Narrative:

On a scheduled flight to lax nearing the la basin with a clearance to fly the redeye 2 STAR to lax for an approach the east runways. At approximately XA50; I requested the lax ATIS. The wind was out of the west but not quite out of limits for a tailwind so we were surprised to see the landing runways to the west. This information was in contradiction with our WX and forecast obtained prior to departure. The captain and I discussed the landing runways not matching up with the assigned arrival and we decided to ask for clarification from ZLA. ZLA controller responded with a standby and more than 10 minutes went by before we were issued the civet 5 arrival rather than the arrival we already had programmed in the FMS. We then had to question the controller to clarify our landing runway since the FMS ties the two elements together. Following some communications between other aircraft and the controller; he gave us a crossing restriction to cross gramm at and maintain FL180 from FL360. The captain entered the crossing restriction into the FMS and selected FL180 in the altitude select window and armed profile. I confirmed the altitude pre-select and noted the profile descent arrow was in front of the aircraft. Promptly and at the computed descent point the aircraft started down. I notified ATC we were descending. Additionally; I was head down entering the new arrival route and approach with runway data into the FMS. As per company training; I was also making all of the altitude at or above or at or below restriction hard altitudes. This is a procedure the flight standards pilot wants us to use because it is believed it makes it easier for the FMS/autoplt to fly the arrival and approach while in descent profile on FMS. We are expected to make maximum use of the FMS and automation into the la area. After the captain confirmed the descent path; we began verifying all of the data entered into the FMS secondary flight plan. This is a requirement in our operations specifications. The captain was monitoring the descent when he noticed what appeared to be a map shift as indicated by our descent (altitude) being below the computed descent path that the computer showed for crossing gramm at FL180 to the computed descent path deviation index moving rapidly full scale in the opposite direction; then showing the aircraft too high to make the restriction without intervention. The captain immediately extended the speed brake handle fully and disconnected the autothrottles; ensuring the throttles were at flight idle increasing our rate of descent. The radio traffic was steadily increasing and as we were able to determine we would not make the restriction; the controller did not provide an adequate break for us to notify him. After we crossed the intersection too high; the controller asked our altitude. He did not indicate any problems or conflicts nor did we see any aircraft on our TCAS nor did we receive any TCAS advisories while on the 12 mile scale. Factors: middle of the night; runway configuration unusual to night operations at lax. Preflight WX and forecast did not support a westerly operation. Company paperwork and clearance indicating redeye 2 and landing east. Slow response from controller; a complicated arrival/approach to lax. A late clearance issuance and a late crossing restriction. Additionally; expectation bias on the part of the pilots and the center controller. These factors created a huge workload at a difficult time of night at the end of a long day. Maybe if the center/approach controller would have coordinated earlier for runway change or if we would have pressed earlier or hard for information; maybe we could have kept this from happening.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR DESCENDING INTO LAX WAS GIVEN A LATE RWY CHANGE. AN EAST LNDG CHANGED TO A WEST LNDG CAUSING THE ACFT TO BE HIGH AT ARR CONSTRAINTS.

