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Attributes | |
ACN | 746815 |
Time | |
Date | 200707 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Altitude | msl single value : 13000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : zzz.tracon tower : zzz.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | climbout : intermediate altitude |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 249 flight time total : 10000 flight time type : 7039 |
ASRS Report | 746815 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : multi engine pilot : instrument pilot : flight engineer pilot : atp pilot : commercial |
Experience | flight time total : 2500 |
ASRS Report | 748459 |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical other anomaly |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued new clearance flight crew : declared emergency flight crew : landed in emergency condition |
Consequence | other other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Aircraft |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Narrative:
During climb out from ZZZ; my FMC failed. I had no display and the fail light was illuminated on the side of the unit. Shortly thereafter; I felt the cockpit temperature rising; but thought the temperature controller for the cockpit just needed to be adjusted to a cooler setting. Once stable in climb on the departure; I engaged the right autoplt. I adjusted the cabin temperature controller to a cooler setting and then turned my attention to my failed FMC. We had just gotten the QRH out to reference the procedures for FMC failure when the captain remarked he thought he smelled something. I too began to smell something but thought it might be related to the elevated cockpit temperature. Almost immediately the captain announced he saw smoke. I looked down and saw smoke rising in front of my instruments. We both donned our oxygen masks and established communications with each other. I was the PF; so the captain declared an emergency with ATC and announced our intention to return to ZZZ. He then notified the flight attendants and passenger of our intention to return to ZZZ. I flew the airplane and communicated with ATC. Fortunately the WX was clear with good visibility so a visual approach could be flown. We used the ILS approach as a backup. The captain was busy working on the smoke and fumes checklist. I needed to build a little buffer for the approach because we were at approximately 13000 ft MSL but only 10 mi or so from the airfield. In coordination with ATC I made a descending left 360 degree turn to achieve a normal glidepath. I configured the aircraft for landing and we were on final approach when the captain completed his checklists. The smoke began to dissipate and we made an overweight (approximately 220000 pounds; maximum landing weight 198000 pounds) but otherwise normal landing on runway 25R and stopped straight ahead. Fire/rescue surrounded the airplane but confirmed no outside problems. We felt it was safe to taxi the airplane to the gate with fire/rescue escort. Maintenance determined that the failed; right FMC had indeed been the source of the smoke. The flight was canceled and the pilot crew deadheaded to ZZZ1 (our intended destination). Although this event was successfully handled; a few lessons were learned for me: 1) the smoke goggle/face mask system worked as designed and is a big improvement over the old mask system with separate goggles. Still; visibility through the plastic goggles requires getting used to. 2) the interphone panel volumes need to be continually adjusted to accommodate when one needs to hear through the cockpit speaker at any given time. If the volumes are not adjusted; ATC xmissions get blocked by interphone xmissions and vice versa through the pilot's speaker. 3) flying the airplane is still #1 priority. The captain had his hands completely full coordinating with the cabin and running checklists. The PF has to plan the arrival and my configuring the aircraft at the appropriate time freed him to continue fighting the smoke. The pilot accomplishing the smoke and fumes checklist along with the other checklists is totally immersed in those duties given the compressed time from declaring the emergency to landing (well under 10 mins). 4) locating specific circuit breakers for components is not an easy task. First; specific breaker locations are published in the fault reporting manual; a large; bulky book which is useful for routine maintenance fault reporting but does not lend itself to quick reference in a time-compressed emergency. A circuit breaker list in the QRH would be very helpful to quickly locating circuit breaker locations. Second; access to some of these circuit breakers on the overhead panel requires a pilot to un-strap; and the length of the oxygen hose makes reaching some breakers a challenge without removing the mask. The PF is of limited help here (see #3). 5) even after the smoke dissipates; residual odor is still present. We were cautious that this did not mask a recurrence of the problem as we taxied to the gate.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B757 FLT CREW EXPERIENCES FMC FAILURE SHORTLY AFTER TKOF; FOLLOWED BY SMOKE. FLT CREW DONS OXYGEN MASKS; DECLARE AN EMERGENCY; AND RETURN TO THE DEPARTURE ARPT.
