Narrative:

Ground operations were normal minus delays for service equipment breaking down (belt loader); pushback; taxi went normal. Takeoff was planned runway 4L; de-rate 1.33 EPR; flaps 5 degrees; takeoff weight 289000 pounds. Climbing through FL310; VFR; we felt a slight shudder; followed by a high-pitched vibration running full length of aircraft. It was more pronounced through the body of the aircraft than the flight controls; yoke and rudder pedals. Flight attendants called and reported slight vibration; which seemed to be coming from overwing exits. All engine instruments normal and within limits with the left #1 engine showing a slightly elevated egt; +60 degrees and the vibration gauge reading 1.8 - 2.2. The captain used the 'call me' function and dispatch came up with maintenance. We discussed what the possibilities could be of our airframe vibration and our plan of action in case the condition was to worsen. In the meantime we were gathering WX data for possible divert fields en route to ZZZ1. Those being ZZZ2; ZZZ3; ZZZ4; along our route of flight. We hung up the call with dispatch and maintenance and proceeded towards ZZZ1. Not long after that; we had just past the point between ZZZ and ZZZ1 when the vibration gauge started increasing from 3.2 to 3.6. We turned off the autothrottles again and retarded the throttle to idle to see if that made a difference. Idle seemed to settle the vibrations down; but the high frequency vibration was not affected by the throttle being brought to idle. Still; all engine instruments were well within parameters. We were contemplating a precautionary flaps 20 degree approach and landing; with then #1 engine at idle power. We started the APU as a back-up in case the engine quit or we were going to be forced to shut down the engine. We also pulled out checklist to review in the case a catastrophic failure occurred. Another call to dispatch and maintenance. Maintenance came back with a possibility that our spinner might be delaminating. He needed a visual check. The captain sent me back to compare the left and right engine. After inspecting both engines; I found no difference in appearance. I also went to the business class galley area to get a sense of the vibration and it was much more pronounced than the vibration we were feeling in the cockpit -- which I reported to the captain on my return to the cockpit. Maintenance remained on frequency; as did dispatch during this check. We were given a descent to FL290. It was during this descent the airframe vibration increased; as did the engine vibration gauge. It was also at that time we got our first status message; '#1 engine fire loop inoperative.' we all agreed that a controled engine shutdown was necessary. We were now passing FL260; with a tailwind and 40 NM past ZZZ4. I secured the engine via the checklist. A drift-down was not necessary as we received clearance to FL190 and the eo altitude was FL260 at a left/D maximum of 235 KTS. The captain working with dispatch; chief pilot; maintenance and myself the first officer pulled the WX for ZZZ1 and all agreed that ZZZ1 would be a suitable divert in point and time. We declared an emergency and gave ATC all the appropriate information required and received priority handling. The captain called back and issued a cabin advisory and spoke to the passenger. We left downwind for runway and some minor WX avoidance. Approach and landing were as briefed with flaps 20 degrees; autobrakes 2 degrees; gross weight 274000 pounds. Crash equipment was standing by and met us; chocked us; and then checked to ensure that we were safe to taxi to the gate -- which we did so; uneventfully. In my opinion; the captain performed flawlessly -- at all times calm; assertive; in control; making the right decisions; and keeping everybody in the loop. It is a true pleasure to have people of his ability and caliber to work with when the chips are down.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767-300 EXPERIENCED ENG VIBRATION AND HIGH EGT CRUISING AT FL310. AFTER VIBRATION INCREASED THE CREW SHUT THE ENG DOWN; DECLARED AN EMER; AND LANDED.

