Narrative:

During approach to bhm we had flown through quite a bit of WX and were left somewhat high as ZTL was more concerned with communication problems with some air carrier aircraft going into atl than getting us lower. Before starting our descent I copied the ATIS from bhm which was stating that they were conducting visual approachs to runway 24. The WX was gusty winds out of the south. All runways were wet and the ceiling was around 8500 ft broken. I told the captain to expect a visual to runway 24 and gave him the WX. When we finally were handed off to approach we were told to slow to 160 KTS and the descend to 4000 ft. We were then given a vector behind a hawker that was much slower than we were and to give us some spacing. We were also vectored through final and then were given another turn back to the south to finally rejoin. When spacing was good we were cleared to join the localizer for a visual approach and were told that the GS was OTS. We also had to make some speed corrections before landing after hearing that the hawker lost close to 20 KTS on final. Since I live in bhm and learned to fly there I know the airport quite well. We had very briefly talked about the displaced threshold but had not really discussed the new construction on runway 24. When we were about 3-4 mi out due to the rain we could only see the pavement of the runway and nothing else. No paint markings; no markings to stop us from landing on the closed portion of the runway; nothing. Due to the rain the painted markings were obscured due to the sheen from the water. When we were on short final to the runway and at about 300-400 ft above the runway we got a 'caution terrain' warning. The captain corrected slightly and it went away. We then got another one in which he corrected slightly. I then heard him say that he was on a 3 degree glidepath and that he didn't understand what was going on. Just then I could see the markings (which were incredibly small) reminding us of the closed portion of the runway and the displaced threshold. The barriers used to mark the closed portion of the runway were way too small to be used to block off that portion of the runway. I told him to be careful as he was close to landing on the displaced threshold. He then corrected the descent rate again and made a normal landing. After getting to the gate he stated that he thought we were flying an ILS approach. It was then that I informed him that we had been cleared for the visual approach runway 24 ILS GS unusable. He stated to me that he thought we were cleared for an ILS approach. He never heard approach control state to us that the ILS GS unusable. To prevent this event from happening again; a few things need to happen: 1) approach/tower controllers need to stop using the terminology 'cleared for ILS runway 24 GS unusable.' in a high stress situation; it is too easy for the pilot to only hear cleared for ILS approach and not the GS unusable portion. Instead; I think controllers need to go back to the old phraseology of localizer approach. That would help clear up the confusion. 2) much better markings on the closed runway. The barriers used were almost impossible to see until we were about 200 ft AGL. The barriers need to be much bigger and lit up if they are going to be any use to the pilots. The paint markings of the runway were completely obscured since the pavement was wet. 3) if the displaced threshold is going to be as large as it is at runway 24 in bhm; then a VASI needs to be installed. Until something like this is installed; aircraft are going to continue to come in too low on this runway. With the new added length of runway 24; the natural instinct is to land in the touchdown area. Without a VASI or a GS helping the pilots land past the displaced threshold many aircraft are going to come in too low; possibly get caution terrain messages and maybe even land on the displaced threshold.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 FLT CREW REPORTS DIFFICULTIES DURING THE APPROACH TO RWY 24 AT BHM. CAPTAIN NOT AWARE GS OTS AND TEMPORARY DISPLACED THRESHOLD BARRIERS NOT VISIBLE UNTIL VERY CLOSE TO THE RWY.