Narrative: DURING CLBOUT FROM ZZZ; MY FMC FAILED. I HAD NO DISPLAY AND THE FAIL LIGHT WAS ILLUMINATED ON THE SIDE OF THE UNIT. SHORTLY THEREAFTER; I FELT THE COCKPIT TEMP RISING; BUT THOUGHT THE TEMP CTLR FOR THE COCKPIT JUST NEEDED TO BE ADJUSTED TO A COOLER SETTING. ONCE STABLE IN CLB ON THE DEP; I ENGAGED THE R AUTOPLT. I ADJUSTED THE CABIN TEMP CTLR TO A COOLER SETTING AND THEN TURNED MY ATTN TO MY FAILED FMC. WE HAD JUST GOTTEN THE QRH OUT TO REF THE PROCS FOR FMC FAILURE WHEN THE CAPT REMARKED HE THOUGHT HE SMELLED SOMETHING. I TOO BEGAN TO SMELL SOMETHING BUT THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE RELATED TO THE ELEVATED COCKPIT TEMP. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY THE CAPT ANNOUNCED HE SAW SMOKE. I LOOKED DOWN AND SAW SMOKE RISING IN FRONT OF MY INSTS. WE BOTH DONNED OUR OXYGEN MASKS AND ESTABLISHED COMS WITH EACH OTHER. I WAS THE PF; SO THE CAPT DECLARED AN EMER WITH ATC AND ANNOUNCED OUR INTENTION TO RETURN TO ZZZ. HE THEN NOTIFIED THE FLT ATTENDANTS AND PAX OF OUR INTENTION TO RETURN TO ZZZ. I FLEW THE AIRPLANE AND COMMUNICATED WITH ATC. FORTUNATELY THE WX WAS CLR WITH GOOD VISIBILITY SO A VISUAL APCH COULD BE FLOWN. WE USED THE ILS APCH AS A BACKUP. THE CAPT WAS BUSY WORKING ON THE SMOKE AND FUMES CHKLIST. I NEEDED TO BUILD A LITTLE BUFFER FOR THE APCH BECAUSE WE WERE AT APPROX 13000 FT MSL BUT ONLY 10 MI OR SO FROM THE AIRFIELD. IN COORD WITH ATC I MADE A DSNDING L 360 DEG TURN TO ACHIEVE A NORMAL GLIDEPATH. I CONFIGURED THE ACFT FOR LNDG AND WE WERE ON FINAL APCH WHEN THE CAPT COMPLETED HIS CHKLISTS. THE SMOKE BEGAN TO DISSIPATE AND WE MADE AN OVERWT (APPROX 220000 LBS; MAX LNDG WT 198000 LBS) BUT OTHERWISE NORMAL LNDG ON RWY 25R AND STOPPED STRAIGHT AHEAD. FIRE/RESCUE SURROUNDED THE AIRPLANE BUT CONFIRMED NO OUTSIDE PROBS. WE FELT IT WAS SAFE TO TAXI THE AIRPLANE TO THE GATE WITH FIRE/RESCUE ESCORT. MAINT DETERMINED THAT THE FAILED; R FMC HAD INDEED BEEN THE SOURCE OF THE SMOKE. THE FLT WAS CANCELED AND THE PLT CREW DEADHEADED TO ZZZ1 (OUR INTENDED DEST). ALTHOUGH THIS EVENT WAS SUCCESSFULLY HANDLED; A FEW LESSONS WERE LEARNED FOR ME: 1) THE SMOKE GOGGLE/FACE MASK SYS WORKED AS DESIGNED AND IS A BIG IMPROVEMENT OVER THE OLD MASK SYS WITH SEPARATE GOGGLES. STILL; VISIBILITY THROUGH THE PLASTIC GOGGLES REQUIRES GETTING USED TO. 2) THE INTERPHONE PANEL VOLUMES NEED TO BE CONTINUALLY ADJUSTED TO ACCOMMODATE WHEN ONE NEEDS TO HEAR THROUGH THE COCKPIT SPEAKER AT ANY GIVEN TIME. IF THE VOLUMES ARE NOT ADJUSTED; ATC XMISSIONS GET BLOCKED BY INTERPHONE XMISSIONS AND VICE VERSA THROUGH THE PLT'S SPEAKER. 3) FLYING THE AIRPLANE IS STILL #1 PRIORITY. THE CAPT HAD HIS HANDS COMPLETELY FULL COORDINATING WITH THE CABIN AND RUNNING CHKLISTS. THE PF HAS TO PLAN THE ARR AND MY CONFIGURING THE ACFT AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME FREED HIM TO CONTINUE FIGHTING THE SMOKE. THE PLT ACCOMPLISHING THE SMOKE AND FUMES CHKLIST ALONG WITH THE OTHER CHKLISTS IS TOTALLY IMMERSED IN THOSE DUTIES GIVEN THE COMPRESSED TIME FROM DECLARING THE EMER TO LNDG (WELL UNDER 10 MINS). 4) LOCATING SPECIFIC CIRCUIT BREAKERS FOR COMPONENTS IS NOT AN EASY TASK. FIRST; SPECIFIC BREAKER LOCATIONS ARE PUBLISHED IN THE FAULT RPTING MANUAL; A LARGE; BULKY BOOK WHICH IS USEFUL FOR ROUTINE MAINT FAULT RPTING BUT DOES NOT LEND ITSELF TO QUICK REF IN A TIME-COMPRESSED EMER. A CIRCUIT BREAKER LIST IN THE QRH WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL TO QUICKLY LOCATING CIRCUIT BREAKER LOCATIONS. SECOND; ACCESS TO SOME OF THESE CIRCUIT BREAKERS ON THE OVERHEAD PANEL REQUIRES A PLT TO UN-STRAP; AND THE LENGTH OF THE OXYGEN HOSE MAKES REACHING SOME BREAKERS A CHALLENGE WITHOUT REMOVING THE MASK. THE PF IS OF LIMITED HELP HERE (SEE #3). 5) EVEN AFTER THE SMOKE DISSIPATES; RESIDUAL ODOR IS STILL PRESENT. WE WERE CAUTIOUS THAT THIS DID NOT MASK A RECURRENCE OF THE PROB AS WE TAXIED TO THE GATE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.