Narrative: GND OPS WERE NORMAL MINUS DELAYS FOR SVC EQUIP BREAKING DOWN (BELT LOADER); PUSHBACK; TAXI WENT NORMAL. TKOF WAS PLANNED RWY 4L; DE-RATE 1.33 EPR; FLAPS 5 DEGS; TKOF WT 289000 LBS. CLBING THROUGH FL310; VFR; WE FELT A SLIGHT SHUDDER; FOLLOWED BY A HIGH-PITCHED VIBRATION RUNNING FULL LENGTH OF ACFT. IT WAS MORE PRONOUNCED THROUGH THE BODY OF THE ACFT THAN THE FLT CTLS; YOKE AND RUDDER PEDALS. FLT ATTENDANTS CALLED AND RPTED SLIGHT VIBRATION; WHICH SEEMED TO BE COMING FROM OVERWING EXITS. ALL ENG INSTS NORMAL AND WITHIN LIMITS WITH THE L #1 ENG SHOWING A SLIGHTLY ELEVATED EGT; +60 DEGS AND THE VIBRATION GAUGE READING 1.8 - 2.2. THE CAPT USED THE 'CALL ME' FUNCTION AND DISPATCH CAME UP WITH MAINT. WE DISCUSSED WHAT THE POSSIBILITIES COULD BE OF OUR AIRFRAME VIBRATION AND OUR PLAN OF ACTION IN CASE THE CONDITION WAS TO WORSEN. IN THE MEANTIME WE WERE GATHERING WX DATA FOR POSSIBLE DIVERT FIELDS ENRTE TO ZZZ1. THOSE BEING ZZZ2; ZZZ3; ZZZ4; ALONG OUR RTE OF FLT. WE HUNG UP THE CALL WITH DISPATCH AND MAINT AND PROCEEDED TOWARDS ZZZ1. NOT LONG AFTER THAT; WE HAD JUST PAST THE POINT BTWN ZZZ AND ZZZ1 WHEN THE VIBRATION GAUGE STARTED INCREASING FROM 3.2 TO 3.6. WE TURNED OFF THE AUTOTHROTTLES AGAIN AND RETARDED THE THROTTLE TO IDLE TO SEE IF THAT MADE A DIFFERENCE. IDLE SEEMED TO SETTLE THE VIBRATIONS DOWN; BUT THE HIGH FREQ VIBRATION WAS NOT AFFECTED BY THE THROTTLE BEING BROUGHT TO IDLE. STILL; ALL ENG INSTS WERE WELL WITHIN PARAMETERS. WE WERE CONTEMPLATING A PRECAUTIONARY FLAPS 20 DEG APCH AND LNDG; WITH THEN #1 ENG AT IDLE PWR. WE STARTED THE APU AS A BACK-UP IN CASE THE ENG QUIT OR WE WERE GOING TO BE FORCED TO SHUT DOWN THE ENG. WE ALSO PULLED OUT CHKLIST TO REVIEW IN THE CASE A CATASTROPHIC FAILURE OCCURRED. ANOTHER CALL TO DISPATCH AND MAINT. MAINT CAME BACK WITH A POSSIBILITY THAT OUR SPINNER MIGHT BE DELAMINATING. HE NEEDED A VISUAL CHK. THE CAPT SENT ME BACK TO COMPARE THE L AND R ENG. AFTER INSPECTING BOTH ENGS; I FOUND NO DIFFERENCE IN APPEARANCE. I ALSO WENT TO THE BUSINESS CLASS GALLEY AREA TO GET A SENSE OF THE VIBRATION AND IT WAS MUCH MORE PRONOUNCED THAN THE VIBRATION WE WERE FEELING IN THE COCKPIT -- WHICH I RPTED TO THE CAPT ON MY RETURN TO THE COCKPIT. MAINT REMAINED ON FREQ; AS DID DISPATCH DURING THIS CHK. WE WERE GIVEN A DSCNT TO FL290. IT WAS DURING THIS DSCNT THE AIRFRAME VIBRATION INCREASED; AS DID THE ENG VIBRATION GAUGE. IT WAS ALSO AT THAT TIME WE GOT OUR FIRST STATUS MESSAGE; '#1 ENG FIRE LOOP INOP.' WE ALL AGREED THAT A CTLED ENG SHUTDOWN WAS NECESSARY. WE WERE NOW PASSING FL260; WITH A TAILWIND AND 40 NM PAST ZZZ4. I SECURED THE ENG VIA THE CHKLIST. A DRIFT-DOWN WAS NOT NECESSARY AS WE RECEIVED CLRNC TO FL190 AND THE EO ALT WAS FL260 AT A L/D MAX OF 235 KTS. THE CAPT WORKING WITH DISPATCH; CHIEF PLT; MAINT AND MYSELF THE FO PULLED THE WX FOR ZZZ1 AND ALL AGREED THAT ZZZ1 WOULD BE A SUITABLE DIVERT IN POINT AND TIME. WE DECLARED AN EMER AND GAVE ATC ALL THE APPROPRIATE INFO REQUIRED AND RECEIVED PRIORITY HANDLING. THE CAPT CALLED BACK AND ISSUED A CABIN ADVISORY AND SPOKE TO THE PAX. WE LEFT DOWNWIND FOR RWY AND SOME MINOR WX AVOIDANCE. APCH AND LNDG WERE AS BRIEFED WITH FLAPS 20 DEGS; AUTOBRAKES 2 DEGS; GROSS WT 274000 LBS. CRASH EQUIP WAS STANDING BY AND MET US; CHOCKED US; AND THEN CHKED TO ENSURE THAT WE WERE SAFE TO TAXI TO THE GATE -- WHICH WE DID SO; UNEVENTFULLY. IN MY OPINION; THE CAPT PERFORMED FLAWLESSLY -- AT ALL TIMES CALM; ASSERTIVE; IN CTL; MAKING THE RIGHT DECISIONS; AND KEEPING EVERYBODY IN THE LOOP. IT IS A TRUE PLEASURE TO HAVE PEOPLE OF HIS ABILITY AND CALIBER TO WORK WITH WHEN THE CHIPS ARE DOWN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.