Narrative:

I was the first officer of flight X to ZZZ. The captain noticed that this aircraft had 2 similar entries on the logbook on the same day talking about sparks next to the captain map light; smell of smoke; short circuit with captain dome light; and circuit breaker popping in-flight. The maintenance actions that were performed were: instrument panel was inspected; could not see anything suspicious; replaced a bulb in the captain dome light; and signed the aircraft to be airworthy. The captain inspected the map light and flipped it up to discover on the right side of it a bare wire. The map light has 2 wires going to the bulb; the one on the left had 2 levels of protective housing; one black and beneath it directly in contact with the wire a white one. On the right side; though; the 2 protective housings were damaged and we could see the bare wire. This bare wire was at close proximity to a metal piece. This did not appear to be safe and the captain requested for a mechanic to come to the aircraft to inspect it and give us his expertise. 2 mechanics showed up and after showing them the wire one of them said that it was nothing to be concerned about; that the bare wire on the right side could not touch any metal due to the fact that there is an o-ring. The captain asked him what was going to happen if it touched the metal piece we were pointing out and he said that it might pop the circuit breaker and stop the short. The captain asked the mechanic if he thought it was safe for us to take this aircraft at night overwater with a risk of short circuit; and he then contradicted himself saying that there will be no short; that even now the bare wire could come in contact with the metal piece and nothing would happen. The captain did it and nothing happened. The mechanic then called maintenance control in a frustrated tone and told them; in spanish; that he had been talking with the captain for 5 mins; that the aircraft was ok to go; and no reason for the crew to be holding the flight. Not fair for the mechanic to blame the crew for 'holding' the flight when there is a legitimate concern about flying an aircraft at night; over the middle of the ocean with the possibility of a short occurring in the cockpit; which had happened already. He decided there was no corrective maintenance action to be done to protect the wire and left the aircraft. The captain told what had happened to the flight attendants and one of them decided; due to the fact that the aircraft had this problem twice before and came back; and the wire was still showing; that he was neither comfortable nor felt safe to fly in that specific aircraft. He called scheduling and removed himself from the flight. The flight was canceled. The event occurred as a result of the aircraft having been written up for sparks and smoke in the cockpit coming from wires leading to the map light on the captain's yoke. Crew believed wire needed insulation and mechanics said the wire was insulated. The mechanics also said that a circuit breaker would pop out if the wire came in contact with metal but then they said that it would not because it was insulated. This after the crew expressing their concern of having this happen in-flight in the middle of the ocean. Flight attendant; very understandably; did not feel safe with the contradictory opinions of the mechanics. We feel that this needs to be addressed. The attitude of the mechanic was not the best accusing the crew of holding the flight for a silly wire; as he so put it. The concern was legitimate and all they had to do was put another layer of insulation as it was on all the other 3 wires (including the first officer's yoke). When a maintenance issue arises and there is a concern about the safety of the flight by the crew; maintenance center should always take the safest course of action. We think that isolating the wire would have been the safer course of action. Instead the mechanic was pushing us to go with an aircraft that; from his point of view was; airworthy. With the recent history of this aircraft that day coming back after takeoff twice for sparks; smell of smoke and popped circuit breaker; it is certainly not safe to try to fly again at night overwater. Also; when a crew hasrefused an aircraft because of a maintenance issue; the company should have a procedure in place in the flight release to advise the next crew of the reasons why the aircraft was refused. Many times the new crew can only read the aml (logbook) and does not have a complete picture from what happened during the flight where the write-up occurred. Crews should be able to know that the preceding crew refused to take that specific aircraft and why.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ATR72-212 CAPTAIN RAISES CONCERNS ABOUT PREVIOUS LOG WRITE-UPS FOR SPARKS; SMELL OF SMOKE; SHORT CIRCUIT OF DOME LIGHT AND CIRCUIT BREAKER POPPING IN-FLIGHT.

