Narrative:

We pushed back from our gate at lga 10 mins early; all checklists and preparations completed. Our taxi out was relatively short for lga (we were about #6 in line for takeoff). While taxiing to runway 31 (#5 for departure); we were told to call clearance for a rerte. We did so; and were given a full route change. We quickly updated our FMS data; but I asked my first officer to contact dispatch to make sure our fuel load was adequate for the rerte; air carrier company procedures. Meanwhile; we moved up to #1 for the runway. I called the dispatcher on my cell phone to try to get a quicker answer; but it was not quick enough. We asked lga tower for extra time to confirm with our dispatcher; but we were told to taxi right on taxiway Z and back around on taxiway a to hold short of taxiway V and report ready. As soon as we had the brakes set; our dispatcher confirmed that we had enough fuel for the rerte. We called ready and got back in line and performed a rolling takeoff (first officer flying) due to traffic on a 3 mi final for runway 22. So far; a very hectic but otherwise 'normal' (for lga) departure. After contacting departure control; we were given clearance to climb to 12000 ft and a vector to the west. We were given another heading change; followed by a frequency change. After changing frequencys; we were given a clearance to col VOR direct white (col was not on our flight plan; so it was not loaded into the FMS). When I entered col into the FMS; 5 possible choices came up. I mumbled something about 'this must be the one.' while confirming the entry on the FMS; I heard the altitude deviation warning; and looked up to see that we had overshot our altitude by about 300 ft (that was the maximum deviation). Right after that; nyc departure told us to maintain 12000 ft as we were returning to our assigned altitude. We did so; and the rest of the flight proceeded normally. Apparently; my first officer had been distraction by my 'mumbling' about the col VOR choices and had looked over to his SID chart to help me out just before leveloff. Fortunately; the autothrottle was engaged; so we didn't go blasting up any farther through the altitude. I was absorbed trying to comply with the rapid succession of clrncs being issued while updating the FMS and heading and altitude bugs; as well as a frequency change. Clearly; I was task-saturated and unable to back up my first officer with altitude awareness (I think he probably sensed that; and that is why he was trying to help me). Altogether; it added up to a very stressful lga departure. It's interesting to note that some yrs ago we had a very similar scenario in the simulator (the departure airport was lga) during recurrent training. The idea was to overload us to the point where we would deviate from our clearance. I don't think that it was a coincidence that they chose lga for this scenario. Contributing factors include the accumulated stress from the whole rerte and rolling takeoff situation. We have a flight crew at our base that is being pursued by the FAA (certificate action) for taking off after a rerte without checking with dispatch first for adequate fuel (the exact same issue). Even though I was certain we had enough fuel for the rerte; we did not desire to repeat the same mistake. Also contributing was the fact that it was the first leg of the trip; as well as the fact that we had each gotten up early for the drive from our respective homes to the airport (fatigue).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 FLT CREW OVERSHOT ALT ON DEP WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY LOADING ROUTE CHANGE INTO FMS.

