Narrative:

The first officer and I conducted all preflight inspections; procedures and approved checklists in accordance with applicable far's; standards and policies; and local rules. I briefed the first officer that my intent was to start both engines after pushback in anticipation of a short taxi and requisite engine warm up. After pushback; start; and after start checklists had been completed; I taxied the aircraft sbound. The aircraft system were operating normally. Approaching the area abeam gate without prior warning; both engines suddenly flamed out and I applied brakes to stop the aircraft short of the center roadway so as not to interfere with roadway traffic. All cockpit lighting had extinguished and all radios and intercoms were silent. There was no audible sound in the cockpit other than our own voices and the sound of the IRU warning horn. The only engine instruments available at that moment were the #2 engine N1; egt and N2; all of which were rolling back. I pointed to the available engine instruments and asked the first officer to confirm that the engines had flamed out. The first officer agreed that both engines had flamed out. I verbalized and performed the immediate action items for engine failure. After assessing that there was no evidence of fire or any other immediate safety threat to the passenger; crew or aircraft; my main priority was to establish communications. Knowing that I did not have any normal electrical power source; I verbalized and performed the immediate action items for electrical failure. After trying to call the flight attendants with the intercom and after having tried to use the #1 VHF radio; I realized that they did not work as I had expected. I chose not to use the PA to talk to the flight attendants for fear of upsetting the passenger. I did have the first officer open the door to the cabin and I spoke directly to the flight attendants to ensure all was well in the cabin. We then started the APU in order to restore normal electrical power. I felt that trying to restart the engines would be a mistake since I had no idea why they had shut down. After electrical power was restored with the APU; I communicated with ramp control; the flight attendants; the passenger; and line maintenance in order to put together and execute a plan to tow the aircraft to a gate; deplane the passenger; find the passenger transportation and have maintenance personnel meet the aircraft at the gate for evaluate. During those few mins; the first officer asked if he should move the engine start levers to the off position. I agreed and told him to do so. The aircraft was towed to gate where we were met by maintenance personnel and the gate agent. The maintenance personnel evaluated the aircraft with the first officer while I coordinated with the gate agent to ensure passenger movement to their destination. I called our dispatcher and told him of the situation. I also spoke with the MD88 maintenance coordinator several times. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that the engines appeared to flameout simultaneously shortly after starting the taxi from the gate. The company has attempted to simulate the event in the simulator and the reporter stated that several scenarios were achieved: 1) maintenance had cycled both fire handles during a phase check the night before and the firewall shutoff valves may have not opened back up. This would have left very little fuel in the lines and the engine could have flamed out due to this scenario. 2) the cycling of the fire handles may have opened the generator field relays and they didn't close. When the APU was shut down during taxi the aircraft had complete electrical failure due to both engine generators being isolated and the initial indications to the flight crew would have been that both engines had flamed out. Since the engine are in the far rear of the aircraft the flight crew would not hear them operating and the illusion first officer the engines flaming out would appear correct. The reporter stated that during the incident and reading the proper checklist for the dual flameout the first officer indicated that the power levels were still in the on position. They were subsequently placed to the cut off position and the APU started. After electrical power was restored by the APU generator it reinforced to the crew that bothengs had flamed out. The reporter stated that after being through several simulator sessions to recreate the event he believes that both engine generators were isolated and that when the APU was secured during taxi the aircraft had complete electrical failure. The crew assumed that the engines had flamed out as the reporter stated that he may have just moved the power levers to idle after adding power to start the taxi and saw the N1; egt and N2 rolling back (these gauges remain pwred with complete electrical failure). This enhanced the perception that the engines had flamed out. After this both power levers were placed in the cut off position and the flight crew assumed that the engines flamed out. The reporter stated that there is an ongoing investigation by his company and the alpa safety committee. Additionally; he stated that the flight crew was required to take a simulator check ride to be requalified as the incident was considered serious enough to warrant such action by the company.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD88 FLT CREW HAS BOTH ENGS FLAME OUT DURING TAXI FOR DEP.

