Narrative:

The company issued a bulletin. This document refers to an eo that was scheduled be effective on april xa. The aom bulletin describing the procedures to deal with this issue was not made available to me when departing the domicile for this trip on april xc. Some of the information within in the aom bulletin was first made available to the operating crewmembers in the fleet bulletin. We operated flight from ZZZZ to ZZZZ1 to ZZZ2 on april xd. We have reason to believe that we operated outside the far's on the second segment. Two placards on the forward instrument panel state 'tank 2 ballast required if useable (sic) fuel in tanks 1/2/3 is less than 145;000 pounds.' the placards do not specify a time when this restriction is not applicable. We conclude then; that it is applicable to all phases of flight and all operations. 1) we did not block ballast fuel in the FMS per the procedure. We automatically and manually maintained the fuel in excess of the ballast required per placard; except that during cruise flight we inadvertently allowed the #2 tank to get slightly below 25K for a short period. 2) we did not comply with the manual procedure to maintain a minimum of 25K pounds in tank 2 throughout the flight. We did manually manage the fuel to assure more than 25K pounds at landing. 3) we departed ZZZZ1 planning to use manual fuel management for a segment of the flight without written; flight plan calculations for the lack of tail fuel management for that portion of the flight when manual fuel procedures were implemented. We reasoned that the 17000 pounds we added to be in compliance with the intent of the bulletin were well more than the published 2.7% penalty (less than 4000 pounds) we would have incurred by not using tail fuel management for the entire flight. We planned on operating without tail fuel management for only (approximately) the descent and landing phase of flight further reducing the actual fuel burn from the 2.7% penalty level. Retrospective review indicates that we should have queried dispatch if such calculations capability existed within commercial planning software so as to publish said numbers on the release. Explanation and concerns: on april xd; we arrived at the gateway in ZZZZ unaware of any new issues with the fuel system of the md-11. As indicated by his advanced accomplishment of the required repetitive inspection at the aircraft; the mechanic knew of the issue about to unfold; and briefed us on it even prior to boarding. The gateway's fuel load aboard the aircraft did not contain any ballast fuel; therefore; it appears that gateway operations personnel were not aware of the bulletin(south). During the preflight; I contacted the dispatcher and spoke of several seemingly important issues. I asked if there was some type of bulletin issued to afford my crew and me some insight of the new procedures. It was stated that information was contained within the departure papers and later in the preflight; this indeed was found to be the case. There was some information presented in the paperwork. I requested that the release reflect the necessary fueling schedule to include ballast control fuel; and that was later accomplished through the issuance of a second; corrected release; delivered to the aircraft somewhat later. Attempting to completely and fully understand the specific fueling requirements for the duty day's two