Narrative:

I have been on the airbus for approximately 6 months and a new captain for approximately 6 months. I have only seen a handful of problems on this aircraft since my training and experience to date. This is the first time that I have had numerous problems in 1 flight segment. There was a lot of distracting factors that led us to not properly preflight our cockpit even though we had 3 times to complete the flows. We apparently had left the autothrust system off. If it were not for the autothrust system being off; this event would not lead me to filing a safety report. Arrived at aircraft on time and began preflight duties. After determining that significant convective WX was along our proposed route of flight; I conferred with dispatch about a rerte. The dispatcher concurred and we received a new clearance from ATC. Upon beginning our before start flows; we received a fault light on the #1 center tank fuel pump. We contacted dispatch who patched us through to maintenance. We were instructed to perform circuit breaker procedures and we complied. This eliminated the fuel fault. An information only was obtained and entered into the logbook. Just prior to beginning our before start flows for the second time; we received an ECAM warning for 'second #2.' we turned off 'second #2' and it reset itself. I started my before start flows now for the third time and called for the before start checklist. We received push clearance and taxied without further interruption. We were required to do a toga takeoff power setting. Our takeoff was on runway 12R for performance requirements. Takeoff was normal and climb power was accomplished at 1000 ft AGL and the after takeoff checklist was called for and performed. Just after I called the checklist complete; we got an ECAM warning that the forward cargo door was open. Since the first officer was flying; he called for the ECAM actions and QRH. I directed him to fly the airplane and communicate with ATC. The first officer recommended that we level off at 7000 ft MSL. We called and told ATC we had a problem we needed to solve and wanted to level of at 7000 ft MSL. ATC cleared us to 7000 ft MSL and asked if we needed assistance. I told them not at this time. I began the ECAM actions and had my QRH out and began complying with the instructions. The first officer stated at this time he could not control the airspeed and I looked down and we were accelerating through 280 KTS. I selected the thrust levers to idle and told the first officer to extend the speed brakes to get our airspeed back to 250 KIAS. He complied. Apparently; our autothrust did not arm after takeoff and we did not notice this interruption in the autothrust system. Our attention was quickly diverted to the task of the ECAM warning on the forward cargo door and we failed to recognize the autothrust was not armed. ATC did not mention to us about our airspeed. Once the airspeed was back under control; I completed the QRH procedures and notified dispatch and conferred with maintenance. All cabin pressure indications were normal and we determined the ECAM warning on the cargo door was an indication problem. Maintenance concurred and we continued on without further problems. Upon landing; the forward cargo door indicating system was placed on MEL. The actual ECAM warning on the forward cargo door distraction the PF from his responsibility of flying the aircraft. His inattn to flying the aircraft led to the excessive airspeed below 10000 ft. His failure to act quickly on controling the aircraft speed in any manner consistent with safe operating procedures was not done. Once I established the proper separation of duties in the cockpit; my first officer continued to divide his attention from the problem at hand on the cargo door to his attention on flying. I tried to reiterate to him that his attention should be solely on flying the aircraft. I eventually got this instruction across to him. No other problems occurred. We corrected the airspeed and continued on with the task at hand determining the ECAM warning on the forward cargo door indication. This is a tough one. Any flight crew member has been in this situation when a problem with an aircraft system has occurred and the attention is diverted to that problem. It is inherent in most crew members to involve themselves in the problem in some sort of way if not fully. However; once a problem occurs; it is imperative that duties are delegated to each crew member and as a captain this is my job. Once I give a directive to a crew member; I expect that crew member follow my commands to the best of their ability. When a crew member is given the responsibility to fly the aircraft; I expect them to do that and not devote their attention to the problem task unless and until it is needed. This is a human factors problem and we all want to solve the current situation; but it is one; as an individual; we must overcome to perform delegated tasks to the best of our ability. We must stay focused on what we are delegated to do. This is a personal skill and one you must force yourself to do. I know of no other method. As a new captain; I am learning the skills of delegation. There is a time to be a little more forceful in my use of command authority/authorized. At the same time; I have to be open to the inputs of my fellow crew member. Supplemental information from acn 741718: airspeed below 10K. Make sure autothrottles engage on takeoff. I should have noticed that they did not engage and will reinforce that into my scan in the future. As always; continue to fly the aircraft no matter what else is occurring at the time. I thought I did a good job of this; by going to 245 selected with climb thrust selected. But with no autothrottles operating; the jet accelerated past 250 before I could catch it. Really reinforces FMA; FMA; FMA. Ensure flight director is selected during preflight flow. Will reinforce that part of my scan as well.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A320 CREW REPORTS SEVERAL DISTRACTIONS DURING PREFLT. THEN A TKOF WITH AUTOTHRUST OFF LED TO AN OVERSPD WHILE DEALING WITH A CARGO DOOR OPEN ECAM WARNING.

