Narrative:

Controller rushing and failure to communicate prior to a critical phase of flight led to a hazardous situation. On the morning of may/xa/07; I was flying air carrier X with first officer XXX. This was our first round trip flight ever flown together. We were returning to hnl from ogg and it was XXX's landing. There had been rain showers at the field within 30 mins of our arrival but none at the time. The WX was clearing and we could see the field from 30+ mi out. With hcf approach we were aware of company on frequency; air carrier Y. They were behind us for the field; however; it was not clear how far behind. We were cleared for the approach for runway 4R and switched to tower. Upon checking in; we were given a 'cleared to land' instruction. XXX flew a stable; on speed approach. I briefed the first officer that we did not have a lahso instruction; the runway was slightly damp; and that the whole landing area was 'ours to use if needed.' we were moderately heavy; with over 100 passenger on board; I believe our vref was approximately 128 KTS for flaps 5 degrees with a +5 for wind correction. I believe ATIS was reporting winds at 10 KTS. We touched down just slightly past the touchdown zone on centerline and the first officer applied the thrust reversers in a timely and appropriate manner. At 115 KIAS; and just abeam taxiway D; tower said in a stern voice 'air carrier X; hold short of runway 8L.' I consider 115 KTS and thrust reversers at 1.24 EPR a 'critical phase of flight' and all of my attention is on the landing until we reach taxi speed unless it is an emergency situation. I chose to not deviate my attention from my duties and did not answer this radio call. I believe air carrier Y behind us must have misunderstood because of the similar call sign; and they answered this first call. While I didn't pick up on their whole transmission; I assume air carrier Y was saying that they couldn't be issued a lahso so late in their approach because I heard the tower controller literally yelling at them something to the equivalent of 'air carrier Y I'm aware of that and I wasn't talking to you' followed immediately in a stern and demanding rude voice 'air carrier X clear at kilo and hold short of runway 8L' (these instructions might have been in reverse order). My problem with this is that we were still at 100 KTS (having encountered a similar scenario 2 months ago I was now very aware of our speed; location; and tower's instruction). We were at 100 KTS; thrust reversers deployed; approaching abeam taxiway east on a damp runway and still in a critical phase of flight; again I stayed focused on my duties as the captain; and did not respond to this radio call. Almost what seemed immediately; tower instructed an air carrier Z aircraft; in position on runway 8L; that he was 'cleared for takeoff.' (to add to the error; tower had never told us; as far as I can recall; that there was an aircraft holding in position on runway 8L; I believe that this is a requirement now.) this was wrong and unsafe -- we were still at 85 KTS; thrust reversers deployed; abeam taxiway east and dead center on the runway 4R centerline not even a slight turn had been initiated. I had not committed to holding short of runway 8L and tower had no visual indication that we were holding short or that we could yet clear at taxiway K! Fortunately; the conditions did permit us to clear at taxiway K and we held short while air carrier Z departed. Then the controller instructed us to 'expedite across the runways and clear at taxiway K.' not even 2 seconds later; as I was bringing the power up to cross; the controller told air carrier Y landing on runway 4R to 'go around' in the same angry tone of voice. As I crossed and looked behind to visually clear the approach end of runway 4L for traffic; I could see air carrier Y. It is only my opinion; however; it seemed that we were 3 more seconds from having our tail clear of runway 4R; on the move; and that air carrier Y still had more than adequate time and altitude to have us clear and land. It seemed that the controller was taking out his frustration of 'his' mishandled controling and confusing radio instructions on the crew and passenger of air carrier Y. Human performance/evaluation: my level of frustration at this situation is heightened by the fact that I had almost this exact scenario; without the aircraft landing behind us; approximately 2 months ago. At that time I filed a report. Additionally; in the last several months; I have had a 90% increase in controllers trying to issue us instructions that are non-emergency during this critical landing phase of flight; and they seem to expect a response so they can prematurely launch another aircraft or give landing clearance on a conflicting runway. The worst and most frequent use of this is when we are landing on runway 4R. Adding to the frustration of this whole situation is how completely rude and accusatory this particular controller was to us and to air carrier Y. I realize that the controllers are under a lot of pressure and that it has been heightened by the new procedures that require them to have additional broadcasts of aircraft locations and separation clearance. However; the landing roll is one of the most 'high attention/awareness' times for a pilot; and in the interest of the safety of our passenger; we should not be answering non-emergency radio calls for the convenience of the controller's job. And; the controllers should not be making assumptions that cause them to clear an aircraft for takeoff before we have slowed to taxi speed; visually cleared a runway; or responded to their call. I had fully intended to return the controller's call as we were clearing at taxiway K; but certainly 'not' at 115-100 KTS; thrust reversers deployed; 'on' centerline; without holding short assured! Something has got to be done about this frequent problem and I would gladly speak with anyone further about this matter. Feel free to contact me if needed. A lot of failed communications took place due to critical phase of flight (high speed on landing rollout) with a heavy aircraft and given the landing distance remaining; the crew was too busy to talk to the tower during the high speed portion of this landing.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR CAPT EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING ATC OP AT HNL; LNDG RWY 4R AND TOLD TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 8L FOR DEP ACFT; CITING HIGH SPEED/WORKLOAD.