flights; I also requested a copy of any bulletin; airworthiness directive; or any other bulletins that would be applicable; and the dispatcher noted the request. I was told that these items would not even be available to the dispatcher. I relayed the placarded information to the dispatcher; and indicated that the second leg might cause payload issues. The dispatcher said that based on information he had available; he believed that ballast fuel would not be required for the second leg but that he understood our concerns; found them to be of great interest; and he would 'check on it.' later; after aircraft logbook review;we noted our aircraft was placarded for the eo on april xb. In an effort to make a safe; on-time departure; several requests were made to the supervisor at the airplane (even prior to completing the less-than-ideal in-cockpit flight planning and paperwork preflight duties). Eventually the fuel was up-loaded as required by the deferral; and after reviewing each of the gateway's three separate attempts of providing a correct weight and balance form; and we departed somewhat late for ZZZZ1. Upon arrival in ZZZZ1; we were given a faxed directive to operate without 'ballast' fuel from operations. While the intent of the directive to operate (that we did not need ballast fuel onboard for landing) was clear; the improper grammar made the actual meaning undecipherable and meaningless if read precisely. The load plan ZZZZ1-ZZZ2 did not include sufficient fuel to allow blocking 25K pounds of ballast as we believe is required by the placard and flight briefing package verbiage. I called operations for yet additional guidance. While this discussion was ongoing; a maintenance supervisor called us and I asked him to provide a facsimile of the aom bulletin or any other information he had available regarding this new procedure. The station mechanic then retrieved the facsimile copy of the bulletin and brought it onboard. This was the first time anyone on the crew had seen the aom bulletin. Reading the bulletin did not clear up our concern. As we expected there was much confusion between the bulletin and the other verbal and written guidance issued to us. Just as my crew discussed (supposed) earlier in the day; as expressed to both the dispatcher and to maintenance; the bulletin indeed addresses the electrical arcing potential as a function of tank fuel levels. The bulletin very clearly spells out the intent of the bulletin as this: keep the fuel pumps submerged for all phases of aircraft operations. In my mind; this statement includes landing and go-around; and block-in; in fact all phases and operations; not just takeoff. This seems to be in concert with the aircraft's two placards. The company; through less formal verbal and written directives; seemed to be saying something completely different to us. Operations stated specifically that the fuel loading changes made effective by this 'deferral' applied only to take-off fuel loads and was a function of some presumed fuel temperature at arrival or enroute. That if the aircraft departed with a boeing specified 'safe' fuel quantity of 'full' tanks 1/2/3 pounds (no 'ballast required'); that the aircraft's pumps would somehow remain safely covered for the duration of the flight; regardless of the planned block-in fuel load. And based on a presumed fuel temperature to be experienced for some portion of the