Narrative: I HAVE BEEN ON THE AIRBUS FOR APPROX 6 MONTHS AND A NEW CAPT FOR APPROX 6 MONTHS. I HAVE ONLY SEEN A HANDFUL OF PROBS ON THIS ACFT SINCE MY TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE TO DATE. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THAT I HAVE HAD NUMEROUS PROBS IN 1 FLT SEGMENT. THERE WAS A LOT OF DISTRACTING FACTORS THAT LED US TO NOT PROPERLY PREFLT OUR COCKPIT EVEN THOUGH WE HAD 3 TIMES TO COMPLETE THE FLOWS. WE APPARENTLY HAD LEFT THE AUTOTHRUST SYS OFF. IF IT WERE NOT FOR THE AUTOTHRUST SYS BEING OFF; THIS EVENT WOULD NOT LEAD ME TO FILING A SAFETY RPT. ARRIVED AT ACFT ON TIME AND BEGAN PREFLT DUTIES. AFTER DETERMINING THAT SIGNIFICANT CONVECTIVE WX WAS ALONG OUR PROPOSED RTE OF FLT; I CONFERRED WITH DISPATCH ABOUT A RERTE. THE DISPATCHER CONCURRED AND WE RECEIVED A NEW CLRNC FROM ATC. UPON BEGINNING OUR BEFORE START FLOWS; WE RECEIVED A FAULT LIGHT ON THE #1 CTR TANK FUEL PUMP. WE CONTACTED DISPATCH WHO PATCHED US THROUGH TO MAINT. WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO PERFORM CIRCUIT BREAKER PROCS AND WE COMPLIED. THIS ELIMINATED THE FUEL FAULT. AN INFO ONLY WAS OBTAINED AND ENTERED INTO THE LOGBOOK. JUST PRIOR TO BEGINNING OUR BEFORE START FLOWS FOR THE SECOND TIME; WE RECEIVED AN ECAM WARNING FOR 'SEC #2.' WE TURNED OFF 'SEC #2' AND IT RESET ITSELF. I STARTED MY BEFORE START FLOWS NOW FOR THE THIRD TIME AND CALLED FOR THE BEFORE START CHKLIST. WE RECEIVED PUSH CLRNC AND TAXIED WITHOUT FURTHER INTERRUPTION. WE WERE REQUIRED TO DO A TOGA TKOF PWR SETTING. OUR TKOF WAS ON RWY 12R FOR PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS. TKOF WAS NORMAL AND CLB PWR WAS ACCOMPLISHED AT 1000 FT AGL AND THE AFTER TKOF CHKLIST WAS CALLED FOR AND PERFORMED. JUST AFTER I CALLED THE CHKLIST COMPLETE; WE GOT AN ECAM WARNING THAT THE FORWARD CARGO DOOR WAS OPEN. SINCE THE FO WAS FLYING; HE CALLED FOR THE ECAM ACTIONS AND QRH. I DIRECTED HIM TO FLY THE AIRPLANE AND COMMUNICATE WITH ATC. THE FO RECOMMENDED THAT WE LEVEL OFF AT 7000 FT MSL. WE CALLED AND TOLD ATC WE HAD A PROB WE NEEDED TO SOLVE AND WANTED TO LEVEL OF AT 7000 FT MSL. ATC CLRED US TO 7000 FT MSL AND ASKED IF WE NEEDED ASSISTANCE. I TOLD THEM NOT AT THIS TIME. I BEGAN THE ECAM ACTIONS AND HAD MY QRH OUT AND BEGAN COMPLYING WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS. THE FO STATED AT THIS TIME HE COULD NOT CTL THE AIRSPD AND I LOOKED DOWN AND WE WERE ACCELERATING THROUGH 280 KTS. I SELECTED THE THRUST LEVERS TO IDLE AND TOLD THE FO TO EXTEND THE SPD BRAKES TO GET OUR AIRSPD BACK TO 250 KIAS. HE COMPLIED. APPARENTLY; OUR AUTOTHRUST DID NOT ARM AFTER TKOF AND WE DID NOT NOTICE THIS INTERRUPTION IN THE AUTOTHRUST SYS. OUR ATTN WAS QUICKLY DIVERTED TO THE TASK OF THE ECAM WARNING ON THE FORWARD CARGO DOOR AND WE FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE AUTOTHRUST WAS NOT ARMED. ATC DID NOT MENTION TO US ABOUT OUR AIRSPD. ONCE THE AIRSPD WAS BACK UNDER