Narrative: CTLR RUSHING AND FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE PRIOR TO A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT LED TO A HAZARDOUS SITUATION. ON THE MORNING OF MAY/XA/07; I WAS FLYING ACR X WITH FO XXX. THIS WAS OUR FIRST ROUND TRIP FLT EVER FLOWN TOGETHER. WE WERE RETURNING TO HNL FROM OGG AND IT WAS XXX'S LNDG. THERE HAD BEEN RAIN SHOWERS AT THE FIELD WITHIN 30 MINS OF OUR ARR BUT NONE AT THE TIME. THE WX WAS CLRING AND WE COULD SEE THE FIELD FROM 30+ MI OUT. WITH HCF APCH WE WERE AWARE OF COMPANY ON FREQ; ACR Y. THEY WERE BEHIND US FOR THE FIELD; HOWEVER; IT WAS NOT CLR HOW FAR BEHIND. WE WERE CLRED FOR THE APCH FOR RWY 4R AND SWITCHED TO TWR. UPON CHKING IN; WE WERE GIVEN A 'CLRED TO LAND' INSTRUCTION. XXX FLEW A STABLE; ON SPD APCH. I BRIEFED THE FO THAT WE DID NOT HAVE A LAHSO INSTRUCTION; THE RWY WAS SLIGHTLY DAMP; AND THAT THE WHOLE LNDG AREA WAS 'OURS TO USE IF NEEDED.' WE WERE MODERATELY HVY; WITH OVER 100 PAX ON BOARD; I BELIEVE OUR VREF WAS APPROX 128 KTS FOR FLAPS 5 DEGS WITH A +5 FOR WIND CORRECTION. I BELIEVE ATIS WAS RPTING WINDS AT 10 KTS. WE TOUCHED DOWN JUST SLIGHTLY PAST THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE ON CTRLINE AND THE FO APPLIED THE THRUST REVERSERS IN A TIMELY AND APPROPRIATE MANNER. AT 115 KIAS; AND JUST ABEAM TXWY D; TWR SAID IN A STERN VOICE 'ACR X; HOLD SHORT OF RWY 8L.' I CONSIDER 115 KTS AND THRUST REVERSERS AT 1.24 EPR A 'CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT' AND ALL OF MY ATTN IS ON THE LNDG UNTIL WE REACH TAXI SPD UNLESS IT IS AN EMER SITUATION. I CHOSE TO NOT DEVIATE MY ATTN FROM MY DUTIES AND DID NOT ANSWER THIS RADIO CALL. I BELIEVE ACR Y BEHIND US MUST HAVE MISUNDERSTOOD BECAUSE OF THE SIMILAR CALL SIGN; AND THEY ANSWERED THIS FIRST CALL. WHILE I DIDN'T PICK UP ON THEIR WHOLE XMISSION; I ASSUME ACR Y WAS SAYING THAT THEY COULDN'T BE ISSUED A LAHSO SO LATE IN THEIR APCH BECAUSE I HEARD THE TWR CTLR LITERALLY YELLING AT THEM SOMETHING TO THE EQUIVALENT OF 'ACR Y I'M AWARE OF THAT AND I WASN'T TALKING TO YOU' FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY IN A STERN AND DEMANDING RUDE VOICE 'ACR X CLR AT KILO AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 8L' (THESE INSTRUCTIONS MIGHT HAVE BEEN IN REVERSE ORDER). MY PROB WITH THIS IS THAT WE WERE STILL AT 100 KTS (HAVING ENCOUNTERED A SIMILAR SCENARIO 2 MONTHS AGO I WAS NOW VERY AWARE OF OUR SPD; LOCATION; AND TWR'S INSTRUCTION). WE WERE AT 100 KTS; THRUST REVERSERS DEPLOYED; APCHING ABEAM TXWY E ON A DAMP RWY AND STILL IN A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT; AGAIN I STAYED FOCUSED ON MY DUTIES AS THE CAPT; AND DID NOT RESPOND TO THIS RADIO CALL. ALMOST WHAT SEEMED IMMEDIATELY; TWR INSTRUCTED AN ACR Z ACFT; IN POS ON RWY 8L; THAT HE WAS 'CLRED FOR TKOF.' (TO ADD TO THE ERROR; TWR HAD NEVER TOLD US; AS FAR AS I CAN RECALL; THAT THERE WAS AN ACFT HOLDING IN POS ON RWY 8L; I BELIEVE THAT THIS IS A REQUIREMENT NOW.) THIS WAS WRONG AND UNSAFE -- WE WERE STILL AT 85 KTS; THRUST REVERSERS