Narrative:

While working the final vector #1 radar position; I was running instrument and visual approachs to runway 27R in marginal VFR conditions. The airport was at the tail end of a busy arrival push that included losing the secondary runway. Traffic was still heavy at the time a decision was made to run opposite direction approachs to runways 27R and 9R. I was never told that we were going to start running approachs to runway 9R while I was still running approachs to runway 27R. Although the legality of the operation remains in question; this operation unquestionably decreased the safety of the operation. No less than 12 commercial airliners carrying hundreds of passenger were put at risk in an apparent effort to avoid arrival delays. Aiming aircraft at each other with a closure speed of a combined 400 KTS in marginal VFR conditions with no protection against possible missed approachs; communication failure or any other equipment or mechanical consideration is a careless decision made by phl management. This operation along with many other recent decisions with regard to the operation displays a disregard for safety and quite possibly gross negligence by the phl management team. It would be advised for an agency other than the FAA to investigate the continued incompetence of phl management before an actual disaster occurs. Supplemental information from acn 733762: while working the south arrival radar position I was in a hold with 5 aircraft at 2 separate fixes. The airport was just finishing up a busy arrival push that included losing the secondary runway. Traffic was still heavy at the final vector #1 position running visuals to runways 27R and runway 26 (a west flow). The winds favored a runway 17 operation and as such the most advantageous operation would be a runway 9R; runway 17 confign (an east flow). While FV1 had 7-8 aircraft that they were still vectoring for the west flow I was directed to come out of the hold and 'run to runway 9R.' I was instructed by the supervisor to run the new east flow simultaneously while the FV1 controller was still running traffic to runways 27R and 26. I was also required to 'share final' with the north arrival controller; which in a runway 27 operation is still technically north and south departure airspace respectively. To the best of my knowledge the departures were not aware that we were going to start using their airspace; although it was clear that there were no more departures from runway 27L. Furthermore; and quite importantly FV1 was unaware that we were running to a runway that was exactly opposite direction from the still significant arrival flow from the east. To top this off the first aircraft I was required to run to runway 9R could not see the airport; and after coordinating with the local controller I was forced to issue an ILS approach to runway 9R. The local controller stated that he would be able to apply visual separation and that he would separate the arrival from the other traffic involved; however this is certainly a recipe for disaster. I repeatedly informed the supervisor that I was uncomfortable with the situation; and that I felt that the so called coordination had not even been remotely accomplished in full. There was absolutely no reason to run to opposite direction runways; period.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PHL TRACON CTLRS EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING OPPOSITE DIRECTION OPS DURING RWY CHANGE; CITING LACK OF COORD AND POOR SUPVR DECISIONS.

Narrative: WHILE WORKING THE FINAL VECTOR #1 RADAR POS; I WAS RUNNING INST AND VISUAL APCHS TO RWY 27R IN MARGINAL VFR CONDITIONS. THE ARPT WAS AT THE TAIL END OF A BUSY ARR PUSH THAT INCLUDED LOSING THE SECONDARY RWY. TFC WAS STILL HVY AT THE TIME A DECISION WAS MADE TO RUN OPPOSITE DIRECTION APCHS TO RWYS 27R AND 9R. I WAS NEVER TOLD THAT WE WERE GOING TO START RUNNING APCHS TO RWY 9R WHILE I WAS STILL RUNNING APCHS TO RWY 27R. ALTHOUGH THE LEGALITY OF THE OP REMAINS IN QUESTION; THIS OP UNQUESTIONABLY DECREASED THE SAFETY OF THE OP. NO LESS THAN 12 COMMERCIAL AIRLINERS CARRYING HUNDREDS OF PAX WERE PUT AT RISK IN AN APPARENT EFFORT TO AVOID ARR DELAYS. AIMING ACFT AT EACH OTHER WITH A CLOSURE SPD OF A COMBINED 400 KTS IN MARGINAL VFR CONDITIONS WITH NO PROTECTION AGAINST POSSIBLE MISSED APCHS; COM FAILURE OR ANY OTHER EQUIP OR MECHANICAL CONSIDERATION IS A CARELESS DECISION MADE BY PHL MGMNT. THIS OP ALONG WITH MANY OTHER RECENT DECISIONS WITH REGARD TO THE OP DISPLAYS A DISREGARD FOR SAFETY AND QUITE POSSIBLY GROSS NEGLIGENCE BY THE PHL MGMNT TEAM. IT WOULD BE ADVISED FOR AN AGENCY OTHER THAN THE FAA TO INVESTIGATE THE CONTINUED INCOMPETENCE OF PHL MGMNT BEFORE AN ACTUAL DISASTER OCCURS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 733762: WHILE WORKING THE S ARR RADAR POS I WAS IN A HOLD WITH 5 ACFT AT 2 SEPARATE FIXES. THE ARPT WAS JUST FINISHING UP A BUSY ARR PUSH THAT INCLUDED LOSING THE SECONDARY RWY. TFC WAS STILL HVY AT THE FINAL VECTOR #1 POS RUNNING VISUALS TO RWYS 27R AND RWY 26 (A W FLOW). THE WINDS FAVORED A RWY 17 OP AND AS SUCH THE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS OP WOULD BE A RWY 9R; RWY 17 CONFIGN (AN E FLOW). WHILE FV1 HAD 7-8 ACFT THAT THEY WERE STILL VECTORING FOR THE W FLOW I WAS DIRECTED TO COME OUT OF THE HOLD AND 'RUN TO RWY 9R.' I WAS INSTRUCTED BY THE SUPVR TO RUN THE NEW E FLOW SIMULTANEOUSLY WHILE THE FV1 CTLR WAS STILL RUNNING TFC TO RWYS 27R AND 26. I WAS ALSO REQUIRED TO 'SHARE FINAL' WITH THE N ARR CTLR; WHICH IN A RWY 27 OP IS STILL TECHNICALLY N AND S DEP AIRSPACE RESPECTIVELY. TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE THE DEPS WERE NOT AWARE THAT WE WERE GOING TO START USING THEIR AIRSPACE; ALTHOUGH IT WAS CLR THAT THERE WERE NO MORE DEPS FROM RWY 27L. FURTHERMORE; AND QUITE IMPORTANTLY FV1 WAS UNAWARE THAT WE WERE RUNNING TO A RWY THAT WAS EXACTLY OPPOSITE DIRECTION FROM THE STILL SIGNIFICANT ARR FLOW FROM THE E. TO TOP THIS OFF THE FIRST ACFT I WAS REQUIRED TO RUN TO RWY 9R COULD NOT SEE THE ARPT; AND AFTER COORDINATING WITH THE LCL CTLR I WAS FORCED TO ISSUE AN ILS APCH TO RWY 9R. THE LCL CTLR STATED THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO APPLY VISUAL SEPARATION AND THAT HE WOULD SEPARATE THE ARR FROM THE OTHER TFC INVOLVED; HOWEVER THIS IS CERTAINLY A RECIPE FOR DISASTER. I REPEATEDLY INFORMED THE SUPVR THAT I WAS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE SITUATION; AND THAT I FELT THAT THE SO CALLED COORD HAD NOT EVEN BEEN REMOTELY ACCOMPLISHED IN FULL. THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO REASON TO RUN TO OPPOSITE DIRECTION RWYS; PERIOD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.