flight; no arcing would occur. Information available to us; even prior to this event; countered that philosophy and we searched at every opportunity to receive additional concise; non-conflicting information on this day. Maintenance and flight operations are mandating the dispatch of flights with extremely different block-in fuel load/level requirements for operations: larger block-in fuel load planning where maximum. Gross takeoff weights (payload plus fuel) are not an issue of operational concern; and minimum (far?) block in fuel loads when any additional 'ballast control' fuel would negatively affect payloads. Operations is apparently isolating and interpreting the word 'loading' (in the aom bulletin's descriptive note showing reason for implementation) to mean that only during fuel 'loading?' does the minimum of 'full' or 'ballast up to 25;000 pounds' apply. Barring further details; we cannot comprehend that plan's logic; as it seems contrary to the placards; other passages of the aom bulletin; and experiences. In what had been previously understood as a captain/dispatcher obligation; crews are now instructed via written communications to 'check with the gateway' for fueling requirements (regarding this item). Again; the note in the aom bulletin stating the purpose of the procedure exacerbated our concern. The bulletin states; 'note: the intent of the guidance is to assure loading of sufficient fuel in tank 2 so that all tank pumps remain submerged in fuel at flight termination.' while trying to convince the crew that the ballast fuel was not needed for the flight ZZZZ1-ZZZZ; several of the manager's verbal explanations; in an attempt to explain their interpretation of the issue; centered on the temperature of the tank and the length of the flight segment. These descriptions of the issue by the managers at operations and maintenance were later rescinded by some; and those reasons seemed to be replaced with verbiage more precisely in line with the aom bulletin. Acknowledgement was made of the presentations available to mechanics about the issue of arcing within the fuel tanks. Still; management stated that we did not need ballast fuel for this segment. Perhaps we did not. The flight crew later determined from the weight and balance (with the actual payload shown); that we had fuel tank capacity and performance capability for enough fuel to ensure that at least the minimum 25;000 pounds of fuel required in the #2 tank (by our interpretation of the available information); flight briefing package; and placard; could be placed onboard. We asked for; and eventually given an additional 17;000 pounds of fuel. This brought our T/O gross weight up to the originally planned to gw. No payload was lost. The dispatcher provided an updated fuel burn. Since we were nearing our drop-dead time for extended duty; we soon completed the pre-block-out procedures and discussed how to use manual fuel management to preserve the 25K in the center tank. We departed ZZZZ1. We operated the system in automatic mode to allow tail fuel management to save us as much fuel as possible and then using manual fuel management for the last hour or so of the flight as we descended allowing us to land in ZZZ2 with more than 25K pounds in the #2 tank. We are confident that our actions assured the pumps were submerged throughout the flight. This entire ordeal was more than fatiguing and in