Narrative: I WAS THE FO OF FLT X TO ZZZ. THE CAPT NOTICED THAT THIS ACFT HAD 2 SIMILAR ENTRIES ON THE LOGBOOK ON THE SAME DAY TALKING ABOUT SPARKS NEXT TO THE CAPT MAP LIGHT; SMELL OF SMOKE; SHORT CIRCUIT WITH CAPT DOME LIGHT; AND CIRCUIT BREAKER POPPING INFLT. THE MAINT ACTIONS THAT WERE PERFORMED WERE: INST PANEL WAS INSPECTED; COULD NOT SEE ANYTHING SUSPICIOUS; REPLACED A BULB IN THE CAPT DOME LIGHT; AND SIGNED THE ACFT TO BE AIRWORTHY. THE CAPT INSPECTED THE MAP LIGHT AND FLIPPED IT UP TO DISCOVER ON THE R SIDE OF IT A BARE WIRE. THE MAP LIGHT HAS 2 WIRES GOING TO THE BULB; THE ONE ON THE L HAD 2 LEVELS OF PROTECTIVE HOUSING; ONE BLACK AND BENEATH IT DIRECTLY IN CONTACT WITH THE WIRE A WHITE ONE. ON THE R SIDE; THOUGH; THE 2 PROTECTIVE HOUSINGS WERE DAMAGED AND WE COULD SEE THE BARE WIRE. THIS BARE WIRE WAS AT CLOSE PROX TO A METAL PIECE. THIS DID NOT APPEAR TO BE SAFE AND THE CAPT REQUESTED FOR A MECH TO COME TO THE ACFT TO INSPECT IT AND GIVE US HIS EXPERTISE. 2 MECHS SHOWED UP AND AFTER SHOWING THEM THE WIRE ONE OF THEM SAID THAT IT WAS NOTHING TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT; THAT THE BARE WIRE ON THE R SIDE COULD NOT TOUCH ANY METAL DUE TO THE FACT THAT THERE IS AN O-RING. THE CAPT ASKED HIM WHAT WAS GOING TO HAPPEN IF IT TOUCHED THE METAL PIECE WE WERE POINTING OUT AND HE SAID THAT IT MIGHT POP THE CIRCUIT BREAKER AND STOP THE SHORT. THE CAPT ASKED THE MECH IF HE THOUGHT IT WAS SAFE FOR US TO TAKE THIS ACFT AT NIGHT OVERWATER WITH A RISK OF SHORT CIRCUIT; AND HE THEN CONTRADICTED HIMSELF SAYING THAT THERE WILL BE NO SHORT; THAT EVEN NOW THE BARE WIRE COULD COME IN CONTACT WITH THE METAL PIECE AND NOTHING WOULD HAPPEN. THE CAPT DID IT AND NOTHING HAPPENED. THE MECH THEN CALLED MAINT CTL IN A FRUSTRATED TONE AND TOLD THEM; IN SPANISH; THAT HE HAD BEEN TALKING WITH THE CAPT FOR 5 MINS; THAT THE ACFT WAS OK TO GO; AND NO REASON FOR THE CREW TO BE HOLDING THE FLT. NOT FAIR FOR THE MECH TO BLAME THE CREW FOR 'HOLDING' THE FLT WHEN THERE IS A LEGITIMATE CONCERN ABOUT FLYING AN ACFT AT NIGHT; OVER THE MIDDLE OF THE OCEAN WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF A SHORT OCCURRING IN THE COCKPIT; WHICH HAD HAPPENED ALREADY. HE DECIDED THERE WAS NO CORRECTIVE MAINT ACTION TO BE DONE TO PROTECT THE WIRE AND LEFT THE ACFT. THE CAPT TOLD WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO THE FLT ATTENDANTS AND ONE OF THEM DECIDED; DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE ACFT HAD THIS PROB TWICE BEFORE AND CAME BACK; AND THE WIRE WAS STILL SHOWING; THAT HE WAS NEITHER COMFORTABLE NOR FELT SAFE TO FLY IN THAT SPECIFIC ACFT. HE CALLED SCHEDULING AND REMOVED HIMSELF FROM THE FLT. THE FLT WAS CANCELED. THE EVENT OCCURRED AS A RESULT OF THE ACFT HAVING BEEN WRITTEN UP FOR SPARKS AND SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT COMING FROM WIRES LEADING TO THE MAP LIGHT ON THE CAPT'S YOKE. CREW BELIEVED WIRE NEEDED INSULATION AND MECHS SAID THE WIRE WAS INSULATED. THE MECHS ALSO SAID THAT A CIRCUIT BREAKER WOULD POP OUT IF THE WIRE CAME IN CONTACT WITH METAL BUT THEN THEY SAID THAT IT WOULD NOT BECAUSE IT WAS INSULATED. THIS AFTER THE CREW EXPRESSING THEIR CONCERN OF HAVING THIS HAPPEN INFLT IN THE MIDDLE OF THE OCEAN. FLT ATTENDANT; VERY UNDERSTANDABLY; DID NOT FEEL SAFE WITH THE CONTRADICTORY OPINIONS OF THE MECHS. WE FEEL THAT THIS NEEDS TO BE ADDRESSED. THE ATTITUDE OF THE MECH WAS NOT THE BEST ACCUSING THE CREW OF HOLDING THE FLT FOR A SILLY WIRE; AS HE SO PUT IT. THE CONCERN WAS LEGITIMATE AND ALL THEY HAD TO DO WAS PUT ANOTHER LAYER OF INSULATION AS IT WAS ON ALL THE OTHER 3 WIRES (INCLUDING THE FO'S YOKE). WHEN A MAINT ISSUE ARISES AND THERE IS A CONCERN ABOUT THE SAFETY OF THE FLT BY THE CREW; MAINT CTR SHOULD ALWAYS TAKE THE SAFEST COURSE OF ACTION. WE THINK THAT ISOLATING THE WIRE WOULD HAVE BEEN THE SAFER COURSE OF ACTION. INSTEAD THE MECH WAS PUSHING US TO GO WITH AN ACFT THAT; FROM HIS POINT OF VIEW WAS; AIRWORTHY. WITH THE RECENT HISTORY OF THIS ACFT THAT DAY COMING BACK AFTER TKOF TWICE FOR SPARKS; SMELL OF SMOKE AND POPPED CIRCUIT BREAKER; IT IS CERTAINLY NOT SAFE TO TRY TO FLY AGAIN AT NIGHT OVERWATER. ALSO; WHEN A CREW HASREFUSED AN ACFT BECAUSE OF A MAINT ISSUE; THE COMPANY SHOULD HAVE A PROC IN PLACE IN THE FLT RELEASE TO ADVISE THE NEXT CREW OF THE REASONS WHY THE ACFT WAS REFUSED. MANY TIMES THE NEW CREW CAN ONLY READ THE AML (LOGBOOK) AND DOES NOT HAVE A COMPLETE PICTURE FROM WHAT HAPPENED DURING THE FLT WHERE THE WRITE-UP OCCURRED. CREWS SHOULD BE ABLE TO KNOW THAT THE PRECEDING CREW REFUSED TO TAKE THAT SPECIFIC ACFT AND WHY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.