CTL; I COMPLETED THE QRH PROCS AND NOTIFIED DISPATCH AND CONFERRED WITH MAINT. ALL CABIN PRESSURE INDICATIONS WERE NORMAL AND WE DETERMINED THE ECAM WARNING ON THE CARGO DOOR WAS AN INDICATION PROB. MAINT CONCURRED AND WE CONTINUED ON WITHOUT FURTHER PROBS. UPON LNDG; THE FORWARD CARGO DOOR INDICATING SYS WAS PLACED ON MEL. THE ACTUAL ECAM WARNING ON THE FORWARD CARGO DOOR DISTR THE PF FROM HIS RESPONSIBILITY OF FLYING THE ACFT. HIS INATTN TO FLYING THE ACFT LED TO THE EXCESSIVE AIRSPD BELOW 10000 FT. HIS FAILURE TO ACT QUICKLY ON CTLING THE ACFT SPD IN ANY MANNER CONSISTENT WITH SAFE OPERATING PROCS WAS NOT DONE. ONCE I ESTABLISHED THE PROPER SEPARATION OF DUTIES IN THE COCKPIT; MY FO CONTINUED TO DIVIDE HIS ATTN FROM THE PROB AT HAND ON THE CARGO DOOR TO HIS ATTN ON FLYING. I TRIED TO REITERATE TO HIM THAT HIS ATTN SHOULD BE SOLELY ON FLYING THE ACFT. I EVENTUALLY GOT THIS INSTRUCTION ACROSS TO HIM. NO OTHER PROBS OCCURRED. WE CORRECTED THE AIRSPD AND CONTINUED ON WITH THE TASK AT HAND DETERMINING THE ECAM WARNING ON THE FORWARD CARGO DOOR INDICATION. THIS IS A TOUGH ONE. ANY FLT CREW MEMBER HAS BEEN IN THIS SITUATION WHEN A PROB WITH AN ACFT SYS HAS OCCURRED AND THE ATTN IS DIVERTED TO THAT PROB. IT IS INHERENT IN MOST CREW MEMBERS TO INVOLVE THEMSELVES IN THE PROB IN SOME SORT OF WAY IF NOT FULLY. HOWEVER; ONCE A PROB OCCURS; IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT DUTIES ARE DELEGATED TO EACH CREW MEMBER AND AS A CAPT THIS IS MY JOB. ONCE I GIVE A DIRECTIVE TO A CREW MEMBER; I EXPECT THAT CREW MEMBER FOLLOW MY COMMANDS TO THE BEST OF THEIR ABILITY. WHEN A CREW MEMBER IS GIVEN THE RESPONSIBILITY TO FLY THE ACFT; I EXPECT THEM TO DO THAT AND NOT DEVOTE THEIR ATTN TO THE PROB TASK UNLESS AND UNTIL IT IS NEEDED. THIS IS A HUMAN FACTORS PROB AND WE ALL WANT TO SOLVE THE CURRENT SITUATION; BUT IT IS ONE; AS AN INDIVIDUAL; WE MUST OVERCOME TO PERFORM DELEGATED TASKS TO THE BEST OF OUR ABILITY. WE MUST STAY FOCUSED ON WHAT WE ARE DELEGATED TO DO. THIS IS A PERSONAL SKILL AND ONE YOU MUST FORCE YOURSELF TO DO. I KNOW OF NO OTHER METHOD. AS A NEW CAPT; I AM LEARNING THE SKILLS OF DELEGATION. THERE IS A TIME TO BE A LITTLE MORE FORCEFUL IN MY USE OF COMMAND AUTH. AT THE SAME TIME; I HAVE TO BE OPEN TO THE INPUTS OF MY FELLOW CREW MEMBER. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 741718: AIRSPD BELOW 10K. MAKE SURE AUTOTHROTTLES ENGAGE ON TKOF. I SHOULD HAVE NOTICED THAT THEY DID NOT ENGAGE AND WILL REINFORCE THAT INTO MY SCAN IN THE FUTURE. AS ALWAYS; CONTINUE TO FLY THE ACFT NO MATTER WHAT ELSE IS OCCURRING AT THE TIME. I THOUGHT I DID A GOOD JOB OF THIS; BY GOING TO 245 SELECTED WITH CLB THRUST SELECTED. BUT WITH NO AUTOTHROTTLES OPERATING; THE JET ACCELERATED PAST 250 BEFORE I COULD CATCH IT. REALLY REINFORCES FMA; FMA; FMA. ENSURE FLT DIRECTOR IS SELECTED DURING PREFLT FLOW. WILL REINFORCE THAT PART OF MY SCAN AS WELL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.