Narrative: ON A SCHEDULED FLT TO LAX NEARING THE LA BASIN WITH A CLRNC TO FLY THE REDEYE 2 STAR TO LAX FOR AN APCH THE EAST RWYS. AT APPROX XA50; I REQUESTED THE LAX ATIS. THE WIND WAS OUT OF THE WEST BUT NOT QUITE OUT OF LIMITS FOR A TAILWIND SO WE WERE SURPRISED TO SEE THE LNDG RWYS TO THE WEST. THIS INFO WAS IN CONTRADICTION WITH OUR WX AND FORECAST OBTAINED PRIOR TO DEP. THE CAPT AND I DISCUSSED THE LNDG RWYS NOT MATCHING UP WITH THE ASSIGNED ARR AND WE DECIDED TO ASK FOR CLARIFICATION FROM ZLA. ZLA CTLR RESPONDED WITH A STANDBY AND MORE THAN 10 MINUTES WENT BY BEFORE WE WERE ISSUED THE CIVET 5 ARR RATHER THAN THE ARR WE ALREADY HAD PROGRAMMED IN THE FMS. WE THEN HAD TO QUESTION THE CTLR TO CLARIFY OUR LNDG RWY SINCE THE FMS TIES THE TWO ELEMENTS TOGETHER. FOLLOWING SOME COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN OTHER ACFT AND THE CTLR; HE GAVE US A CROSSING RESTRICTION TO CROSS GRAMM AT AND MAINTAIN FL180 FROM FL360. THE CAPT ENTERED THE CROSSING RESTRICTION INTO THE FMS AND SELECTED FL180 IN THE ALT SELECT WINDOW AND ARMED PROFILE. I CONFIRMED THE ALT PRE-SELECT AND NOTED THE PROFILE DESCENT ARROW WAS IN FRONT OF THE ACFT. PROMPTLY AND AT THE COMPUTED DESCENT POINT THE ACFT STARTED DOWN. I NOTIFIED ATC WE WERE DESCENDING. ADDITIONALLY; I WAS HEAD DOWN ENTERING THE NEW ARR RTE AND APCH WITH RWY DATA INTO THE FMS. AS PER COMPANY TRAINING; I WAS ALSO MAKING ALL OF THE ALT AT OR ABOVE OR AT OR BELOW RESTRICTION HARD ALTITUDES. THIS IS A PROC THE FLT STANDARDS PLT WANTS US TO USE BECAUSE IT IS BELIEVED IT MAKES IT EASIER FOR THE FMS/AUTOPLT TO FLY THE ARR AND APCH WHILE IN DESCENT PROFILE ON FMS. WE ARE EXPECTED TO MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF THE FMS AND AUTOMATION INTO THE LA AREA. AFTER THE CAPT CONFIRMED THE DESCENT PATH; WE BEGAN VERIFYING ALL OF THE DATA ENTERED INTO THE FMS SECONDARY FLT PLAN. THIS IS A REQUIREMENT IN OUR OPS SPECS. THE CAPT WAS MONITORING THE DESCENT WHEN HE NOTICED WHAT APPEARED TO BE A MAP SHIFT AS INDICATED BY OUR DESCENT (ALT) BEING BELOW THE COMPUTED DESCENT PATH THAT THE COMPUTER SHOWED FOR CROSSING GRAMM AT FL180 TO THE COMPUTED DESCENT PATH DEVIATION INDEX MOVING RAPIDLY FULL SCALE IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION; THEN SHOWING THE ACFT TOO HIGH TO MAKE THE RESTRICTION WITHOUT INTERVENTION. THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY EXTENDED THE SPD BRAKE HANDLE FULLY AND DISCONNECTED THE AUTOTHROTTLES; ENSURING THE THROTTLES WERE AT FLT IDLE INCREASING OUR RATE OF DESCENT. THE RADIO TFC WAS STEADILY INCREASING AND AS WE WERE ABLE TO DETERMINE WE WOULD NOT MAKE THE RESTRICTION; THE CTLR DID NOT PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE BREAK FOR US TO NOTIFY HIM. AFTER WE CROSSED THE INTXN TOO HIGH; THE CTLR ASKED OUR ALT. HE DID NOT INDICATE ANY PROBS OR CONFLICTS NOR DID WE SEE ANY ACFT ON OUR TCAS NOR DID WE RECEIVE ANY TCAS ADVISORIES WHILE ON THE 12 MILE SCALE. FACTORS: MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT; RWY CONFIGURATION UNUSUAL TO NIGHT OPS AT LAX. PREFLT WX AND FORECAST DID NOT SUPPORT A WESTERLY OPERATION. COMPANY PAPERWORK AND CLRNC INDICATING REDEYE 2 AND LNDG EAST. SLOW RESPONSE FROM CTLR; A COMPLICATED ARR/APCH TO LAX. A LATE CLRNC ISSUANCE AND A LATE CROSSING RESTRICTION. ADDITIONALLY; EXPECTATION BIAS ON THE PART OF THE PLTS AND THE CTR CTLR. THESE FACTORS CREATED A HUGE WORKLOAD AT A DIFFICULT TIME OF NIGHT AT THE END OF A LONG DAY. MAYBE IF THE CTR/APCH CTLR WOULD HAVE COORDINATED EARLIER FOR RWY CHANGE OR IF WE WOULD HAVE PRESSED EARLIER OR HARD FOR INFO; MAYBE WE COULD HAVE KEPT THIS FROM HAPPENING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.