DEPLOYED; ABEAM TXWY E AND DEAD CTR ON THE RWY 4R CTRLINE NOT EVEN A SLIGHT TURN HAD BEEN INITIATED. I HAD NOT COMMITTED TO HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 8L AND TWR HAD NO VISUAL INDICATION THAT WE WERE HOLDING SHORT OR THAT WE COULD YET CLR AT TXWY K! FORTUNATELY; THE CONDITIONS DID PERMIT US TO CLR AT TXWY K AND WE HELD SHORT WHILE ACR Z DEPARTED. THEN THE CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO 'EXPEDITE ACROSS THE RWYS AND CLR AT TXWY K.' NOT EVEN 2 SECONDS LATER; AS I WAS BRINGING THE PWR UP TO CROSS; THE CTLR TOLD ACR Y LNDG ON RWY 4R TO 'GO AROUND' IN THE SAME ANGRY TONE OF VOICE. AS I CROSSED AND LOOKED BEHIND TO VISUALLY CLR THE APCH END OF RWY 4L FOR TFC; I COULD SEE ACR Y. IT IS ONLY MY OPINION; HOWEVER; IT SEEMED THAT WE WERE 3 MORE SECONDS FROM HAVING OUR TAIL CLR OF RWY 4R; ON THE MOVE; AND THAT ACR Y STILL HAD MORE THAN ADEQUATE TIME AND ALT TO HAVE US CLR AND LAND. IT SEEMED THAT THE CTLR WAS TAKING OUT HIS FRUSTRATION OF 'HIS' MISHANDLED CTLING AND CONFUSING RADIO INSTRUCTIONS ON THE CREW AND PAX OF ACR Y. HUMAN PERFORMANCE/EVALUATION: MY LEVEL OF FRUSTRATION AT THIS SITUATION IS HEIGHTENED BY THE FACT THAT I HAD ALMOST THIS EXACT SCENARIO; WITHOUT THE ACFT LNDG BEHIND US; APPROX 2 MONTHS AGO. AT THAT TIME I FILED A RPT. ADDITIONALLY; IN THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS; I HAVE HAD A 90% INCREASE IN CTLRS TRYING TO ISSUE US INSTRUCTIONS THAT ARE NON-EMER DURING THIS CRITICAL LNDG PHASE OF FLT; AND THEY SEEM TO EXPECT A RESPONSE SO THEY CAN PREMATURELY LAUNCH ANOTHER ACFT OR GIVE LNDG CLRNC ON A CONFLICTING RWY. THE WORST AND MOST FREQUENT USE OF THIS IS WHEN WE ARE LNDG ON RWY 4R. ADDING TO THE FRUSTRATION OF THIS WHOLE SITUATION IS HOW COMPLETELY RUDE AND ACCUSATORY THIS PARTICULAR CTLR WAS TO US AND TO ACR Y. I REALIZE THAT THE CTLRS ARE UNDER A LOT OF PRESSURE AND THAT IT HAS BEEN HEIGHTENED BY THE NEW PROCS THAT REQUIRE THEM TO HAVE ADDITIONAL BROADCASTS OF ACFT LOCATIONS AND SEPARATION CLRNC. HOWEVER; THE LNDG ROLL IS ONE OF THE MOST 'HIGH ATTN/AWARENESS' TIMES FOR A PLT; AND IN THE INTEREST OF THE SAFETY OF OUR PAX; WE SHOULD NOT BE ANSWERING NON-EMER RADIO CALLS FOR THE CONVENIENCE OF THE CTLR'S JOB. AND; THE CTLRS SHOULD NOT BE MAKING ASSUMPTIONS THAT CAUSE THEM TO CLR AN ACFT FOR TKOF BEFORE WE HAVE SLOWED TO TAXI SPD; VISUALLY CLRED A RWY; OR RESPONDED TO THEIR CALL. I HAD FULLY INTENDED TO RETURN THE CTLR'S CALL AS WE WERE CLRING AT TXWY K; BUT CERTAINLY 'NOT' AT 115-100 KTS; THRUST REVERSERS DEPLOYED; 'ON' CTRLINE; WITHOUT HOLDING SHORT ASSURED! SOMETHING HAS GOT TO BE DONE ABOUT THIS FREQUENT PROB AND I WOULD GLADLY SPEAK WITH ANYONE FURTHER ABOUT THIS MATTER. FEEL FREE TO CONTACT ME IF NEEDED. A LOT OF FAILED COMS TOOK PLACE DUE TO CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT (HIGH SPD ON LNDG ROLLOUT) WITH A HVY ACFT AND GIVEN THE LNDG DISTANCE REMAINING; THE CREW WAS TOO BUSY TO TALK TO THE TWR DURING THE HIGH SPD PORTION OF THIS LNDG.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.