Narrative:

The gate agents were ready to push when the captain got to the aircraft. The captain was flying for the first day as an ffdo. He was having difficulties unlocking his weapon and getting it holstered. The tug operator was calling on the radio and the captain was trying to reply to him while trying to manage the weapon. I of course was trying to avoid the pointy end of the weapon. Needless to say our normal routine and timing were disrupted. The captain who normally does check the legs with me was distraction. I made efforts to assist; but my routine was also interrupted. Therefore; I did not catch my input error on the FMC legs page. At the gate in smf I made an input error while loading the FMC. I missed J7. En route; just passing fra; center asked if we were beginning our turn to J7 yet. I looked down and noticed J7 had not been entered. I entered J7 immediately and replied yes we are starting our turn now. The controller then asked if we showed J7 in our clearance. I said yes we did. He replied ok; then cleared direct reberg them fim. I replied. He then handed us off to the next controller. This controller gave us a heading assignment of 165 degrees for a brief period then cleared us direct fim. My input error had us going fra-fim. The controller noticed immediately past fra we had not begun our turn to 165 degrees. His call was immediate. I commend him. After our communications with the controller and making our corrections; I did note my time and location and reviewed my error with the captain. We both discussed the events which led to the oversight. I can only speak for myself in this situation; although I make every attempt to adhere to all procedures and checks and xchks; this particular example just demonstrates how when new things are introduced such as the captain's new procedures as a new ffdo; normal routines can be interrupted to the point where things are missed. I will continue to notice that these are the times which require extra diligence. Furthermore; may I respectively suggest that if it is difficult to holster a weapon in the seat; that perhaps it would be safer to keep it in the flight bag area.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-700 FLT CREW FAILED TO PROPERLY LOAD ROUTE OF FLT INTO FMS. ATC OBSERVED THE NAVIGATION ERROR AND ISSUED NEW CLRNC.

Narrative: THE GATE AGENTS WERE READY TO PUSH WHEN THE CAPT GOT TO THE ACFT. THE CAPT WAS FLYING FOR THE FIRST DAY AS AN FFDO. HE WAS HAVING DIFFICULTIES UNLOCKING HIS WEAPON AND GETTING IT HOLSTERED. THE TUG OPERATOR WAS CALLING ON THE RADIO AND THE CAPT WAS TRYING TO REPLY TO HIM WHILE TRYING TO MANAGE THE WEAPON. I OF COURSE WAS TRYING TO AVOID THE POINTY END OF THE WEAPON. NEEDLESS TO SAY OUR NORMAL ROUTINE AND TIMING WERE DISRUPTED. THE CAPT WHO NORMALLY DOES CHK THE LEGS WITH ME WAS DISTR. I MADE EFFORTS TO ASSIST; BUT MY ROUTINE WAS ALSO INTERRUPTED. THEREFORE; I DID NOT CATCH MY INPUT ERROR ON THE FMC LEGS PAGE. AT THE GATE IN SMF I MADE AN INPUT ERROR WHILE LOADING THE FMC. I MISSED J7. ENRTE; JUST PASSING FRA; CTR ASKED IF WE WERE BEGINNING OUR TURN TO J7 YET. I LOOKED DOWN AND NOTICED J7 HAD NOT BEEN ENTERED. I ENTERED J7 IMMEDIATELY AND REPLIED YES WE ARE STARTING OUR TURN NOW. THE CTLR THEN ASKED IF WE SHOWED J7 IN OUR CLRNC. I SAID YES WE DID. HE REPLIED OK; THEN CLRED DIRECT REBERG THEM FIM. I REPLIED. HE THEN HANDED US OFF TO THE NEXT CTLR. THIS CTLR GAVE US A HDG ASSIGNMENT OF 165 DEGS FOR A BRIEF PERIOD THEN CLRED US DIRECT FIM. MY INPUT ERROR HAD US GOING FRA-FIM. THE CTLR NOTICED IMMEDIATELY PAST FRA WE HAD NOT BEGUN OUR TURN TO 165 DEGS. HIS CALL WAS IMMEDIATE. I COMMEND HIM. AFTER OUR COMS WITH THE CTLR AND MAKING OUR CORRECTIONS; I DID NOTE MY TIME AND LOCATION AND REVIEWED MY ERROR WITH THE CAPT. WE BOTH DISCUSSED THE EVENTS WHICH LED TO THE OVERSIGHT. I CAN ONLY SPEAK FOR MYSELF IN THIS SITUATION; ALTHOUGH I MAKE EVERY ATTEMPT TO ADHERE TO ALL PROCS AND CHKS AND XCHKS; THIS PARTICULAR EXAMPLE JUST DEMONSTRATES HOW WHEN NEW THINGS ARE INTRODUCED SUCH AS THE CAPT'S NEW PROCS AS A NEW FFDO; NORMAL ROUTINES CAN BE INTERRUPTED TO THE POINT WHERE THINGS ARE MISSED. I WILL CONTINUE TO NOTICE THAT THESE ARE THE TIMES WHICH REQUIRE EXTRA DILIGENCE. FURTHERMORE; MAY I RESPECTIVELY SUGGEST THAT IF IT IS DIFFICULT TO HOLSTER A WEAPON IN THE SEAT; THAT PERHAPS IT WOULD BE SAFER TO KEEP IT IN THE FLT BAG AREA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.