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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 744213 |
Time | |
Date | 200706 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B737-700 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : parked ground : pushback ground : preflight |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
ASRS Report | 744213 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight attendant : on duty |
Events | |
Anomaly | other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : overcame equipment problem other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Cabin Crew Human Performance Aircraft |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Narrative:
When the forward entry door was shut by the flight attendant; it did not properly seal. There is no way for the flight crew to be aware of the improperly shut door until after takeoff. The flight attendants have no way of knowing that the door was improperly shut. The only person who could catch the error prior to takeoff is the operations agent in the jetway. In our case; he did; and prevented an unpressurized takeoff and air turn back. The operations agent is the only one who can catch the potential error. Could it be incorporated into their duties to verify that the door was properly shut? The flight attendant shut the forward entry door. It was hard to shut like a B-300; not easy to shut like a B-700. But it was shut. The cockpit indication for the door was not illuminated. The operations agent in the jetway advised the push back crew.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A B737-700 ACFT FWD ENTRY DOOR DID NOT SEAL PROPERLY AFTER FLT ATTENDANT CLOSED DOOR. JETWAY OPS AGENT NOTICED DOOR AND STOPPED PUSHBACK; THEREBY PREVENTING UNPRESSURIZED TAKE OFF.
Narrative: WHEN THE FORWARD ENTRY DOOR WAS SHUT BY THE FLT ATTENDANT; IT DID NOT PROPERLY SEAL. THERE IS NO WAY FOR THE FLT CREW TO BE AWARE OF THE IMPROPERLY SHUT DOOR UNTIL AFTER TKOF. THE FLT ATTENDANTS HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING THAT THE DOOR WAS IMPROPERLY SHUT. THE ONLY PERSON WHO COULD CATCH THE ERROR PRIOR TO TKOF IS THE OPS AGENT IN THE JETWAY. IN OUR CASE; HE DID; AND PREVENTED AN UNPRESSURIZED TKOF AND AIR TURN BACK. THE OPS AGENT IS THE ONLY ONE WHO CAN CATCH THE POTENTIAL ERROR. COULD IT BE INCORPORATED INTO THEIR DUTIES TO VERIFY THAT THE DOOR WAS PROPERLY SHUT? THE FLT ATTENDANT SHUT THE FORWARD ENTRY DOOR. IT WAS HARD TO SHUT LIKE A B-300; NOT EASY TO SHUT LIKE A B-700. BUT IT WAS SHUT. THE COCKPIT INDICATION FOR THE DOOR WAS NOT ILLUMINATED. THE OPS AGENT IN THE JETWAY ADVISED THE PUSH BACK CREW.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.