my opinion it had a serious negative impact on operations that day. We are yet unable to understand the requirement for 25K pounds of ballast for the landing after a short duration flight (one that started with less than 120K of fuel) but not the same requirement for the same quantity to assure submersion after a longer flight. Our reasoning is that the potential to expose a pump (or its connections) on a go-around (or elsewhere) seems the same on both flights. Basically; we are questioning; 'what does stage length have to do with the minimum fuel level requirements to accomplish submersion of the (possibly) faulty part(south)?' we chose to err to a more conservative side of the equation by providing what we reasoned was a safer operation than had been verbally directed.callback conversation with reporter acn 734078 revealed the following information: reporter stated that his air carrier did not feel it was necessary to carry fuel in the center tank for landing; only takeoff; and therefore the fuel was ballast only for takeoff. The crew; including the captain and an on board check captain disagreed and after talking with dispatch they carried the extra fuel. The air carrier's dispatch stated that since the fuel tanks were cold soaked from cruise; cooling fuel in the tank was not necessary.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN MD11 PLT RPTS AMBIGUITY ABOUT TANKERING 25000 LBS OF #2 TANK FUEL FOR PUMP COOLING DURING BOTH TKOF AND LNDG.

Narrative: THE COMPANY ISSUED A BULLETIN. THIS DOCUMENT REFERS TO AN EO THAT WAS SCHEDULED BE EFFECTIVE ON APRIL XA. THE AOM BULLETIN DESCRIBING THE PROCEDURES TO DEAL WITH THIS ISSUE WAS NOT MADE AVAILABLE TO ME WHEN DEPARTING THE DOMICILE FOR THIS TRIP ON APRIL XC. SOME OF THE INFORMATION WITHIN IN THE AOM BULLETIN WAS FIRST MADE AVAILABLE TO THE OPERATING CREWMEMBERS IN THE FLEET BULLETIN. WE OPERATED FLIGHT FROM ZZZZ TO ZZZZ1 TO ZZZ2 ON APRIL XD. WE HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT WE OPERATED OUTSIDE THE FAR'S ON THE SECOND SEGMENT. TWO PLACARDS ON THE FORWARD INSTRUMENT PANEL STATE 'TANK 2 BALLAST REQUIRED IF USEABLE (SIC) FUEL IN TANKS 1/2/3 IS LESS THAN 145;000 LBS.' THE PLACARDS DO NOT SPECIFY A TIME WHEN THIS RESTRICTION IS NOT APPLICABLE. WE CONCLUDE THEN; THAT IT IS APPLICABLE TO ALL PHASES OF FLIGHT AND ALL OPERATIONS. 1) WE DID NOT BLOCK BALLAST FUEL IN THE FMS PER THE PROCEDURE. WE AUTOMATICALLY AND MANUALLY MAINTAINED THE FUEL IN EXCESS OF THE BALLAST REQUIRED PER PLACARD; EXCEPT THAT DURING CRUISE FLIGHT WE INADVERTENTLY ALLOWED THE #2 TANK TO GET SLIGHTLY BELOW 25K FOR A SHORT PERIOD. 2) WE DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE MANUAL PROCEDURE TO MAINTAIN A MINIMUM OF 25K LBS IN TANK 2 THROUGHOUT THE FLIGHT. WE DID MANUALLY MANAGE THE FUEL TO ASSURE MORE THAN 25K LBS AT LANDING. 3) WE DEPARTED ZZZZ1 PLANNING TO USE MANUAL FUEL MANAGEMENT FOR A SEGMENT OF THE FLIGHT WITHOUT WRITTEN; FLIGHT PLAN CALCULATIONS FOR THE LACK OF TAIL FUEL MANAGEMENT FOR THAT PORTION OF THE FLIGHT WHEN MANUAL FUEL PROCEDURES WERE IMPLEMENTED. WE REASONED THAT THE 17000 POUNDS WE ADDED TO BE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE INTENT OF THE BULLETIN WERE WELL MORE THAN THE PUBLISHED 2.7% PENALTY (LESS THAN 4000 LBS) WE WOULD HAVE INCURRED BY NOT USING TAIL FUEL MANAGEMENT FOR THE ENTIRE FLIGHT. WE PLANNED ON OPERATING WITHOUT TAIL FUEL MANAGEMENT FOR