Narrative:

On jun/xa/07; I was conducting the third leg of an initial captain IOE. On arrival at ZZZ flight operations to prepare for flight; I had the occasion to casually run into a captain who mentioned that he had just turned down an aircraft for maintenance related issues. He volunteered a brief synopsis of the issue. My student; an initial captain and I then proceeded to obtain dispatch paperwork for our flight. After reviewing the fpf; maintenance documents and WX; I quite comfortably electronically signed dispatch release-01 for that segment on aircraft Y. At that point; the aircraft status and pertinent operational issues seemed quite normal. We departed flight operations for our aircraft that was ostensibly parked at gate. Upon arrival at the gate; we were almost instantly queried by the gate agent about whether the maintenance issues associated with our aircraft had been sufficiently resolved. She asked if she could begin passenger boarding. The tenor of her concern was disconcerting. I learned from her that our aircraft had been rejected by X that was previously scheduled to operate that airplane. As it turns out; the captain had concluded that the aircraft did not meet operational safety standards required for his intended overwater flight. I asked that boarding not commence until I ascertained what was going on. I was initially alarmed and perplexed by the thought that I was not aware of this critical information. I wondered how I had not noticed this in our papers. Upon closer inspection however; it became apparent that the aircraft at the gate was other than the one for which I had signed. The aircraft at our gate was not tail number Y. Instead; it was aircraft X. Despite the fact that I had signed my release within the previous 15 mins; now there was a different aircraft at the gate! At some previous time; a decision had been made to swap the aircraft. It seemed that the determination had been made well before I signed my release. As we approached; already the full complement of passenger was assembled and supervisors were attempting to choreograph boarding activities. There was instant pressure for me to blindly accept the new aircraft and load passenger. Supervisors and personnel from customer service weighed in with their sense of urgency and desire to board passenger. The principal gate agent went as far as to hand me a cell telephone so that I could explain to zone control my decision to delay the boarding process while I sorted out the questionable maintenance status of the aircraft -- the jetbridge phone was broken. I explained my concerns to the zone controller and also asked him to tell me what he knew about the aircraft history. I asked very directly and unambiguously whether the aircraft had been refused by the previous captain for engine problems. The controller was evasive and seemed irritated by my questions. Instead of being frank; he insisted that 'qualified mechanics' had deferred the maintenance issues. As far as he was concerned; the aircraft was legal to fly -- that I should take it as is. Apparently my captain's judgement was irrelevant. At this point I was not satisfied with my understanding of the true maintenance status of the plane. I further feel that I was being pressured to dismiss my experienced concerns; be cooperative and fly the aircraft. I felt that I was being expected to overlook my captain/lca's responsibility to the safety and integrity of our flight operations. In order to avoid further pressures from the present constituencies; I returned to flight operations so that I could contact both maintenance and dispatch personnel directly and calmly seek more candid disclosures. After talking with maintenance I discovered that one of the aircraft engines had experienced 4 overheat conditions in excess of 645 degrees C within the previous 6 days. The maintenance controller told me that the history called for the aircraft engine to be replaced. I learned that the latest engine overheat had occurred on the inbound leg and that beyond deferral; no physical maintenance had been performed. After my discussion with maintenance; felt that the circumstances surrounding the last min unannounced aircraft change may not have been so inadvertent. The local pressure to accept an aircraft without review of its significant maintenance discrepancies; the non-disclosures and lack of zone controller candor were suspicious and completely unacceptable. I therefore contacted and spoke to the duty flight manager and carefully detailed what had transpired. He seemed to understand my perspectives and appreciated that something was seriously amiss. In our conversation; I discovered from him that the aircraft was also scheduled to subsequently fly from ZZZ1 to ZZZ2. At ZZZ1 only the shorter runway was operational. The high OAT and short runway performance realities would certainly require a full thrust takeoff. The questionable engine maintenance had; in my view; the potential to also negatively impact that flight segment. My conversations with the flight manager therefore solidified my ultimate decision to refuse to fly the aircraft. He stated that he respected my judgements. I was left with the impression that he understood that my decision ultimately rested with my interest in safety. He asked that I submit a report to document what had transpired. To my dismay; as we later taxied past aircraft X; it was being preflight inspected by another possibly unsuspecting crew. I hope that we have not operationally descended to pushing crews into badly maintained aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 FLT CREW SIGNED PAPERWORK FOR A FLT; ONLY TO DISCOVER THAT A DIFFERENT ACFT WAS AT THEIR ASSIGNED GATE. THIS ACFT HAD CHRONIC ENG PROBLEMS AND ALTHOUGH THE FLT CREW WAS PRESSURED TO FLY THIS ACFT; THEY REFUSED AFTER DISCUSSING THE ISSUE WITH MAINT.