Narrative: THE FO AND I CONDUCTED ALL PREFLT INSPECTIONS; PROCS AND APPROVED CHKLISTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE FAR'S; STANDARDS AND POLICIES; AND LCL RULES. I BRIEFED THE FO THAT MY INTENT WAS TO START BOTH ENGS AFTER PUSHBACK IN ANTICIPATION OF A SHORT TAXI AND REQUISITE ENG WARM UP. AFTER PUSHBACK; START; AND AFTER START CHKLISTS HAD BEEN COMPLETED; I TAXIED THE ACFT SBOUND. THE ACFT SYS WERE OPERATING NORMALLY. APCHING THE AREA ABEAM GATE WITHOUT PRIOR WARNING; BOTH ENGS SUDDENLY FLAMED OUT AND I APPLIED BRAKES TO STOP THE ACFT SHORT OF THE CTR ROADWAY SO AS NOT TO INTERFERE WITH ROADWAY TFC. ALL COCKPIT LIGHTING HAD EXTINGUISHED AND ALL RADIOS AND INTERCOMS WERE SILENT. THERE WAS NO AUDIBLE SOUND IN THE COCKPIT OTHER THAN OUR OWN VOICES AND THE SOUND OF THE IRU WARNING HORN. THE ONLY ENG INSTS AVAILABLE AT THAT MOMENT WERE THE #2 ENG N1; EGT AND N2; ALL OF WHICH WERE ROLLING BACK. I POINTED TO THE AVAILABLE ENG INSTS AND ASKED THE FO TO CONFIRM THAT THE ENGS HAD FLAMED OUT. THE FO AGREED THAT BOTH ENGS HAD FLAMED OUT. I VERBALIZED AND PERFORMED THE IMMEDIATE ACTION ITEMS FOR ENG FAILURE. AFTER ASSESSING THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF FIRE OR ANY OTHER IMMEDIATE SAFETY THREAT TO THE PAX; CREW OR ACFT; MY MAIN PRIORITY WAS TO ESTABLISH COMS. KNOWING THAT I DID NOT HAVE ANY NORMAL ELECTRICAL PWR SOURCE; I VERBALIZED AND PERFORMED THE IMMEDIATE ACTION ITEMS FOR ELECTRICAL FAILURE. AFTER TRYING TO CALL THE FLT ATTENDANTS WITH THE INTERCOM AND AFTER HAVING TRIED TO USE THE #1 VHF RADIO; I REALIZED THAT THEY DID NOT WORK AS I HAD EXPECTED. I CHOSE NOT TO USE THE PA TO TALK TO THE FLT ATTENDANTS FOR FEAR OF UPSETTING THE PAX. I DID HAVE THE FO OPEN THE DOOR TO THE CABIN AND I SPOKE DIRECTLY TO THE FLT ATTENDANTS TO ENSURE ALL WAS WELL IN THE CABIN. WE THEN STARTED THE APU IN ORDER TO RESTORE NORMAL ELECTRICAL PWR. I FELT THAT TRYING TO RESTART THE ENGS WOULD BE A MISTAKE SINCE I HAD NO IDEA WHY THEY HAD SHUT DOWN. AFTER ELECTRICAL PWR WAS RESTORED WITH THE APU; I COMMUNICATED WITH RAMP CTL; THE FLT ATTENDANTS; THE PAX; AND LINE MAINT IN ORDER TO PUT TOGETHER AND EXECUTE A PLAN TO TOW THE ACFT TO A GATE; DEPLANE THE PAX; FIND THE PAX TRANSPORTATION AND HAVE MAINT PERSONNEL MEET THE ACFT AT THE GATE FOR EVAL. DURING THOSE FEW MINS; THE FO ASKED IF HE SHOULD MOVE THE ENG START LEVERS TO THE OFF POS. I AGREED AND TOLD HIM TO DO SO. THE ACFT WAS TOWED TO GATE WHERE WE WERE MET BY MAINT PERSONNEL AND THE GATE AGENT. THE MAINT PERSONNEL EVALUATED THE ACFT WITH THE FO WHILE I COORDINATED WITH THE GATE AGENT TO ENSURE PAX MOVEMENT TO THEIR DEST. I CALLED OUR DISPATCHER AND TOLD HIM OF THE SIT. I ALSO SPOKE WITH THE MD88 MAINT COORDINATOR SEVERAL TIMES. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THE ENGS APPEARED TO FLAMEOUT SIMULTANEOUSLY SHORTLY AFTER STARTING THE TAXI FROM THE GATE. THE COMPANY HAS ATTEMPTED TO SIMULATE THE EVENT IN THE SIMULATOR AND THE RPTR STATED THAT SEVERAL SCENARIOS WERE ACHIEVED: 1) MAINT HAD CYCLED BOTH FIRE HANDLES DURING A PHASE CHK THE NIGHT BEFORE AND THE FIREWALL SHUTOFF VALVES MAY HAVE NOT OPENED BACK UP. THIS WOULD HAVE LEFT VERY LITTLE FUEL IN THE LINES AND THE ENG COULD HAVE FLAMED OUT DUE TO THIS SCENARIO. 2) THE CYCLING OF THE FIRE HANDLES MAY HAVE OPENED THE GENERATOR FIELD RELAYS AND THEY DIDN'T CLOSE. WHEN THE APU WAS SHUT DOWN DURING TAXI THE ACFT HAD COMPLETE ELECTRICAL FAILURE DUE TO BOTH ENG GENERATORS BEING ISOLATED AND THE INITIAL INDICATIONS TO THE FLT CREW WOULD HAVE BEEN THAT BOTH ENGS HAD FLAMED OUT. SINCE THE ENG ARE IN THE FAR REAR OF THE ACFT THE FLT CREW WOULD NOT HEAR THEM OPERATING AND THE ILLUSION FO THE ENGS FLAMING OUT WOULD APPEAR CORRECT. THE RPTR STATED THAT DURING THE INCIDENT AND READING THE PROPER CHKLIST FOR THE DUAL FLAMEOUT THE FO INDICATED THAT THE PWR LEVELS WERE STILL IN THE ON POS. THEY WERE SUBSEQUENTLY PLACED TO THE CUT OFF POS AND THE APU STARTED. AFTER ELECTRICAL PWR WAS RESTORED BY THE APU GENERATOR IT REINFORCED TO THE CREW THAT BOTHENGS HAD FLAMED OUT. THE RPTR STATED THAT AFTER BEING THROUGH SEVERAL SIMULATOR SESSIONS TO RECREATE THE EVENT HE BELIEVES THAT BOTH ENG GENERATORS WERE ISOLATED AND THAT WHEN THE APU WAS SECURED DURING TAXI THE ACFT HAD COMPLETE ELECTRICAL FAILURE. THE CREW ASSUMED THAT THE ENGS HAD FLAMED OUT AS THE RPTR STATED THAT HE MAY HAVE JUST MOVED THE PWR LEVERS TO IDLE AFTER ADDING PWR TO START THE TAXI AND SAW THE N1; EGT AND N2 ROLLING BACK (THESE GAUGES REMAIN PWRED WITH COMPLETE ELECTRICAL FAILURE). THIS ENHANCED THE PERCEPTION THAT THE ENGS HAD FLAMED OUT. AFTER THIS BOTH PWR LEVERS WERE PLACED IN THE CUT OFF POS AND THE FLT CREW ASSUMED THAT THE ENGS FLAMED OUT. THE RPTR STATED THAT THERE IS AN ONGOING INVESTIGATION BY HIS COMPANY AND THE ALPA SAFETY COMMITTEE. ADDITIONALLY; HE STATED THAT THE FLT CREW WAS REQUIRED TO TAKE A SIMULATOR CHK RIDE TO BE REQUALIFIED AS THE INCIDENT WAS CONSIDERED SERIOUS ENOUGH TO WARRANT SUCH ACTION BY THE COMPANY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.