Narrative: DURING APCH TO BHM WE HAD FLOWN THROUGH QUITE A BIT OF WX AND WERE LEFT SOMEWHAT HIGH AS ZTL WAS MORE CONCERNED WITH COM PROBS WITH SOME ACR ACFT GOING INTO ATL THAN GETTING US LOWER. BEFORE STARTING OUR DSCNT I COPIED THE ATIS FROM BHM WHICH WAS STATING THAT THEY WERE CONDUCTING VISUAL APCHS TO RWY 24. THE WX WAS GUSTY WINDS OUT OF THE S. ALL RWYS WERE WET AND THE CEILING WAS AROUND 8500 FT BROKEN. I TOLD THE CAPT TO EXPECT A VISUAL TO RWY 24 AND GAVE HIM THE WX. WHEN WE FINALLY WERE HANDED OFF TO APCH WE WERE TOLD TO SLOW TO 160 KTS AND THE DSND TO 4000 FT. WE WERE THEN GIVEN A VECTOR BEHIND A HAWKER THAT WAS MUCH SLOWER THAN WE WERE AND TO GIVE US SOME SPACING. WE WERE ALSO VECTORED THROUGH FINAL AND THEN WERE GIVEN ANOTHER TURN BACK TO THE S TO FINALLY REJOIN. WHEN SPACING WAS GOOD WE WERE CLRED TO JOIN THE LOC FOR A VISUAL APCH AND WERE TOLD THAT THE GS WAS OTS. WE ALSO HAD TO MAKE SOME SPD CORRECTIONS BEFORE LNDG AFTER HEARING THAT THE HAWKER LOST CLOSE TO 20 KTS ON FINAL. SINCE I LIVE IN BHM AND LEARNED TO FLY THERE I KNOW THE ARPT QUITE WELL. WE HAD VERY BRIEFLY TALKED ABOUT THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD BUT HAD NOT REALLY DISCUSSED THE NEW CONSTRUCTION ON RWY 24. WHEN WE WERE ABOUT 3-4 MI OUT DUE TO THE RAIN WE COULD ONLY SEE THE PAVEMENT OF THE RWY AND NOTHING ELSE. NO PAINT MARKINGS; NO MARKINGS TO STOP US FROM LNDG ON THE CLOSED PORTION OF THE RWY; NOTHING. DUE TO THE RAIN THE PAINTED MARKINGS WERE OBSCURED DUE TO THE SHEEN FROM THE WATER. WHEN WE WERE ON SHORT FINAL TO THE RWY AND AT ABOUT 300-400 FT ABOVE THE RWY WE GOT A 'CAUTION TERRAIN' WARNING. THE CAPT CORRECTED SLIGHTLY AND IT WENT AWAY. WE THEN GOT ANOTHER ONE IN WHICH HE CORRECTED SLIGHTLY. I THEN HEARD HIM SAY THAT HE WAS ON A 3 DEG GLIDEPATH AND THAT HE DIDN'T UNDERSTAND WHAT WAS GOING ON. JUST THEN I COULD SEE THE MARKINGS (WHICH WERE INCREDIBLY SMALL) REMINDING US OF THE CLOSED PORTION OF THE RWY AND THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD. THE BARRIERS USED TO MARK THE CLOSED PORTION OF THE RWY WERE WAY TOO SMALL TO BE USED TO BLOCK OFF THAT PORTION OF THE RWY. I TOLD HIM TO BE CAREFUL AS HE WAS CLOSE TO LNDG ON THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD. HE THEN CORRECTED THE DSCNT RATE AGAIN AND MADE A NORMAL LNDG. AFTER GETTING TO THE GATE HE STATED THAT HE THOUGHT WE WERE FLYING AN ILS APCH. IT WAS THEN THAT I INFORMED HIM THAT WE HAD BEEN CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH RWY 24 ILS GS UNUSABLE. HE STATED TO ME THAT HE THOUGHT WE WERE CLRED FOR AN ILS APCH. HE NEVER HEARD APCH CTL STATE TO US THAT THE ILS GS UNUSABLE. TO PREVENT THIS EVENT FROM HAPPENING AGAIN; A FEW THINGS NEED TO HAPPEN: 1) APCH/TWR CTLRS NEED TO STOP USING THE TERMINOLOGY 'CLRED FOR ILS RWY 24 GS UNUSABLE.' IN A HIGH STRESS SITUATION; IT IS TOO EASY FOR THE PLT TO ONLY HEAR CLRED FOR ILS APCH AND NOT THE GS UNUSABLE PORTION. INSTEAD; I THINK CTLRS NEED TO GO BACK TO THE OLD PHRASEOLOGY OF LOC APCH. THAT WOULD HELP CLR UP THE CONFUSION. 2) MUCH BETTER MARKINGS ON THE CLOSED RWY. THE BARRIERS USED WERE ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO SEE UNTIL WE WERE ABOUT 200 FT AGL. THE BARRIERS NEED TO BE MUCH BIGGER AND LIT UP IF THEY ARE GOING TO BE ANY USE TO THE PLTS. THE PAINT MARKINGS OF THE RWY WERE COMPLETELY OBSCURED SINCE THE PAVEMENT WAS WET. 3) IF THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD IS GOING TO BE AS LARGE AS IT IS AT RWY 24 IN BHM; THEN A VASI NEEDS TO BE INSTALLED. UNTIL SOMETHING LIKE THIS IS INSTALLED; ACFT ARE GOING TO CONTINUE TO COME IN TOO LOW ON THIS RWY. WITH THE NEW ADDED LENGTH OF RWY 24; THE NATURAL INSTINCT IS TO LAND IN THE TOUCHDOWN AREA. WITHOUT A VASI OR A GS HELPING THE PLTS LAND PAST THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD MANY ACFT ARE GOING TO COME IN TOO LOW; POSSIBLY GET CAUTION TERRAIN MESSAGES AND MAYBE EVEN LAND ON THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.