Narrative: ON JUN/XA/07; I WAS CONDUCTING THE THIRD LEG OF AN INITIAL CAPT IOE. ON ARR AT ZZZ FLT OPS TO PREPARE FOR FLT; I HAD THE OCCASION TO CASUALLY RUN INTO A CAPT WHO MENTIONED THAT HE HAD JUST TURNED DOWN AN ACFT FOR MAINT RELATED ISSUES. HE VOLUNTEERED A BRIEF SYNOPSIS OF THE ISSUE. MY STUDENT; AN INITIAL CAPT AND I THEN PROCEEDED TO OBTAIN DISPATCH PAPERWORK FOR OUR FLT. AFTER REVIEWING THE FPF; MAINT DOCUMENTS AND WX; I QUITE COMFORTABLY ELECTRONICALLY SIGNED DISPATCH RELEASE-01 FOR THAT SEGMENT ON ACFT Y. AT THAT POINT; THE ACFT STATUS AND PERTINENT OPERATIONAL ISSUES SEEMED QUITE NORMAL. WE DEPARTED FLT OPS FOR OUR ACFT THAT WAS OSTENSIBLY PARKED AT GATE. UPON ARR AT THE GATE; WE WERE ALMOST INSTANTLY QUERIED BY THE GATE AGENT ABOUT WHETHER THE MAINT ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH OUR ACFT HAD BEEN SUFFICIENTLY RESOLVED. SHE ASKED IF SHE COULD BEGIN PAX BOARDING. THE TENOR OF HER CONCERN WAS DISCONCERTING. I LEARNED FROM HER THAT OUR ACFT HAD BEEN REJECTED BY X THAT WAS PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED TO OPERATE THAT AIRPLANE. AS IT TURNS OUT; THE CAPT HAD CONCLUDED THAT THE ACFT DID NOT MEET OPERATIONAL SAFETY STANDARDS REQUIRED FOR HIS INTENDED OVERWATER FLT. I ASKED THAT BOARDING NOT COMMENCE UNTIL I ASCERTAINED WHAT WAS GOING ON. I WAS INITIALLY ALARMED AND PERPLEXED BY THE THOUGHT THAT I WAS NOT AWARE OF THIS CRITICAL INFO. I WONDERED HOW I HAD NOT NOTICED THIS IN OUR PAPERS. UPON CLOSER INSPECTION HOWEVER; IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE ACFT AT THE GATE WAS OTHER THAN THE ONE FOR WHICH I HAD SIGNED. THE ACFT AT OUR GATE WAS NOT TAIL NUMBER Y. INSTEAD; IT WAS ACFT X. DESPITE THE FACT THAT I HAD SIGNED MY RELEASE WITHIN THE PREVIOUS 15 MINS; NOW THERE WAS A DIFFERENT ACFT AT THE GATE! AT SOME PREVIOUS TIME; A DECISION HAD BEEN MADE TO SWAP THE ACFT. IT SEEMED THAT THE DETERMINATION HAD BEEN MADE WELL BEFORE I SIGNED MY RELEASE. AS WE APCHED; ALREADY THE FULL COMPLEMENT OF PAX WAS ASSEMBLED AND SUPVRS WERE ATTEMPTING TO CHOREOGRAPH BOARDING ACTIVITIES. THERE WAS INSTANT PRESSURE FOR ME TO BLINDLY ACCEPT THE NEW ACFT AND LOAD PAX. SUPVRS AND PERSONNEL FROM CUSTOMER SVC WEIGHED IN WITH THEIR SENSE OF URGENCY AND DESIRE TO BOARD PAX. THE PRINCIPAL GATE AGENT WENT AS FAR AS TO HAND ME A CELL TELEPHONE SO THAT I COULD EXPLAIN TO ZONE CTL MY DECISION TO DELAY THE BOARDING PROCESS WHILE I SORTED OUT THE QUESTIONABLE MAINT STATUS OF THE ACFT -- THE JETBRIDGE PHONE WAS BROKEN. I EXPLAINED MY CONCERNS TO THE ZONE CTLR AND ALSO ASKED HIM TO TELL ME WHAT HE KNEW ABOUT THE ACFT HISTORY. I ASKED VERY DIRECTLY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY WHETHER THE ACFT HAD BEEN REFUSED BY THE PREVIOUS