A 1-TIME FERRY FLT. BUT NO OTHER MAINT PROC WAS NOTED. AS THE MECH WHO DEALT WITH THE PROB WAS INSPECTING THE ENG FOR OIL DRIPPING RPTED BY MY FO BEFORE MY ARR; I WENT BACK AND DISCUSSED THE ISSUE. HE WAS ABLE TO CONFIRM THE ABSENCE OF ANY PROC BESIDE THE RUN-UP. BECAUSE I COULD NOT BELIEVE THAT AN ENG COULD HAVE GONE FROM BURNING 10.4 TIMES THE LIMIT OF OIL TO NONE AT ALL; I CALLED MAINT AND TALKED TO A SUPVR. IN CONCLUSION OF WHICH CONVERSATION; I REFUSED THE AIRPLANE. THE CHIEF PLT ON DUTY CALLED ME TO HEAR OUR SIDE OF THE STORY. I THEN DEDUCED THAT MAINT WAS SYSTEMATICALLY OCCULTING ANY EVENT SHOWING A DISCREPANCY IN OIL CONSUMPTION TO FOCUS ON THE NEW NORMAL RUN UP. I THEN HAD TO READ VERBATIM TO THE CHIEF PLT THE DIFFERENT WRITE UP AND LOGBOOK ENTRIES IN ORDER FOR HIM TO FORGE HIS OWN OPINION. WE FINALLY AGREED ON THE FACT THAT BASED ON FLT TIME WITH OIL CONSUMPTION AT A RATE OF OVER 2 QUARTS PER HR; THE ENG WOULD HAVE ALL THE LIKELIHOOD OF SHUTTING DOWN INFLT BEFORE REACHING DEST. MOREOVER; THE DECISION ALSO CONSIDERED THE FACT THAT CONSUMPTION RATE WAS WAY ABOVE THE LIMITATIONS SPECIFIED BY THE FSM (ENG SVC MANUAL). THEREFORE; WE WOULD WAIT FOR AN ADDITIONAL MAINT INVESTIGATION BEFORE THIS AIRPLANE COULD BE FLOWN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.