Narrative:

During climb after departure from ZZZZ; flight attendant #4 called the flight deck to advise that the right engine appeared to be wobbling or moving around more than it should. The captain sent the relief officer to investigate and the relief officer reported back with excessive lateral movement of the right engine; left engine was solid -- not moving at all. WX was smooth during climb. Moments later; we leveled off and the captain went to take a look. Power setting was considerably less and he observed a small amount of engine movement. The relief officer was adamant that something was wrong with the engine or the pylon mounting. The relief officer and I were very concerned that continuing on to ZZZ would create a possible unsafe situation. The relief officer and myself advised the captain continually that we felt a diversion was necessary as we are not mechanics and not qualified to determine the reliability of the engine as we were about to enter the ETOPS portion of our flight. The captain listened and thanked us for our input and advised we would continue to destination. Dispatch and maintenance were notified. Through ACARS (via dispatch); technician gave us a possible cause and maintenance recommended not to use reverse thrust upon landing; so as not to stress the engine mountings further. During cruise; the engine movement was minimal to non-existent. During descent into ZZZ; right engine wobble started again and continued throughout the descent until landing. A maintenance discrepancy was written up in the logbook upon arrival. Having previously been a captain; I understand the provisions of flight manual part I; reference the captain's ultimate authority/authorized; along with the responsibility of the first officer to continually advise the captain of any situation detrimental to the safety of the flight. The relief officer and I fully complied with our responsibility in part I. The purpose of this report is not to question captain's authority/authorized in any fashion. Although I am concerned that due to the recent economic downturn within our company or other unknown reasons; the most conservative course of action is not always being taken. For quite a while we have been taught there is no mission. I think as a flight department; we need to re-emphasize this. Had the lateral movement caused an engine failure or more significantly the separation of the engine from the aircraft; the outcome would have been very different. I do not believe we took the safest; most conservative action; and I was in complete disagreement with the decision to continue to ZZZ the entire flight; as was the relief officer. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated that the high pressure fuel pump on the engine accessory drive pad was out of balance. When an out of balance condition becomes severe the engine can move on the pylon in ways it was not intended to do. In his opinion a diversion would have been justified. This maintenance event became a CRM issue and he would have dealt with it differently.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767-300 FO REPORTS AN APPARENTLY LOOSE ENG MOUNT ALLOWING EXCESSIVE LATERAL ENG MOVEMENT. THE CAPT WOULD NOT DIVERT TO INSPECT ACFT.

Narrative: DURING CLB AFTER DEP FROM ZZZZ; FLT ATTENDANT #4 CALLED THE FLT DECK TO ADVISE THAT THE R ENG APPEARED TO BE WOBBLING OR MOVING AROUND MORE THAN IT SHOULD. THE CAPT SENT THE RELIEF OFFICER TO INVESTIGATE AND THE RELIEF OFFICER RPTED BACK WITH EXCESSIVE LATERAL MOVEMENT OF THE R ENG; L ENG WAS SOLID -- NOT MOVING AT ALL. WX WAS SMOOTH DURING CLB. MOMENTS LATER; WE LEVELED OFF AND THE CAPT WENT TO TAKE A LOOK. PWR SETTING WAS CONSIDERABLY LESS AND HE OBSERVED A SMALL AMOUNT OF ENG MOVEMENT. THE RELIEF OFFICER WAS ADAMANT THAT SOMETHING WAS WRONG WITH THE ENG OR THE PYLON MOUNTING. THE RELIEF OFFICER AND I WERE VERY CONCERNED THAT CONTINUING ON TO ZZZ WOULD CREATE A POSSIBLE UNSAFE SITUATION. THE RELIEF OFFICER AND MYSELF ADVISED THE CAPT CONTINUALLY THAT WE FELT A DIVERSION WAS NECESSARY AS WE ARE NOT MECHS AND NOT QUALIFIED TO DETERMINE THE RELIABILITY OF THE ENG AS WE WERE ABOUT TO ENTER THE ETOPS PORTION OF OUR FLT. THE CAPT LISTENED AND THANKED US FOR OUR INPUT AND ADVISED WE WOULD CONTINUE TO DEST. DISPATCH AND MAINT WERE NOTIFIED. THROUGH ACARS (VIA DISPATCH); TECHNICIAN GAVE US A POSSIBLE CAUSE AND MAINT RECOMMENDED NOT TO USE REVERSE THRUST UPON LNDG; SO AS NOT TO STRESS THE ENG MOUNTINGS FURTHER. DURING CRUISE; THE ENG MOVEMENT WAS MINIMAL TO NON-EXISTENT. DURING DSCNT INTO ZZZ; R ENG WOBBLE STARTED AGAIN AND CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE DSCNT UNTIL LNDG. A MAINT DISCREPANCY WAS WRITTEN UP IN THE LOGBOOK UPON ARR. HAVING PREVIOUSLY BEEN A CAPT; I UNDERSTAND THE PROVISIONS OF FLT MANUAL PART I; REF THE CAPT'S ULTIMATE AUTH; ALONG WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FO TO CONTINUALLY ADVISE THE CAPT OF ANY SITUATION DETRIMENTAL TO THE SAFETY OF THE FLT. THE RELIEF OFFICER AND I FULLY COMPLIED WITH OUR RESPONSIBILITY IN PART I. THE PURPOSE OF THIS RPT IS NOT TO QUESTION CAPT'S AUTH IN ANY FASHION. ALTHOUGH I AM CONCERNED THAT DUE TO THE RECENT ECONOMIC DOWNTURN WITHIN OUR COMPANY OR OTHER UNKNOWN REASONS; THE MOST CONSERVATIVE COURSE OF ACTION IS NOT ALWAYS BEING TAKEN. FOR QUITE A WHILE WE HAVE BEEN TAUGHT THERE IS NO MISSION. I THINK AS A FLT DEPT; WE NEED TO RE-EMPHASIZE THIS. HAD THE LATERAL MOVEMENT CAUSED AN ENG FAILURE OR MORE SIGNIFICANTLY THE SEPARATION OF THE ENG FROM THE ACFT; THE OUTCOME WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY DIFFERENT. I DO NOT BELIEVE WE TOOK THE SAFEST; MOST CONSERVATIVE ACTION; AND I WAS IN COMPLETE DISAGREEMENT WITH THE DECISION TO CONTINUE TO ZZZ THE ENTIRE FLT; AS WAS THE RELIEF OFFICER. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE REPORTER STATED THAT THE HIGH PRESSURE FUEL PUMP ON THE ENG ACCESSORY DRIVE PAD WAS OUT OF BALANCE. WHEN AN OUT OF BALANCE CONDITION BECOMES SEVERE THE ENG CAN MOVE ON THE PYLON IN WAYS IT WAS NOT INTENDED TO DO. IN HIS OPINION A DIVERSION WOULD HAVE BEEN JUSTIFIED. THIS MAINTENANCE EVENT BECAME A CRM ISSUE AND HE WOULD HAVE DEALT WITH IT DIFFERENTLY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.