ONLY (APPROX) THE DESCENT AND LANDING PHASE OF FLIGHT FURTHER REDUCING THE ACTUAL FUEL BURN FROM THE 2.7% PENALTY LEVEL. RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW INDICATES THAT WE SHOULD HAVE QUERIED DISPATCH IF SUCH CALCULATIONS CAPABILITY EXISTED WITHIN COMMERCIAL PLANNING SOFTWARE SO AS TO PUBLISH SAID NUMBERS ON THE RELEASE. EXPLANATION AND CONCERNS: ON APRIL XD; WE ARRIVED AT THE GATEWAY IN ZZZZ UNAWARE OF ANY NEW ISSUES WITH THE FUEL SYSTEM OF THE MD-11. AS INDICATED BY HIS ADVANCED ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE REQUIRED REPETITIVE INSPECTION AT THE AIRCRAFT; THE MECHANIC KNEW OF THE ISSUE ABOUT TO UNFOLD; AND BRIEFED US ON IT EVEN PRIOR TO BOARDING. THE GATEWAY'S FUEL LOAD ABOARD THE AIRCRAFT DID NOT CONTAIN ANY BALLAST FUEL; THEREFORE; IT APPEARS THAT GATEWAY OPERATIONS PERSONNEL WERE NOT AWARE OF THE BULLETIN(S). DURING THE PREFLIGHT; I CONTACTED THE DISPATCHER AND SPOKE OF SEVERAL SEEMINGLY IMPORTANT ISSUES. I ASKED IF THERE WAS SOME TYPE OF BULLETIN ISSUED TO AFFORD MY CREW AND ME SOME INSIGHT OF THE NEW PROCEDURES. IT WAS STATED THAT INFORMATION WAS CONTAINED WITHIN THE DEPARTURE PAPERS AND LATER IN THE PREFLIGHT; THIS INDEED WAS FOUND TO BE THE CASE. THERE WAS SOME INFORMATION PRESENTED IN THE PAPERWORK. I REQUESTED THAT THE RELEASE REFLECT THE NECESSARY FUELING SCHEDULE TO INCLUDE BALLAST CONTROL FUEL; AND THAT WAS LATER ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF A SECOND; CORRECTED RELEASE; DELIVERED TO THE AIRCRAFT SOMEWHAT LATER. ATTEMPTING TO COMPLETELY AND FULLY UNDERSTAND THE SPECIFIC FUELING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DUTY DAY'S TWO FLIGHTS; I ALSO REQUESTED A COPY OF ANY BULLETIN; AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE; OR ANY OTHER BULLETINS THAT WOULD BE APPLICABLE; AND THE DISPATCHER NOTED THE REQUEST. I WAS TOLD THAT THESE ITEMS WOULD NOT EVEN BE AVAILABLE TO THE DISPATCHER. I RELAYED THE PLACARDED INFORMATION TO THE DISPATCHER; AND INDICATED THAT THE SECOND LEG MIGHT CAUSE PAYLOAD ISSUES. THE DISPATCHER SAID THAT BASED ON INFORMATION HE HAD AVAILABLE; HE BELIEVED THAT BALLAST FUEL WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED FOR THE SECOND LEG BUT THAT HE UNDERSTOOD OUR CONCERNS; FOUND THEM TO BE OF GREAT INTEREST; AND HE WOULD 'CHECK ON IT.' LATER; AFTER AIRCRAFT LOGBOOK REVIEW;WE NOTED OUR AIRCRAFT WAS PLACARDED FOR THE EO ON APRIL XB. IN AN EFFORT TO MAKE A SAFE; ON-TIME DEPARTURE; SEVERAL REQUESTS WERE MADE TO THE SUPERVISOR AT THE AIRPLANE (EVEN PRIOR TO COMPLETING THE LESS-THAN-IDEAL IN-COCKPIT FLIGHT PLANNING AND PAPERWORK PREFLIGHT DUTIES). EVENTUALLY THE FUEL WAS UP-LOADED AS REQUIRED BY THE DEFERRAL; AND AFTER REVIEWING EACH OF THE GATEWAY'S THREE SEPARATE ATTEMPTS OF PROVIDING A CORRECT WEIGHT AND BALANCE FORM; AND WE DEPARTED SOMEWHAT LATE FOR ZZZZ1. UPON ARRIVAL IN ZZZZ1; WE WERE GIVEN A FAXED DIRECTIVE TO OPERATE WITHOUT 'BALLAST' FUEL FROM OPS. WHILE THE INTENT OF THE DIRECTIVE TO OPERATE (THAT WE DID NOT NEED BALLAST FUEL ONBOARD FOR LANDING) WAS CLEAR; THE IMPROPER GRAMMAR MADE THE ACTUAL MEANING UNDECIPHERABLE AND MEANINGLESS IF READ PRECISELY. THE LOAD PLAN ZZZZ1-ZZZ2 DID NOT INCLUDE SUFFICIENT FUEL TO ALLOW BLOCKING 25K LBS OF BALLAST AS WE BELIEVE IS REQUIRED BY THE PLACARD AND FLIGHT BRIEFING PACKAGE VERBIAGE. I CALLED OPS FOR YET ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE. WHILE THIS DISCUSSION WAS ONGOING; A MAINTENANCE SUPERVISOR CALLED US AND I ASKED HIM TO PROVIDE A FAX OF THE AOM BULLETIN OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION HE HAD AVAILABLE REGARDING THIS NEW PROCEDURE. THE STATION MECHANIC THEN RETRIEVED THE FAX COPY OF THE BULLETIN AND BROUGHT IT ONBOARD. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME ANYONE ON THE CREW HAD SEEN THE AOM BULLETIN. READING THE BULLETIN DID NOT CLEAR UP OUR CONCERN. AS WE EXPECTED THERE WAS MUCH CONFUSION BETWEEN THE BULLETIN AND THE OTHER VERBAL AND WRITTEN GUIDANCE ISSUED TO US. JUST AS MY CREW DISCUSSED (SUPPOSED) EARLIER IN THE DAY; AS EXPRESSED TO BOTH THE DISPATCHER AND TO MAINTENANCE; THE BULLETIN INDEED ADDRESSES THE ELECTRICAL ARCING POTENTIAL AS A FUNCTION OF TANK FUEL LEVELS. THE BULLETIN VERY CLEARLY SPELLS OUT THE INTENT OF THE BULLETIN AS THIS: KEEP THE FUEL PUMPS SUBMERGED FOR ALL PHASES OF AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS. IN MY MIND; THIS STATEMENT INCLUDES LANDING AND GO-AROUND; AND BLOCK-IN; IN FACT ALL PHASES AND OPERATIONS; NOT JUST TAKEOFF. THIS SEEMS TO BE IN CONCERT WITH THE AIRCRAFT'S TWO PLACARDS. THE COMPANY; THROUGH LESS FORMAL VERBAL AND WRITTEN DIRECTIVES; SEEMED TO BE SAYING SOMETHING COMPLETELY DIFFERENT TO US. OPS STATED SPECIFICALLY THAT THE FUEL LOADING CHANGES MADE EFFECTIVE BY THIS 'DEFERRAL' APPLIED ONLY TO TAKE-OFF FUEL LOADS AND WAS A FUNCTION OF SOME PRESUMED FUEL TEMPERATURE AT ARRIVAL OR ENROUTE. THAT IF THE AIRCRAFT DEPARTED WITH A BOEING SPECIFIED 'SAFE' FUEL QUANTITY OF 'FULL' TANKS 1/2/3 POUNDS (NO 'BALLAST REQUIRED'); THAT THE AIRCRAFT'S PUMPS WOULD SOMEHOW REMAIN SAFELY COVERED FOR THE DURATION OF THE FLIGHT; REGARDLESS OF THE PLANNED BLOCK-IN FUEL LOAD. AND BASED ON A PRESUMED FUEL TEMPERATURE TO BE EXPERIENCED FOR SOME PORTION OF THE FLIGHT; NO ARCING WOULD OCCUR. INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US; EVEN PRIOR TO THIS EVENT; COUNTERED THAT PHILOSOPHY AND WE SEARCHED AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO RECEIVE ADDITIONAL CONCISE; NON-CONFLICTING INFORMATION ON THIS DAY. MAINTENANCE AND FLIGHT OPS ARE MANDATING THE DISPATCH OF FLIGHTS WITH EXTREMELY DIFFERENT BLOCK-IN FUEL LOAD/LEVEL REQUIREMENTS FOR OPERATIONS: LARGER BLOCK-IN FUEL LOAD PLANNING WHERE MAX. GROSS TAKEOFF WEIGHTS (PAYLOAD PLUS FUEL) ARE NOT AN ISSUE OF OPERATIONAL CONCERN; AND MINIMUM (FAR?) BLOCK IN FUEL LOADS WHEN ANY ADDITIONAL 'BALLAST CONTROL' FUEL WOULD NEGATIVELY AFFECT PAYLOADS. OPS IS APPARENTLY ISOLATING AND INTERPRETING THE WORD 'LOADING' (IN THE AOM BULLETIN'S DESCRIPTIVE NOTE SHOWING REASON FOR IMPLEMENTATION) TO MEAN THAT ONLY DURING FUEL 'LOADING?' DOES THE MINIMUM OF 'FULL' OR 'BALLAST UP TO 25;000 POUNDS' APPLY. BARRING FURTHER DETAILS; WE CANNOT COMPREHEND THAT PLAN'S LOGIC; AS IT SEEMS CONTRARY TO THE PLACARDS; OTHER PASSAGES OF THE AOM BULLETIN; AND EXPERIENCES. IN WHAT HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY UNDERSTOOD AS A CAPTAIN/DISPATCHER OBLIGATION; CREWS ARE NOW INSTRUCTED VIA WRITTEN COMMUNICATIONS TO 'CHECK WITH THE GATEWAY' FOR FUELING REQUIREMENTS (REGARDING THIS ITEM). AGAIN; THE NOTE IN THE AOM BULLETIN STATING THE PURPOSE OF THE PROCEDURE EXACERBATED OUR CONCERN. THE BULLETIN STATES; 'NOTE: THE INTENT OF THE GUIDANCE IS TO ASSURE LOADING OF SUFFICIENT FUEL IN TANK 2 SO THAT ALL TANK PUMPS REMAIN SUBMERGED IN FUEL AT FLIGHT TERMINATION.' WHILE