Narrative:

Contributing factors: 1) APU inoperative 2) computer generated no bleed takeoff with 13401 ft of runway with temperatures in 70's. Rejected takeoff due to captain's (L2) window opening. Executed approximately 35 KTS below V1. MEL (207) APU inoperative/un-pressurized takeoff. Briefed un-pressurized takeoff and specials including both sliding windows checked -- twice 1) at gate 2) taking the runway. First officer takeoff -- all normal until L2 window slammed open fully on the takeoff roll. I executed the 'reject' at approximately 130 KTS with most of the 13401 ft of runway still ahead of us. Shortly thereafter; I selected the automatic brakes to off. We were slowing rapidly 'back in the yellow' and in an effort to maximize the dynamic event of the rejected takeoff to both passenger and aircraft. We slowed to a stop; evaluated the situation; communicated with tower; cleared the runway and addressed the passenger and flight attendant. First officer referenced the QRH and we carefully taxied back to the gate; determining we were in the 'cooling zone red' of the chart. We alerted ground personnel of the potential hazard and eventually they plugged in power and air (no APU). I inspected the tires and brakes and found them hot; but not extreme. About 50 mins later the right main tires lost psi. Later; we learned there was also brake damage due to the heat. We were surprised of the damage considering the effort taken to minimize brake energy. We stayed with the aircraft for the repairs to be made while passenger and flight attendants made other plans.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737 REJECTED A TKOF AFTER A COCKPIT WINDOW OPENED AT 130 KTS. ACFT RETURN TO THE GATE WHERE OVERHEATED BRAKES AND OTHER BRAKE DAMAGE WAS DISCOVERED.

Narrative: CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) APU INOP 2) COMPUTER GENERATED NO BLEED TAKEOFF WITH 13401 FT OF RWY WITH TEMPS IN 70'S. REJECTED TAKEOFF DUE TO CAPT'S (L2) WINDOW OPENING. EXECUTED APPROX 35 KTS BELOW V1. MEL (207) APU INOP/UN-PRESSURIZED TAKEOFF. BRIEFED UN-PRESSURIZED TAKEOFF AND SPECIALS INCLUDING BOTH SLIDING WINDOWS CHKED -- TWICE 1) AT GATE 2) TAKING THE RWY. FO TAKEOFF -- ALL NORMAL UNTIL L2 WINDOW SLAMMED OPEN FULLY ON THE TAKEOFF ROLL. I EXECUTED THE 'REJECT' AT APPROX 130 KTS WITH MOST OF THE 13401 FT OF RWY STILL AHEAD OF US. SHORTLY THEREAFTER; I SELECTED THE AUTO BRAKES TO OFF. WE WERE SLOWING RAPIDLY 'BACK IN THE YELLOW' AND IN AN EFFORT TO MAXIMIZE THE DYNAMIC EVENT OF THE RTO TO BOTH PAX AND ACFT. WE SLOWED TO A STOP; EVALUATED THE SITUATION; COMMUNICATED WITH TWR; CLRED THE RWY AND ADDRESSED THE PAX AND FLT ATTENDANT. FO REFERENCED THE QRH AND WE CAREFULLY TAXIED BACK TO THE GATE; DETERMINING WE WERE IN THE 'COOLING ZONE RED' OF THE CHART. WE ALERTED GND PERSONNEL OF THE POTENTIAL HAZARD AND EVENTUALLY THEY PLUGGED IN POWER AND AIR (NO APU). I INSPECTED THE TIRES AND BRAKES AND FOUND THEM HOT; BUT NOT EXTREME. ABOUT 50 MINS LATER THE R MAIN TIRES LOST PSI. LATER; WE LEARNED THERE WAS ALSO BRAKE DAMAGE DUE TO THE HEAT. WE WERE SURPRISED OF THE DAMAGE CONSIDERING THE EFFORT TAKEN TO MINIMIZE BRAKE ENERGY. WE STAYED WITH THE ACFT FOR THE REPAIRS TO BE MADE WHILE PAX AND FLT ATTENDANTS MADE OTHER PLANS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.