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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 746221 |
Time | |
Date | 200707 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : ege.airport |
State Reference | CO |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : ege.tower |
Operator | general aviation : corporate |
Make Model Name | Citation Excel |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Navigation In Use | ils localizer only : 25 |
Flight Phase | descent : approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : ege.tower |
Operator | general aviation : personal |
Make Model Name | Other |
Flight Phase | cruise : level |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : charter |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : multi engine pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 120 flight time total : 3100 flight time type : 225 |
ASRS Report | 746221 |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : airborne critical non adherence : clearance |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment : tcas other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued new clearance flight crew : took evasive action flight crew : executed go around |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 200 vertical : 500 |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance ATC Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Narrative:
We were flying the ege localizer runway 25 approach into ege. The WX at the time was VMC; we were under a layer of broken cumulus. Ege tower asked us to report an 8 mi final. Prior to reaching the 8 mi final our TCAS reported traffic then gave an RA to climb. My captain began to initiate a climb; then the RA changed to 'monitor descent/traffic;' so his climb only developed as far as leveling off instead. Simultaneously; I visually acquired the conflicting traffic and advised that we were passing over the top of him at that point. (The conflicting traffic passed below us by 400-500 ft according to our TCAS; from front left to rear right. It was a canard aircraft.) during all of this; we passed and missed the 8 mi final approach call-in to tower. We continued the approach since we judged at that time that we had not deviated far enough from the normal approach altitudes to necessitate a missed approach. Unfortunately; in the confusion and adrenaline rush of missing the other aircraft we both failed to notice that we had not called in to ege tower at the 8 mi final. Upon reaching our 500 ft AGL callout; and running my normal 'down and locked; runway is clear; cleared-to-land' check; I realized we had forgotten the call-in and had not received a landing clearance yet. I called tower; apologized and stated we had missed the required call in at 8 mi; and that we were on short final. The tower controller stated; 'that is unacceptable. The runway is not clear.' I called out for the go around; so the captain aborted the approach and we executed a go around at that time; without touching down. At the tower controller's direction we performed a normal traffic pattern and returned for landing. Ege is performing some runway construction and had construction vehicles near the runway environment. Though the controller later stated there were vehicles on the runway; that was not quite accurate. Moot point; as we still should not have gotten him or us into that situation; but the runway was clear while we were on short final; as well as when we over-flew it during the go around. In hindsight; we both realized that even though we had not deviated from normal altitudes during the step-down portion of the approach; it would have been much more appropriate to execute a missed approach after the TCAS RA. We allowed ourselves to be distraction by it; understandably and appropriately; but we did not then give ourselves an appropriate chance to recover mentally from the RA. As a result of our not doing so; we missed the call-in to the tower; we almost landed without a landing clearance; and we created the potential for what could have been a disastrous conflict and/or crash with construction equipment on the ground had we not remembered at the last moment and given the tower controller enough time to officially clear the runway for us.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: CE560 FLT CREW RECEIVES TCAS RA DURING LDA 25 TO EGE AND FORGETS TO CALL TWR AT 8 DME AS REQUESTED. GO AROUND ENSUES.
Narrative: WE WERE FLYING THE EGE LOC RWY 25 APCH INTO EGE. THE WX AT THE TIME WAS VMC; WE WERE UNDER A LAYER OF BROKEN CUMULUS. EGE TWR ASKED US TO RPT AN 8 MI FINAL. PRIOR TO REACHING THE 8 MI FINAL OUR TCAS RPTED TFC THEN GAVE AN RA TO CLB. MY CAPT BEGAN TO INITIATE A CLB; THEN THE RA CHANGED TO 'MONITOR DSCNT/TFC;' SO HIS CLB ONLY DEVELOPED AS FAR AS LEVELING OFF INSTEAD. SIMULTANEOUSLY; I VISUALLY ACQUIRED THE CONFLICTING TFC AND ADVISED THAT WE WERE PASSING OVER THE TOP OF HIM AT THAT POINT. (THE CONFLICTING TFC PASSED BELOW US BY 400-500 FT ACCORDING TO OUR TCAS; FROM FRONT L TO REAR R. IT WAS A CANARD ACFT.) DURING ALL OF THIS; WE PASSED AND MISSED THE 8 MI FINAL APCH CALL-IN TO TWR. WE CONTINUED THE APCH SINCE WE JUDGED AT THAT TIME THAT WE HAD NOT DEVIATED FAR ENOUGH FROM THE NORMAL APCH ALTS TO NECESSITATE A MISSED APCH. UNFORTUNATELY; IN THE CONFUSION AND ADRENALINE RUSH OF MISSING THE OTHER ACFT WE BOTH FAILED TO NOTICE THAT WE HAD NOT CALLED IN TO EGE TWR AT THE 8 MI FINAL. UPON REACHING OUR 500 FT AGL CALLOUT; AND RUNNING MY NORMAL 'DOWN AND LOCKED; RWY IS CLR; CLRED-TO-LAND' CHK; I REALIZED WE HAD FORGOTTEN THE CALL-IN AND HAD NOT RECEIVED A LNDG CLRNC YET. I CALLED TWR; APOLOGIZED AND STATED WE HAD MISSED THE REQUIRED CALL IN AT 8 MI; AND THAT WE WERE ON SHORT FINAL. THE TWR CTLR STATED; 'THAT IS UNACCEPTABLE. THE RWY IS NOT CLR.' I CALLED OUT FOR THE GAR; SO THE CAPT ABORTED THE APCH AND WE EXECUTED A GAR AT THAT TIME; WITHOUT TOUCHING DOWN. AT THE TWR CTLR'S DIRECTION WE PERFORMED A NORMAL TFC PATTERN AND RETURNED FOR LNDG. EGE IS PERFORMING SOME RWY CONSTRUCTION AND HAD CONSTRUCTION VEHICLES NEAR THE RWY ENVIRONMENT. THOUGH THE CTLR LATER STATED THERE WERE VEHICLES ON THE RWY; THAT WAS NOT QUITE ACCURATE. MOOT POINT; AS WE STILL SHOULD NOT HAVE GOTTEN HIM OR US INTO THAT SITUATION; BUT THE RWY WAS CLR WHILE WE WERE ON SHORT FINAL; AS WELL AS WHEN WE OVER-FLEW IT DURING THE GAR. IN HINDSIGHT; WE BOTH REALIZED THAT EVEN THOUGH WE HAD NOT DEVIATED FROM NORMAL ALTS DURING THE STEP-DOWN PORTION OF THE APCH; IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH MORE APPROPRIATE TO EXECUTE A MISSED APCH AFTER THE TCAS RA. WE ALLOWED OURSELVES TO BE DISTR BY IT; UNDERSTANDABLY AND APPROPRIATELY; BUT WE DID NOT THEN GIVE OURSELVES AN APPROPRIATE CHANCE TO RECOVER MENTALLY FROM THE RA. AS A RESULT OF OUR NOT DOING SO; WE MISSED THE CALL-IN TO THE TWR; WE ALMOST LANDED WITHOUT A LNDG CLRNC; AND WE CREATED THE POTENTIAL FOR WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN A DISASTROUS CONFLICT AND/OR CRASH WITH CONSTRUCTION EQUIP ON THE GND HAD WE NOT REMEMBERED AT THE LAST MOMENT AND GIVEN THE TWR CTLR ENOUGH TIME TO OFFICIALLY CLR THE RWY FOR US.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.