CAPT FOR ENG PROBS. THE CTLR WAS EVASIVE AND SEEMED IRRITATED BY MY QUESTIONS. INSTEAD OF BEING FRANK; HE INSISTED THAT 'QUALIFIED MECHS' HAD DEFERRED THE MAINT ISSUES. AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED; THE ACFT WAS LEGAL TO FLY -- THAT I SHOULD TAKE IT AS IS. APPARENTLY MY CAPT'S JUDGEMENT WAS IRRELEVANT. AT THIS POINT I WAS NOT SATISFIED WITH MY UNDERSTANDING OF THE TRUE MAINT STATUS OF THE PLANE. I FURTHER FEEL THAT I WAS BEING PRESSURED TO DISMISS MY EXPERIENCED CONCERNS; BE COOPERATIVE AND FLY THE ACFT. I FELT THAT I WAS BEING EXPECTED TO OVERLOOK MY CAPT/LCA'S RESPONSIBILITY TO THE SAFETY AND INTEGRITY OF OUR FLT OPS. IN ORDER TO AVOID FURTHER PRESSURES FROM THE PRESENT CONSTITUENCIES; I RETURNED TO FLT OPS SO THAT I COULD CONTACT BOTH MAINT AND DISPATCH PERSONNEL DIRECTLY AND CALMLY SEEK MORE CANDID DISCLOSURES. AFTER TALKING WITH MAINT I DISCOVERED THAT ONE OF THE ACFT ENGS HAD EXPERIENCED 4 OVERHEAT CONDITIONS IN EXCESS OF 645 DEGS C WITHIN THE PREVIOUS 6 DAYS. THE MAINT CTLR TOLD ME THAT THE HISTORY CALLED FOR THE ACFT ENG TO BE REPLACED. I LEARNED THAT THE LATEST ENG OVERHEAT HAD OCCURRED ON THE INBOUND LEG AND THAT BEYOND DEFERRAL; NO PHYSICAL MAINT HAD BEEN PERFORMED. AFTER MY DISCUSSION WITH MAINT; FELT THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE LAST MIN UNANNOUNCED ACFT CHANGE MAY NOT HAVE BEEN SO INADVERTENT. THE LCL PRESSURE TO ACCEPT AN ACFT WITHOUT REVIEW OF ITS SIGNIFICANT MAINT DISCREPANCIES; THE NON-DISCLOSURES AND LACK OF ZONE CTLR CANDOR WERE SUSPICIOUS AND COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE. I THEREFORE CONTACTED AND SPOKE TO THE DUTY FLT MGR AND CAREFULLY DETAILED WHAT HAD TRANSPIRED. HE SEEMED TO UNDERSTAND MY PERSPECTIVES AND APPRECIATED THAT SOMETHING WAS SERIOUSLY AMISS. IN OUR CONVERSATION; I DISCOVERED FROM HIM THAT THE ACFT WAS ALSO SCHEDULED TO SUBSEQUENTLY FLY FROM ZZZ1 TO ZZZ2. AT ZZZ1 ONLY THE SHORTER RWY WAS OPERATIONAL. THE HIGH OAT AND SHORT RWY PERFORMANCE REALITIES WOULD CERTAINLY REQUIRE A FULL THRUST TKOF. THE QUESTIONABLE ENG MAINT HAD; IN MY VIEW; THE POTENTIAL TO ALSO NEGATIVELY IMPACT THAT FLT SEGMENT. MY CONVERSATIONS WITH THE FLT MGR THEREFORE SOLIDIFIED MY ULTIMATE DECISION TO REFUSE TO FLY THE ACFT. HE STATED THAT HE RESPECTED MY JUDGEMENTS. I WAS LEFT WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT MY DECISION ULTIMATELY RESTED WITH MY INTEREST IN SAFETY. HE ASKED THAT I SUBMIT A RPT TO DOCUMENT WHAT HAD TRANSPIRED. TO MY DISMAY; AS WE LATER TAXIED PAST ACFT X; IT WAS BEING PREFLT INSPECTED BY ANOTHER POSSIBLY UNSUSPECTING CREW. I HOPE THAT WE HAVE NOT OPERATIONALLY DESCENDED TO PUSHING CREWS INTO BADLY MAINTAINED ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.