Narrative: WE PUSHED BACK FROM OUR GATE AT LGA 10 MINS EARLY; ALL CHKLISTS AND PREPARATIONS COMPLETED. OUR TAXI OUT WAS RELATIVELY SHORT FOR LGA (WE WERE ABOUT #6 IN LINE FOR TKOF). WHILE TAXIING TO RWY 31 (#5 FOR DEP); WE WERE TOLD TO CALL CLRNC FOR A RERTE. WE DID SO; AND WERE GIVEN A FULL RTE CHANGE. WE QUICKLY UPDATED OUR FMS DATA; BUT I ASKED MY FO TO CONTACT DISPATCH TO MAKE SURE OUR FUEL LOAD WAS ADEQUATE FOR THE RERTE; ACR COMPANY PROCS. MEANWHILE; WE MOVED UP TO #1 FOR THE RWY. I CALLED THE DISPATCHER ON MY CELL PHONE TO TRY TO GET A QUICKER ANSWER; BUT IT WAS NOT QUICK ENOUGH. WE ASKED LGA TWR FOR EXTRA TIME TO CONFIRM WITH OUR DISPATCHER; BUT WE WERE TOLD TO TAXI R ON TXWY Z AND BACK AROUND ON TXWY A TO HOLD SHORT OF TXWY V AND RPT READY. AS SOON AS WE HAD THE BRAKES SET; OUR DISPATCHER CONFIRMED THAT WE HAD ENOUGH FUEL FOR THE RERTE. WE CALLED READY AND GOT BACK IN LINE AND PERFORMED A ROLLING TKOF (FO FLYING) DUE TO TFC ON A 3 MI FINAL FOR RWY 22. SO FAR; A VERY HECTIC BUT OTHERWISE 'NORMAL' (FOR LGA) DEP. AFTER CONTACTING DEP CTL; WE WERE GIVEN CLRNC TO CLB TO 12000 FT AND A VECTOR TO THE W. WE WERE GIVEN ANOTHER HDG CHANGE; FOLLOWED BY A FREQ CHANGE. AFTER CHANGING FREQS; WE WERE GIVEN A CLRNC TO COL VOR DIRECT WHITE (COL WAS NOT ON OUR FLT PLAN; SO IT WAS NOT LOADED INTO THE FMS). WHEN I ENTERED COL INTO THE FMS; 5 POSSIBLE CHOICES CAME UP. I MUMBLED SOMETHING ABOUT 'THIS MUST BE THE ONE.' WHILE CONFIRMING THE ENTRY ON THE FMS; I HEARD THE ALTDEV WARNING; AND LOOKED UP TO SEE THAT WE HAD OVERSHOT OUR ALT BY ABOUT 300 FT (THAT WAS THE MAX DEV). RIGHT AFTER THAT; NYC DEP TOLD US TO MAINTAIN 12000 FT AS WE WERE RETURNING TO OUR ASSIGNED ALT. WE DID SO; AND THE REST OF THE FLT PROCEEDED NORMALLY. APPARENTLY; MY FO HAD BEEN DISTR BY MY 'MUMBLING' ABOUT THE COL VOR CHOICES AND HAD LOOKED OVER TO HIS SID CHART TO HELP ME OUT JUST BEFORE LEVELOFF. FORTUNATELY; THE AUTOTHROTTLE WAS ENGAGED; SO WE DIDN'T GO BLASTING UP ANY FARTHER THROUGH THE ALT. I WAS ABSORBED TRYING TO COMPLY WITH THE RAPID SUCCESSION OF CLRNCS BEING ISSUED WHILE UPDATING THE FMS AND HDG AND ALT BUGS; AS WELL AS A FREQ CHANGE. CLRLY; I WAS TASK-SATURATED AND UNABLE TO BACK UP MY FO WITH ALT AWARENESS (I THINK HE PROBABLY SENSED THAT; AND THAT IS WHY HE WAS TRYING TO HELP ME). ALTOGETHER; IT ADDED UP TO A VERY STRESSFUL LGA DEP. IT'S INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT SOME YRS AGO WE HAD A VERY SIMILAR SCENARIO IN THE SIMULATOR (THE DEP ARPT WAS LGA) DURING RECURRENT TRAINING. THE IDEA WAS TO OVERLOAD US TO THE POINT WHERE WE WOULD DEVIATE FROM OUR CLRNC. I DON'T THINK THAT IT WAS A COINCIDENCE THAT THEY CHOSE LGA FOR THIS SCENARIO. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDE THE ACCUMULATED STRESS FROM THE WHOLE RERTE AND ROLLING TKOF SITUATION. WE HAVE A FLT CREW AT OUR BASE THAT IS BEING PURSUED BY THE FAA (CERTIFICATE ACTION) FOR TAKING OFF AFTER A RERTE WITHOUT CHKING WITH DISPATCH FIRST FOR ADEQUATE FUEL (THE EXACT SAME ISSUE). EVEN THOUGH I WAS CERTAIN WE HAD ENOUGH FUEL FOR THE RERTE; WE DID NOT DESIRE TO REPEAT THE SAME MISTAKE. ALSO CONTRIBUTING WAS THE FACT THAT IT WAS THE FIRST LEG OF THE TRIP; AS WELL AS THE FACT THAT WE HAD EACH GOTTEN UP EARLY FOR THE DRIVE FROM OUR RESPECTIVE HOMES TO THE ARPT (FATIGUE).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.