TRYING TO CONVINCE THE CREW THAT THE BALLAST FUEL WAS NOT NEEDED FOR THE FLIGHT ZZZZ1-ZZZZ; SEVERAL OF THE MANAGER'S VERBAL EXPLANATIONS; IN AN ATTEMPT TO EXPLAIN THEIR INTERPRETATION OF THE ISSUE; CENTERED ON THE TEMPERATURE OF THE TANK AND THE LENGTH OF THE FLIGHT SEGMENT. THESE DESCRIPTIONS OF THE ISSUE BY THE MANAGERS AT OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE WERE LATER RESCINDED BY SOME; AND THOSE REASONS SEEMED TO BE REPLACED WITH VERBIAGE MORE PRECISELY IN LINE WITH THE AOM BULLETIN. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT WAS MADE OF THE PRESENTATIONS AVAILABLE TO MECHANICS ABOUT THE ISSUE OF ARCING WITHIN THE FUEL TANKS. STILL; MANAGEMENT STATED THAT WE DID NOT NEED BALLAST FUEL FOR THIS SEGMENT. PERHAPS WE DID NOT. THE FLIGHT CREW LATER DETERMINED FROM THE WEIGHT AND BALANCE (WITH THE ACTUAL PAYLOAD SHOWN); THAT WE HAD FUEL TANK CAPACITY AND PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY FOR ENOUGH FUEL TO ENSURE THAT AT LEAST THE MINIMUM 25;000 LBS OF FUEL REQUIRED IN THE #2 TANK (BY OUR INTERPRETATION OF THE AVAILABLE INFORMATION); FLIGHT BRIEFING PACKAGE; AND PLACARD; COULD BE PLACED ONBOARD. WE ASKED FOR; AND EVENTUALLY GIVEN AN ADDITIONAL 17;000 POUNDS OF FUEL. THIS BROUGHT OUR T/O GROSS WEIGHT UP TO THE ORIGINALLY PLANNED TO GW. NO PAYLOAD WAS LOST. THE DISPATCHER PROVIDED AN UPDATED FUEL BURN. SINCE WE WERE NEARING OUR DROP-DEAD TIME FOR EXTENDED DUTY; WE SOON COMPLETED THE PRE-BLOCK-OUT PROCEDURES AND DISCUSSED HOW TO USE MANUAL FUEL MANAGEMENT TO PRESERVE THE 25K IN THE CENTER TANK. WE DEPARTED ZZZZ1. WE OPERATED THE SYSTEM IN AUTO MODE TO ALLOW TAIL FUEL MANAGEMENT TO SAVE US AS MUCH FUEL AS POSSIBLE AND THEN USING MANUAL FUEL MANAGEMENT FOR THE LAST HOUR OR SO OF THE FLIGHT AS WE DESCENDED ALLOWING US TO LAND IN ZZZ2 WITH MORE THAN 25K LBS IN THE #2 TANK. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT OUR ACTIONS ASSURED THE PUMPS WERE SUBMERGED THROUGHOUT THE FLIGHT. THIS ENTIRE ORDEAL WAS MORE THAN FATIGUING AND IN MY OPINION IT HAD A SERIOUS NEGATIVE IMPACT ON OPERATIONS THAT DAY. WE ARE YET UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE REQUIREMENT FOR 25K LBS OF BALLAST FOR THE LANDING AFTER A SHORT DURATION FLIGHT (ONE THAT STARTED WITH LESS THAN 120K OF FUEL) BUT NOT THE SAME REQUIREMENT FOR THE SAME QUANTITY TO ASSURE SUBMERSION AFTER A LONGER FLIGHT. OUR REASONING IS THAT THE POTENTIAL TO EXPOSE A PUMP (OR ITS CONNECTIONS) ON A GO-AROUND (OR ELSEWHERE) SEEMS THE SAME ON BOTH FLIGHTS. BASICALLY; WE ARE QUESTIONING; 'WHAT DOES STAGE LENGTH HAVE TO DO WITH THE MINIMUM FUEL LEVEL REQUIREMENTS TO ACCOMPLISH SUBMERSION OF THE (POSSIBLY) FAULTY PART(S)?' WE CHOSE TO ERR TO A MORE CONSERVATIVE SIDE OF THE EQUATION BY PROVIDING WHAT WE REASONED WAS A SAFER OPERATION THAN HAD BEEN VERBALLY DIRECTED.CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH REPORTER ACN 734078 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT HIS ACR DID NOT FEEL IT WAS NECESSARY TO CARRY FUEL IN THE CENTER TANK FOR LNDG; ONLY TKOF; AND THEREFORE THE FUEL WAS BALLAST ONLY FOR TKOF. THE CREW; INCLUDING THE CAPT AND AN ON BOARD CHECK CAPT DISAGREED AND AFTER TALKING WITH DISPATCH THEY CARRIED THE EXTRA FUEL. THE ACR'S DISPATCH STATED THAT SINCE THE FUEL TANKS WERE COLD SOAKED FROM CRUISE; COOLING FUEL IN THE TANK WAS NOT NECESSARY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.